Monday, June 3, 2013

THE SWORD OF ALLAH (PART4)

THE SWORD OF ALLAH (PART4)

 PART IV
THE CONQUEST OF SYRIA

27 : THE PERILOUS MARCH

                At Hira, in late May 634, Khalid opened the Caliph's letter and read:
                In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful. From the slave of Allah, Ateeq, son of Abu Quhafa,1 to Khalid, son of Al Waleed. Peace be upon you.
                I render praise unto Allah save whom there is no God, and invoke blessings on His Prophet, Muhammad, on whom be the blessings of Allah and peace.
                March until you reach the gathering of the Muslims in Syria, who are in a state of great anxiety …
                Khalid stopped reading, fearing that this meant demotion and that at last the pressure of Umar against him had borne fruit. And what bitter fruit! Khalid muttered, “This must be the work of that left-handed one. He is jealous of me for conquering Iraq.”2 But his fears turned to joy as he read on:
                I appoint you commander over the armies of the Muslims and direct you to fight the Romans. You shall be commander over Abu Ubeida and those with him.
                Go with speed and high purpose, O Father of Suleiman,

                1Although the Caliph is known to history as Abu Bakr, his actual name was Abdullah, and he had also been given the name of Ateeq by the Holy Prophet.
                        2Tabari: Vol. 2, p. 608.
302 The Sword of Allah

and complete your task with the help of Allah, exalted be He.
Be among those who strive for Allah.
                Divide your army into two and leave half with Musanna who shall be commander in Iraq. Let not more go with you than stay with him. After victory you shall return to Iraq and resume command.
                Let not pride enter your mind, for it will deceive and mislead you. And let there be no delay. Lo, to Allah belongs all bounty and He is the dispenser of rewards.1
                Thus was Khalid appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Muslim forces in Syria.2
                Khalid now set about the preparations for his march. He explained the instructions of the Caliph to Musanna, divided his army into two and handed over one half of it to Musanna. But in the division of the army, Khalid tried to keep all the Companions of the Prophet—the Emigres and the Ansars, men held in special esteem by the soldiers. To this Musanna objected vehemently. “ I insist on a total execution of Abu Bakr's orders”, he said. “I shall have half the Companions also, for it is by their presence that I hope to win victories.”3
                Khalid saw the justice of Musanna's claim. He revised the division to leave Musanna a satisfactory share of the Companions, particularly as these included many of the finest officers of the army. This done, Khalid was ready for the march to Syria.
                It was Abu Bakr's way to give his generals their mission, the geographical area in which that mission would be carried out, and the resources that could be made available for that purpose. He would then leave it to his generals to accomplish their mission in whatever manner they chose. This is how he had launched Khalid into Iraq, and this is how he was now launching Khalid into Syria. The mission given to Khalid was clear: he was to move with all speed to Syria, take command of the Muslim forces and fight the Romans until victory was achieved. What route Khalid should take to get to Syria was left to him, and

                1Ibid: Vol. 2, pp. 600, 605. Waqidi: Futuh, p. 14 (All references to Waqidi in the remainder of this book are from his Futuh-ush-Sham.)
                2Other versions of how Khalid assumed command in Syria suggest that he himself prevailed upon the other generals to let him command the army, or that the generals themselves appointed him commander on account of his military stature. These versions are not correct. Khalid was expressly appointed Commander-in-Chief in Syria by Caliph Abu Bakr.
                3Tabari:Vol.2, p.605.
The Perilous March 303

this was the most important immediate decision that Khalid had to take. The detailed locations of the Muslim forces in Syria were not known to him. He knew, however, that they were in the general area of Busra and Jabiya, and he had to get there fast.
There were two known routes available to Khalid for his march. The first was the southern route via Daumat-ul-Jandal whence the army could move along the normal caravan track into Syria. This was the easiest and simplest approach, with ample water on the way and no enemy to interfere with his move-ment. But it was also the longest route and the movement would take considerable time to complete. The Caliph had emphasised speed, as the situation of the Muslims was apparently serious. So after due consideration Khalid rejected this route.
The other route was the northern one along the Euphrates to North-Eastern Syria. This too was a well-travelled route, but it would take Khalid away from the Muslim armies, and Roman garrisons on the Euphrates would bar his way. He could, no doubt, overcome this opposition, but again there would be delay. He had to find another way of getting to the Muslim forces in Syria.
Khalid called a council of war and explained the situation to his officers. “How can we find a route to Syria”, he asked, “by which we avoid the front of the Romans? They will certainly try to prevent us from going to the aid of the Muslims.” His reference was to Roman garrisons along the northern route.
“We know of no way”, the officers replied, “that could take an army, though a single man might take such a route. Beware of leading the army astray!”1
But Khalid was determined to find a new route, and asked his question again. None responded except one noted warrior by the name of Rafe bin Umeira. Rafe explained that there was indeed a route through the Land of Samawa. The army could proceed from Hira to Quraqir via Ein-ut-Tamr and Muzayyah, and this would be an easy march. Quraqir was a well-watered oasis in the west of Iraq. Thence to Suwa there was a little known route which led through a barren, waterless desert. At Suwa again there was ample water, and one day's journey before Suwa there was a spring which he knew would provide sufficient water for the army. The most dangerous part of the journey was from
1Ibid: Vol. 2, p. 603.
304 The Sword of Allah

Quraqir to this spring, about 120 miles.
But Rafe cautioned: “You cannot take this route with an army. By Allah, even a lone traveller would attempt it at the peril of his life. It involves five days of extreme hardship without a drop of water and the ever-present danger of losing the way.”
The officers present nodded agreement. To take the army on such a route, where the entire force could get lost and die of thirst, was something that no man in his right senses would consider.
In a quiet voice Khalid said, “We shall take this route!” Seeing the look of alarm on the faces of his officers, he added, “Let not your resolve be weakened. Know that the help of Allah comes according to your deserts. Let not the Muslims fear anything so long as they have the help of Allah.”2
The effect of his words was instantaneous. With one voice his officers replied, “You are a man on whom Allah has bestowed His goodwill. Do as you wish.”3 And with cheerful enthusiasm the army of Khalid set about its preparations for the march to Syria on a route that no army had travelled before and which was known only to one man. Rafe bin Umeira. (See Map 15.)
In early June 634 (beginning of Rabi-ul-Akhir, 13 HiJri) Khalid marched from Hira with an army of 9,000 men.4 No women and children accompanied the army; they were left behind under Khalid's orders for despatch to Madina, where they would remain until it was convenient to have them moved to Syria. The army moved via Ein-ut-Tamr, Sandauda5 and
Muzayyah to Quraqir; and Musanna accompanied Khalid up
to here before returning to Hira to resume watch over the new
frontier with Persia. For the night the army camped at Quraqir
and filled its water skins and other containers with supplies of
water that were expected to last the men and animals five days.
Early next morning, as the perilous march was about to
1lbid: Vol. 2, p. 609.
2Ibid: Vol. 2, p. 603.
3Ibid: Vol. 2, p. 609.
4The strength of the force that took part in this march has been given variously as 500, 700, 800, 6,000 and 9,000; but the last figure is the correct one. It was the strength of half the army as ordered by Abu Bakr; and all the early writers in their accounts of the campaign in Syria, have said that the Muslim forces included 9,000 men who marched with Khalid from Iraq.
5Sandauda is the ruined Masheihad which ties a few miles east of the present Ramadi. (Musil, p. 299.)
MAP 15 : THE PERILOUS MARCH
306 The Sword ofAllah

start, Rafe again approached Khalid. He seemed uncertain of himself. “O Commander,” he pleaded “You cannot traverse this desert with an army. By Allah, even a lone traveller would attempt this journey only at the peril of his life.”
Khalid turned on him angrily. “Woe to you, 0 Rafe”, he said. “By Allah, if I knew of another route to get to Syria quickly I would take it. Proceed as ordered!”1
Rafe proceeded as ordered and led Khalid’s army of 9,000 men into the desert. As usual the men rode on camels, while the horses were led. It was the month of June when the sun beat mer­cilessly upon the sands of the desert, destroying all traces of life and daring man to set foot on the tortured, waterless waste. Sensible men would not do this—certainly not at this time of year; certainly not in such large numbers; and certainly not when the fate of the Muslims in Syria hung on their safe arrival. But the greatest glories of man have never been achieved by sensible men. These soldiers were not sensible men. They were the warriors of Khalid, the Sword of Allah, setting out to per­form one of the greatest feats of military movement in history.
The first three days passed uneventfully. The men were oppressed by the intense heat and glare, but they were inured to hardship and as long as there was water, all was well. But the water, which was meant to last five days, finished at the end of the third day. They had another two days' journey ahead of them with not a drop of water.2
Silently the column resumed the march on the fourth day. The heat now appeared to become more intense. There was no conversation on the march, for the men could think only of water and the horrors of getting lost in the desert and dying of thirst. They shuddered to think of what would happen if Rafe lost the way or was otherwise incapacitated. That night the men camped as usual, but there was no sleep. With the agony of fire in their throats and their tongues swollen in their mouths, they could only repeat in their minds the prayer: Suffi­cient for us is Allah, and what a good protector He is!3
On the fifth morning began the last stage of the march

1Tabari: Vol. 2, p. 609.
         2For the romantic legend of the camel carrying water in a pouch in its belly, as was supposedly done on this march, see Note 7 in Appendix B.
3Quran: 3-173.
The Perilous March 307
which would, by Allah's will, get them to the spring which Rafe knew. Mile after weary mile the column trudged in silence. Hour after painful hour the men struggled through sandy wastes, tortured by the pitiless glare and heat. The day's march was completed and the men still lived, though most of them had reached the limits of human endurance. The column was no longer a neat, orderly formation as it had been at the start of the march. Many of the warriors were straggling in the rear of the column, hoping against hope that they would not fall by the wayside.
As the head of the column reached the area where the spr­ing was supposed to be, Rafe the guide could no longer see. He had been suffering from opthalmia and the blinding glare of the sun had worsened the condition of his eyes. He now wrapped part of his turban over his eyes and halted his camel. The men following him were horrified to see this, and called to him pitiously, “0 Rafe! We are on the point of death. Have you not found the water?” But Rafe could no longer see. In a voice which was little more than a hoarse whisper, he said, “Look for two hillocks like the breasts of a woman.” The column moved on, and soon after the two hillocks were identified and the guide informed accordingly.
“Look for a thorn tree shaped like a man in a sitting posture”, ordered Rafe. A few scouts rode out to look for the tree, but returned a few minutes later to say that no such tree could be found.
“Lo! We belong to Allah and indeed to Him we shall re­turn”, said Rafe, quoting a Quranic verse. 'Then we all perish. But look once again,” The men looked again, and this time found the trunk of a thorn tree of which the remainder had vanished. “Dig under its roots”,1 instructed Rafe. The men dug under the roots, and, in the words of Waqidi, “water flowed out of the earth like a river!”2
The men drank their fill, all the while praising God and invoking His blessings on Rafe. Then the animals were watered, and there was still water to spare. Hundreds of men filled their water skins and set off back on the route which they had travel­led, looking for stragglers, of whom there were many. All were found and brought in alive.

1Tabari: Vol. 2, p. 609.       2Waqidi: p. 14.
308 The Sword of Allah
The perilous march was over. They had made it. It had never been done before, and would never be done again. Khalid had reached the border of Syria, leaving behind the Roman frontier and its garrisons facing Iraq. They were now only a day's march from Suwa, where the desert ended and habitation began. (See Map 15.)
Khalid had no doubt that he and his army had gone through hell and come very near annihilation. But the real ex­tent of the peril which they had faced was not known to him until Rafe, now smiling, came to him and said, “0 Commander, I have only alighted at this spring once, and that was 30 years ago, when as a boy I travelled hither with my father!'1
                                                            *
In later years a certain caliph wrote to an eminent scholar and asked him for a description of the lands under Muslim rule. The scholar wrote back and gave the required description. When he came to Syria, he said, “Know, O Commander of the Faithful, that Syria is a land of clouds and hills and winds and abundance upon abundance. It freshens the body and clears the skin, especially the land of Emessa, which beautifies the body and creates understanding and forbearance. Its waters are pure and sharpen the senses. Syria, O Commander of the Faithful, is a land of pleasant verdure and large forests. Its rivers run in the right courses, and in it camels have plenty to drink.”2
Indeed, Syria was a beautiful land—the fairest province of the Byzantine Empire. Its temperate climate, conditioned by the Mediterranean, provided relief from the heat of the desert and the cold of northern climes. Antioch, now in Turkey, was the capital of the Asian region of the Byzantine Empire, and se­cond only to Constantinople in glory and political importance. The great cities of Syria—Aleppo, Emessa, Damascus—not only contained immense commercial wealth, but were also seats of culture and civilisation. Its thriving ports on the Mediter­ranean—Latakia, Tripolis, Beirut, Tyre, Acre, Jaffa—saw ships of the entire known world and bustled with trade and com­merce.

1Tabari: Vol. 2, pp. 604, 609. For other versions of Khalid's
route, which are mistaken, see Note 9 in Appendix B.
2Masudi: Muruj, Vol. 2, pp. 61-2.
The Perilous March 309
Politically, the Syrian region consisted of two provinces. Syria proper stretched from Antioch and Aleppo in the north to the top of the Dead Sea. West and south of the Dead Sea lay the province of Palestine, which included the holy places of three great faiths and cities no less rich and sophisticated than any in the world. The Arabs of the time also spoke of the Province of Jordan, lying between Syria and Palestine; but this was more of a geographical expression that a term denoting a political and administrative unit. And all this was part of the Eastern Roman, or Byzantine, Empire. To invade Syria was to invade Rome, and this was not an action to be undertaken light-heartedly.
The Eastern Roman Empire too was declining, and this decline had been going on for a much longer period than that of the Persian Empire. The latter still enjoyed a degree of stability and strength, which was due, among other factors, to the power­ful Sasanid Dynasty that had ruled in unbroken succession for the past four centuries. The Romans on the other hand, had no such ruling dynasty, nor did they subscribe to the concept of a royal house to which the privilege of rule was confined. On the death of a ruler, the Empire fell to the most successful general or politician or intriguer.
But the army of Eastern Rome was still a powerful ins­trument for the waging of imperial wars and, after the Persian Army, the most efficient and formidable military machine in the world. Its legions were well-equipped and ably led, and could still strike terror into the hearts of the peoples over whose lands they marched. Like any great imperial army, it was not one national unit but a heterogeneous collection of contingents from many peoples inhabiting many lands. In its ranks served Romans, Slavs, Franks, Greeks, Georgians, Armenians, Arabs and tribes from far-flung regions. These soldiers manned garrisons in the cities of Syria, most of which were fortified.
Syria, like Iraq, was partly an Arab land, especially in its eastern and southern parts. The Arabs had been there since pre-Roman times; and when Emperor Constantine made Chris­tianity the State religion of the Empire in the early part of the Fourth Century A.D., these Arabs also embraced Christianity. But the Arabs of Syria were people of no consequence until the migration of the powerful Ghassan tribe from the Yemen to Syria, which occurred a few centuries before Islam. For
310 The Sword ofAllah
some time the Ghassan fought the Roman garrisons in Eastern Syria. Then as the Romans came to realise and value their martial spirit and warlike traits, they made peace with them and agreed to their living in Syria as a semi-autonomous people with their own king. The Ghassan Dynasty became one of the honoured princely dynasties of the Empire, with the Ghassan king ruling over the Arabs in Jordan and Southern Syria from his capital at Busra. The last of the Ghassan kings, who ruled at the time of Khalid's invasion, was Jabla bin al Eiham. This man shared with Adi bin Hatim, who has been mentioned earlier in this book, the distinction of being the tallest Arab in history. His feet too touched the ground when he rode his horse!1
This then was the Syria, and this its political and mili­tary condition, that greeted the Muslim army in the early weeks of the thirteenth year of the Hijra.
*
The man who commanded the first serious military venture into Syria was a namesake of Khalid, viz. Khalid bin Saeed— a man whose military ability was just the opposite of Khalid's! Towards the end of 12 Hijri (beginning of 634) Abu Bakr placed him at Teima, some distance north of Madina, with a detach­ment which was to act as a general reserve.
While at Teima, it occurred to Khalid bin Saeed to invade Syria; and for this project he sought the Caliph's permission. Abu Bakr had no intention of attempting the conquest of Syria with a small body of men, especially under an indifferent and untried general. But the Muslims knew little about the detailed military situation in Syria and Abu Bakr decided to let this operation proceed as a reconnaissance in force. He therefore wrote and gave Khalid bin Saeed permission to enter Syria; but cautioned him against getting involved in any serious hosti­lities which might threaten his withdrawal into the safety of Arabia.
Khalid bin Saeed set out with his small force, entered Syria and ran headlong into some Roman forces. The Roman commander in contact with the Muslims—a skilful tactician by the
1Ibn Quteiba: p. 644.
The Perilous March 311
name of Bahan—lured the unwary Muslims into a trap and ex­ecuted a pincer movement to encircle them. At this, Khalid bin Saeed lost his nerve and fled, leaving most of his men behind. Luckily for the Muslims, Ikrama bin Abi Jahl was present at this action; and taking command of the situation, he extricated the Muslims from a blunder that was about to turn into a major tragedy. Ikrama was able to save the Muslims, but inevitably the expedition bore the stigma of defeat. Khalid bin Saeed was now in disgrace, and Abu Bakr made no secret of his contempt for the man's pusillanimity and lack of skill. (Later, however, this man was allowed to join the Muslims in Syria, and he re­trieved his honour by dying in battle.)
The exact location of this action is disputed. Some his­torians suggest that it took place at Marj-us-Suffar, south of Damascus, but it is unlikely that the expedition could have got that far before being seriously engaged by the Roman army. The benefit of this abortive venture to the Muslims, however, was that it made it clear to the Caliph that the invasion of Syria was not a matter to be taken lightly.
On return from the annual pilgrimage at Mecca in Feb­ruary 634, Abu Bakr issued a call to arms for the invasion of Syria. All was now quiet on the Iraq front. Khalid's campaign in Iraq had proved an unqualified success: it not only expanded the political boundaries of the Muslim State but also filled the coffers of Madina. The Muslims therefore came to feel that if they could win against the formidable and much-feared Persians, why not also against the Romans who were not so fearsome as an im­perial military power? Moreover, the promise of the new re­ligious movement had to be fulfilled and its destiny achieved. Islam had come as a blessing for all mankind; and the message had to be conveyed to all mankind.
Tribal contingents responded eagerly to the call from Madina. They came in thousands from all over the peninsula, from as far away as Uman and the Yemen. They came mounted and armed for battle, but also brought their women and child­ren with them. Only those who had apostatised were excluded from the summons. The concentration of the able-bodied man­hood of Muslim Arabia was both begun and completed in March 634 (Muharram, 13 Hijri).
Abu Bakr now organised the available manpower into
312 The Sword of Allah
four corps, each of about 7,000 men. The commanders of these corps and the objectives given to them were as follows:
a. Amr bin Al Aas: Objective Palestine. Move on Eila
route, then across Valley of Araba.
b. Yazeed bin Abi Sufyan: Objective Damascus. Move on Tabuk route.
c.  Shurahbeel bin Hasana: Objective Jordan. Move on Tabuk route after Yazeed. (Shurahbeel had fought in the Iraq Campaign under Khalid, and had recently been sent as a messenger to Madina, where the Caliph detained him and gave him the command of a corps for the Syrian Campaign).
d. Abu Ubeida bin Al Jarrah: Objective Emessa. Move
on Tabuk route after Shurahbeel.
Abu Bakr's intention was to invade Syria and take as much of it as possible. (See Map 16.) Not being aware of the size and detailed dispositions of the Roman army, he did not strengthen any one corps at the expense of the others. But he rea­lised that the Romans could concentrate a very large army in any sector of the theatre of operations, and consequently ordered that the corps commanders would keep in touch with each other and that any one of them could seek the help of his comrades if a serious clash with Roman forces appeared imminent on his front. In case the corps had to concentrate for one major battle, the command of the entire Muslim army would be taken by Abu Ubeida.
In the first week of April 634 (beginning of Safar, 13 Hijri), the Muslim forces began to move. The first to leave Madina was Yazeed; and as his column started from its camp outside Madina, Abu Bakr walked for a short distance by his side. His parting words to Yazeed, which he repeated to the other corps com­manders, were as follows:
In your march be not hard on yourself or your army. Be not harsh with your men or your officers, whom you should consult in all matters.
Be just and abjure evil and tyranny, for no nation which is unjust prospers or achieves victory over its enemies.
When you meet the enemy turn not your back on him; for whoever turns his back, except to manoeuvre
MAP 16 : THE INVASION OF SYRIA
314 The Sword of Allah

for battle or to regroup, earns the wrath of Allah. His abode shall be hell, and what a terrible place it is!
And when you have won a victory over your enemies, kill not women or children or the aged and slaughter not beasts except for eating. And break not the pacts which you make.
You will come upon a people who live like her­mits in monasteries, believing that they have given up all for God. Let them be and destroy not their monasteries. And you will meet other people who are partisans of Satan and worshippers of the Cross, who shave the centre of their heads so that you can see the scalp. Assail them with your swords until they submit to Islam or pay the Jizya.
I entrust you to the care of Allah.1
In making this speech Abu Bakr was following the example of the Holy Prophet, who, when despatching a military expedi­tion, would instruct its commander: “Fight in the name of Allah: fight but do not exceed the bounds; and do not be trea­cherous; and do not mutilate; and do not kill women and chil­dren; and do not kill the inmates of monasteries.”2 It is reported that Abu Bakr walked beside Yazeed for nearly 2 miles, and when Yazeed asked him to return, said, “I heard the Messen­ger of Allah say that the feet that get covered with dust in the way of Allah shall not be touched by the fire of hell.”3
With these words ringing in his ears, Yazeed set off from Madina. The invasion of Syria had been launched.
*
Yazeed made good speed on the road to Tabuk. Behind him marched the corps of Shurahbeel, and behind that the corps of Abu Ubeida, each a day's march from the other. Amr bin Al Aas marched with his corps on the western route to Eila. Yazeed had advanced two or three stages beyond Tabuk when he first contacted the enemy—a force of Christian Arabs sent for­ward by the Romans as a reconnaissance element. These Arabs
1Waqidi: p. 4.   
2AbuYusuf: pp. 193-5. 3.
3Ibid: p. 6.
The Perilous March 315
withdrew hastily after a brush with the Muslim advance guard. Following their withdrawal, Yazeed made for the Valley of Araba where it meets the southern end of the Dead Sea. (See Map 16.)
Yazeed arrived at the Valley of Araba at about the same time as Amr bin Al Aas reached Eila. Both corps now made contact with Roman forces of about equal strength which had been sent forward from the main Roman army to prevent the Muslims from entering Palestine. Both Yazeed and Amr bin Al Aas fought the Roman detachments facing them and drove them back with heavy losses. When the Romans defeated by Yazeed withdrew in precipitous haste, Yazeed sent a fast column which overtook the retreating detachment at Dasin, some dis­tance short of Gaza, and caused it considerable damage before rejoining Yazeed at the Valley of Araba. Meanwhile Amr bin Al Aas was moving north along this valley. These engagements took place within a fortnight of the start of the Muslim march from Madina.
While these actions were being fought by the corps of Yazeed—which had strayed from the objective given by the Caliph—Shurahbeel and Abu Ubeida continued their march northwards on the main route: Ma'an-Mauta-Amman. They were followed a little later by Yazeed. By the end of the month of Safar (early May) Shurahbeel and Abu Ubeida had got to the region between Busra and Jabiya;1 Yazeed was camped some­where in North-Eastern Jordan; and Amr waited by the Valley of Araba. It was at this stage that the Muslims came to realise that the Roman eagle was stirring. Indeed the Roman eagle was already on the wing!
The Emperor Heraclius was in Emessa, planning counter-measures against the Muslims. When he first heard of the crush­ing defeats suffered by the Persian Army at the hands of Khalid, he was not a little surprised, for he had had no higher opinion of the Arabs than did the Persian court once have. But he was not unduly worried. Then came news of the fiasco of Khalid bin Saeed, and Heraclius felt reassured.  However, as a precau­tion, he ordered the positioning of several Roman legions
1Masudi (Muruj, Vol. 4, p. 66) gives the location of Jabiya as 2 miles from Jasim. It was a little to the west of the present Jasim-Nawa line, and after the arrival of the Muslims, became known as a military cantonment.
316 The Sword of Allah
at Ajnadein, whence they could operate against any Muslim force entering Palestine or Jordan.
As the Muslim corps set off from Madina, the Roman army received intelligence of the move from Christian Arabs. Apprised of the latest situation and the direction of the Muslim movement, Heraclius realized that this was a serious attempt at the invasion of his domain. Soon after this he heard of the defeat of the Roman covering forces sent from Ajnadein at the hands of the leading corps of the Muslim army. He decided to punish these rough intruders and throw them back into the desert whence they had come. On his orders, large detachments of the Roman army began preparations for a move to Ajnadein from garrisons in Palestine and Syria.
By now the Muslim commanders had established contacts with the local population and laid the foundations of an intel­ligence network. They had already come to know of the existence of a Roman army at Ajnadein. A few days later they received intelligence of the movement of more Roman legions in the direc­tion of Ajnadein; and all corps commanders sent messages to Abu Ubeida informing him of these moves. Three corps of the Muslim army were in more or less the same region—i.e. Eas­tern Jordan and Southern Syria—and Abu Ubeida at once took these corps under his command. Amr bin Al Aas was more isolated from the others and felt that the Roman preparations were being made against his corps. He therefore sought help from Abu Ubeida.
Some time in the middle of Rabi-ul-Awwal (third week of May), the Caliph received a message from Abu Ubeida giving a fairly clear picture of the situation in Syria and Pales­tine. Muslim estimates suggested that presently the Romans would have an army of 100,000 men at Ajnadein, from where it could either strike frontally against Amr bin Al Aas, or manoeuvre against the flanks and rear of the other three Muslim corps. This estimate of Roman strength was not far from the mark, as we shall see later.
The situation had taken a turn for the worse. The Romans were in much larger strength than had been anticipated by the Muslims when the invasion was launched; and it was clear that the Romans were not going to sit in their fortified cities and await attack. They were concentrating into one great army to fight
The Perilous March 317
a grand offensive battle in the field. The Muslims would either have to fight a general set-piece battle with the Imperial Roman Army or withdraw hastily into Arabia, neither of which alter­natives was pleasant to contemplate. The Caliph rejected the second one outright. There was no question of returning to Arabia in face of the Roman threat. The invasion of Syria had been launched; it must be sustained. But what caused Abu Bakr the greatest anxiety was the question of who should command the Muslim army ? Abu Bakr had ordered that Abu Ubeida would take command of the army whenever the corps were united for battle. Abu Ubeida was a wise, intelligent man, and a widely esteemed and venerated Muslim. He was also a man of unques­tionable personal courage. But knowing his mild and gentle nature and his lack of experience in the command of military forces in major operations, Abu Bakr had serious misgivings about his ability to lead the entire Muslim army in a serious clash with the powerful and sophisticated army of Eastern Rome.
Abu Bakr reached the best conclusion which was possible under the circumstances: he would send Khalid bin Al Waleed to command the Muslim army in Syria! Khalid had recently shattered the Persian army in several bloody battles. Khalid would know what to do. This decision made Abu Bakr feel lighter, as if a heavy burden had been lifted off his shoulders. “By Allah,” he said, “I shall destroy the Romans and the friends of Satan with Khalid bin Al Waleed!”1 He consequently des­patched a fast rider to Hira with instructions for Khalid to move with half his army to Syria, take command of the Muslim forces and fight the Romans.
*
The next chapter takes up the thread of events which constituted Khalid's conquest of Syria. This subject is taken up with the full realization of the possibility of error in the account of this campaign, because of the confusion and the contradic­tions that exist in the narratives of the early historians. There is disagreement about many important aspects of this military history—in the dates of the great battles; in the strengths of the
1Tabari: Vol. 2, p. 603.
318 The Sword of Allah
forces deployed in these battles; in the order in which these battles were fought; even, in the case of the odd battle, about who commanded the army at the time. The only writer who has described the campaign in meticulous detail is Waqidi; but his account also contains errors, as it is based on narratives passed down orally from the Syrian veterans, which sometimes conflict.
In this book has been prepared, from all the accounts available, a sequence of events and a version of these events which makes the most military sense and leaves the least room for contradiction. The reader has been spared copious footnotes explaining each alternative version and each deviation from the commonly accepted version of this campaign; but he will find footnotes in the case of the more important issues, so that he may form his own opinion. And Allah knows best!














28: DEEPER INTO SYRIA
If the soldiers hoped that they would have a day of rest after the harrowing experience of the five days' march—which had brought them closer to annihilation than any battle could have done—they were mistaken. The very next morning Khalid set his army in motion towards Suwa. The men could not com­plain, for their commander himself took no rest nor looked as if he needed it. In fact as the march began and Khalid rode up and down the column to see that all was well, the sight of their commander put fresh vigour into the soldiers, and they forgot the horrible memories of the perilous march. This day they would draw their first blood in the Syrian Campaign. They had to draw blood, for Khalid had arrived!
Khalid started his Syrian Campaign wearing a coat of chain mail which had belonged to Museilima the Liar. At his broad leather belt hung a magnificent sword which had also belonged to Museilima the Liar. These two were trophies of the Battle of Yamama. Over his chain helmet he wore a red tur­ban, and under the helmet, a red cap. In this cap, if examined carefully, could be seen a few black lines; and in the eyes of Khalid this cap was more precious than all his weapons and armour. Its story shall be told at another time. In his hand Khalid carried a black standard which had been given to him by the Holy Prophet. It had once belonged to the Prophet and was
320 The Sword of Allah
known as the Eagle.
With Khalid travelled 9,000 fearless fighters, veterans of many victorious battles, not one of whom would think twice before laving down his life on the orders of his beloved com­mander. In this army also travelled some of the bravest young officers of the time, who would perform prodigies of valour and laugh at death. There was Khalid's own son, Abdur Rahman—just turned 18. There was the Caliph's son, also named Abdur Rahman. There was Rafe bin Umeira, the guide on the Perilous March, who was Khalid's son-in-law and a redoubtable warrior.  There was Qaqa bin Amr, the one-man-reinforcement sent to Khalid by the Caliph. And there was one young man of whom we shall hear a great deal in this campaign— Zarrar bin Al Azwar, a slim, sinewy youth whose cheerful coun­tenance and bubbling enthusiasm could make exhausted men want to get up and fight again. Zarrar was to become Khalid's righ-hand man. He would be given the most daring missions, and would show both a reckless disregard for danger and a most uncanny knack of survival.
In the early afternoon the column reached Suwa. (See Map 15.) This was the first settlement near the border of Syria, and was an oasis surrounded by a grassy area of land used to graze large flocks of sheep and herds of cattle. Moving through this settlement, Khalid put down all resistance and comman­deered the grazing flocks, to stock up the army's food supply for the campaign.
Next day the army arrived at Arak, which was a fortified town defended by a garrison of Christian Arabs under the com­mand of a Roman officer. As the garrison had retired to the safety of the fort on sighting them, the Muslims laid siege to Arak. It was here that Khalid first came to know that his fame had spread beyond the lands in which he had fought. His reputa­tion proved sufficient to bring about a peaceful surrender.
In Arak lived an old scholar who kept himself informed on the affairs of the world. When he was told of the arrival of a hostile army across the desert, he asked, “Is the standard of this army a black one? Is the commander of this army a tall, powerfully built, broad-shouldered man with a large beard and a few pock marks on his face?”1 Those who had seen the approach
1Waqidi: p. 15.
Deeper into Syria 321
of Khalid and brought the news to Arak confirmed that it was indeed so. “Then beware of fighting this army”, warned the sage.
The Roman garrison commander made an offer to sur­render the fort, and was astonished at the generous terms offered by the Muslims. Beyond the payment of the Jizya, the people of Arak would pay or suffer nothing. The pact was signed, the fort was surrendered, and the Muslim army camped outside for the night.
The next morning Khalid despatched two columns to subdue Sukhna and Qadma (now known as Qudeim). At the same time, he sent a camel rider to find Abu Ubeida in the area of Jabiya and tell him to remain at his position until the arri­val of Khalid or the receipt of further instructions. Then, with the main body of his army, Khalid marched to Tadmur (Pal­myra).
When the columns sent by Khalid arrived at Sukhna and Qadma, they were received joyfully by the inhabitants, who had heard of the generous terms given the day before to Arak. They were only too willing to make friends. There was no trouble at these places, and the columns returned to the army without any bloodshed.
At Tadmur, the garrison locked itself in the fort, but, hardly had the Muslims arrived and surrounded the fort when parleys were started for a peaceful surrender. Soon a sur­render was negotiated in which the inhabitants of Tadmur agreed to pay the Jizya and feed and shelter any Muslim war­riors passing by their town. The Arab chief of Tadmur also presented Khalid with a prize horse, which he used in several battles of this campaign.
From Tadmur the army marched to Qaryatein, the in­habitants of which resisted the Muslims. They were fought, defeated and plundered.
The next stop was Huwareen (about 10 miles beyond Qaryatein) which contained large herds of cattle. As the Muslims started gathering in the cattle, they were attacked by thousands of Arabs. These were the local inhabitants reinforced by a con­tingent of the Ghassan from Busra, which had hastened to help their comrades in Huwareen. They too were defeated and plundered.
322 The Sword of Allah
The following morning the advance was resumed in the direction of Damascus, and after three days of marching the army arrived at a pass about 20 miles from Damascus. This pass lies between the present Azra and Quteifa and crosses a gently sloping ridge which rises gradually to a height of over 2,000 feet above the level of the surrounding countryside. The ridge is part of the range known as Jabal-ush-Sharq, which is an offshoot of the Anti-Lebanon Range and runs in a north-easterly direction to Tadmur. The pass itself, not a formidable one, is quite long. Khalid stopped at the highest part of it, and here he planted his standard. As a result of this action the pass became known as Saniyyat-ul-Uqab, i.e. the Pass of the Eagle, after the name of Khalid's standard, but is sometimes referred to as just Al Saniyya.1 At this pass Khalid stayed an hour with his standard fluttering in the breeze, and gazed at the Ghuta of Damascus. From where he stood, he could not see the city itself, because it was concealed from view by a rise of ground which stretches east-west, north of the city, but he marvelled at the richness and beauty of the Ghuta.2
From the Pass of the Eagle, Khalid moved to Marj Rahit, a large Ghassan town near the present Azra on the road to Damascus.3 The Muslims arrived in time to participate in a joyous festival of the Ghassan, which participation took the form of a violent raid! At Marj Rahit had gathered a large number of refugees from the region over which Khalid had recently operated, and these refugees mingled with the crowds celebrating the festival. The Ghassan were not unmindful of the danger which Khalid's entry into Syria posed for them. They had positioned a strong screen of warriors on the route from Tadmur, below the pass; but this screen was scattered in a few minutes by a swift charge of the Muslim cavalry. Although some Ghassan resistance continued as the Muslims advanced, it ceased once
1Yaqut: (Vol. 1, p. 936) gives the location of this pass as above the Ghuta of Damascus, on the Emessa Road.
2The Ghuta was, and still is, a green, fertile, well-watered plain, covered with crops, orchards and villages, lying all round Damascus, except to the west and north-west, where stand the foothills of the Anti-Lebanon Range. It formed an irregular D with its base on the foothills, and stretched up to about 10 miles from Damascus.
3Marj Rahit, which was also a meadow, has been placed by Masudi {Muruj, Vol. 3, p. 12; he calls it Marj Azra) 12 miles from Damascus. This would be about the centre of the meadow and the location of the town.
Deeper into Syria 323
the town was reached. The Muslims raided Marj Rahit. After a little while, having collected a large amount of booty and a certain number of captives, Khalid pulled out of the town and camped outside.
The following morning he sent a strong mounted column towards Damascus with the task of raiding the Ghuta. Then, having sent a messenger to Abu Ubeida with instructions to report to him at Busra, Khalid himself set off for Busra with the main body of the army, by-passing Damascus. The mounted column sent to Damascus reached the neighbourhood of the city, picked up more booty and captives, and rejoined Khalid while he was still on the march.
The minor operations following Khalid's entry into Syria were now over.
*
Abu Ubeida had already occupied the District of Hauran which lay north-east of the river Yarmuk. Under his command he had three corps of the Muslim army—his own, Yazeed's and Shurahbeel’s, but he had fought no battles and captured no towns. One place which worried him a great deal was Busra, a large town which was the capital of the Ghassan Kingdom. It was garrisoned by a strong force of Romans and Christian Arabs under the command of Roman officers.
While Khalid was clearing the region of Eastern Syria, Abu Ubeida came to know that he would come under Khalid's command upon the latter's arrival. He decided to take Busra quickly, so that Khalid would not have to worry about this problem. He therefore sent Shurahbeel with 4,000 men to capture Busra. Shurahbeel marched to Busra, the garrison of which withdrew into the fortified town as soon as the Muslims appeared in sight. This garrison consisted of 12,000 soldiers, but expecting that more Muslim forces would soon arrive and that Shurahbeel's detachment was only an advance guard, it remained within the walls of the fort. Shurahbeel camped on the western side of the town, and positioned groups of his men all round the fort.
For two days nothing happened. The following day, as Khalid set out on the last day of his march to Busra, the garrison of the town came out to give battle to the Muslims outside the
324 The Sword of Allah
city. Both forces formed up for battle; but first there were talks between Shurahbeel and the Roman commander, at which the Muslim offered the usual alternatives, Islam, the Jizya or the sword. The Romans chose the sword, and in the middle of the morning the battle began.
For the first two hours or so the fighting continued at a steady pace with neither side making any headway; but soon after midday the superior strength of the Romans began to tell and the battle turned in their favour. The Romans were able to move forces around both Muslim flanks, and the fighting in­creased in intensity. The temper of the Muslims became suicidal as the real danger of their position became evident and they fought ferociously to avoid encirclement, which appeared to be the Roman design. By early afternoon the Roman wings had moved further forward, and the encirclement of Shurahbeel’s force became a virtual certainty. Then suddenly the combatants became aware of a powerful force of cavalry galloping in mass towards the battlefield from the north-west.
Khalid was about a mile from Busra when the wind carried the sounds of battle to him. He immediately ordered the men to horse, and as soon as the cavalry was ready, led it at a gallop towards the battlefield. Beside him rode Abdur Rahman bin Abi Bakr. But Khalid and the Romans never met. As soon as the Romans discovered the arrival of the Muslim cavalry, they broke contact with Shurahbeel and withdrew hastily into the fort. The Muslims under Shurahbeel came to regard this occur­rence as a miracle: the Sword of Allah had been sent to save them from destruction!
Shurahbeel was a brave and pious Muslim in his mid-sixties. A close Companion of the Prophet, he was one of those who used to write down the revelations of the Prophet, and con­sequently became known as the Scribe of the Messenger of Allah. As often as not he was addressed by this title. As a general he was competent and sound, having learnt a great deal about the art of war from Khalid, under whom he had fought at Yamama and in the Iraq Campaign.
It took Khalid only a glance to assess the relative stren­gths of the Muslims and the Romans and he wondered why
Deeper into Syria 325
Shurahbeel had not awaited his arrival before engaging the gar­rison of Busra. As soon as the two met and greeted each other, Khalid said, “O Shurahbeel! Do you not know that this is an important frontier town of the Romans and contains a large garrison commanded by a distinguished general? Why did you go into battle with such a small force?”
“By order of Abu Ubeida”, replied Shurahbeel. There­upon Khalid remarked, “Abu Ubeida is a man of the purest character, but he does not know the strategems of war.”1
Next morning the Roman garrison again came out of the fort to give battle. The shock of Khalid's arrival on the previous day had now worn off, and seeing that the combined strength of the Muslims was about the same as their own, the Romans decided to try their luck once again. They also hoped to fight and defeat the Muslims before they could get a rest after their march. They did not know that Khalid's warriors were not used to resting!
The two armies formed up for battle on the plain outside the town. Khalid kept his centre under his own command, appointing Rafe bin Umeira as the commander of the right wing and Zarrar bin Al Azwar as the commander of the left wing. In front of the centre, he placed a thin screen under Abdur Rahman bin Abi Bakr. At the very start of the battle Abdur Rahman duelled with the Roman army commander and defeated him. As the Roman general fled to the safety of the Roman ranks, Khalid launched a general attack along the entire front. For some time the Romans resisted bravely, while the commanders of the Muslim wings played havoc with the opposing wings, especially Zarrar, who now established a personal tradition which would make him famous in Syria—adored by the Muslims and dreaded by the Romans. Because of the heat of the day, he took off his coat of mail; and this made him feel lighter and happier. Then he took off his shirt and became naked above the waist. This made him feel even lighter and even happier. In this half-naked condition Zarrar launched his assaults against the Romans and slaughtered all who faced him in single combat. Within a week, stories of the Naked Champion would spread over Syria, and only the bravest of Romans would feel inclined to face him in combat.
1Waqidi: p. 17.
326 The Sword of Allah
After some fighting, the Roman army broke contact and withdrew into the fort. At this time Khalid was fighting on foot in front of his centre. As he turned to give orders for the com­mencement of the siege, he saw a horseman approaching through the ranks of the Muslims. This horseman was to achieve fame and glory in the Syrian Campaign that would be second only to Khalid's.
A man in his early fifties, he was tall, slim and wiry with a slight stoop. His lean and clear-cut face was attractive, and his eyes showed understanding and gentleness. His thin beard was dyed. In his hand he held a standard such as only generals car­ried. This was a yellow standard and is believed to have been the standard of the Holy Prophet at the Battle of Kheibar.1 His coat of mail did not conceal the simple and inexpensive appearance of the clothes that he wore. As he smiled at Khalid, he revealed a gap in his front teeth; and this gap was the envy of all Muslims. This was Abu Ubeida, Son of the Surgeon, the One Without Incisors. He had lost his front teeth while pulling out the two links of the Prophet's helmet that had dug into the Prophet's cheek at the Battle of Uhud, and it is said that Abu Ubeida was the handsomest of “those without incisors”!2
Though called Abu Ubeida bin Al Jarrah, his actual name was Amir bin Abdullah bin Al Jarrah. It was Abu Ubeida's grandfather who was the surgeon (Al Jarrah), but like some Arabs he was known after his grandfather rather than his father. As a Muslim, he belonged to the topmost strata and had been very dear to the Prophet, who had once said, “Every nation has its trusted one; and the trusted one of this nation is Abu Ubeida”.3 Thereafter Abu Ubeida had become known as the Trusted One of the Nation—Ameen-ul-Ummat. He was one of the Blessed Ten.
This was the man who had been placed under the com­mand of Khalid, and the new army commander looked with some apprehension at the approach of the old army commander. Khalid had known Abu Ubeida well at Madina, and liked and respected him for his great virtue and his devout piety. Abu Ubeida liked Khalid because of the Prophet's fondness for him,
1Ibid: p. 138.
2Ibn Quteiba: p.248.
3Ibid: p. 247.
Deeper into Syne 327
and saw in him a military instrument that God had chosen to crush disbelief.  Khalid was reassured by Abu Ubeida's smile. As he got near, Abu Ubeida started to dismount, for Khalid was still on foot. “Stay on your horse”, Khalid called to him, and he remained mounted. Khalid walked up to him, and the two top generals in Syria shook hands.
“O Father of Suleiman,” began Abu Ubeida, “I have received with gladness the letter of Abu Bakr appointing you commander over me. There is no resentment in my heart, for I know your skill in matters of war.”
“By Allah,” replied Khalid, “but for the necessity of obeying the orders of the Caliph, I would never have accepted this command over you. You are much higher than me in Islam. I am a Companion of the Prophet, but you are one whom the Messenger of Allah had called 'the trusted one of this nation.'1 And on this happy note Abu Ubeida came under the command of Khalid.
The Muslims now laid siege to Busra. The Roman             com­mander lost hope, for he knew that most of the available reserves had either moved or were moving to Ajnadein, and doubted that any help would be forthcoming. After a few days of inactivity, he surrendered the fort peacefully. The only condition Khalid imposed on Busra was the payment of the Jizya. This surrender took place in about the middle of July 634 (middle of Jamadi-uI-Awwal, 13 Hijri).
Busra was the first important town to be captured by the Muslims in Syria. The Muslims lost 130 men in the two days of fighting that preceded this victory. The casualties suffered by the Romans and the Christian Arabs are not on record. Khalid now wrote to Abu Bakr, informing him of the progress of his operations since his entry into Syria, and sent one-fifth of the spoils which had been won during the past few weeks. Hardly had Busra surrendered when an agent sent by Shurahbeel to the region of Ajnadein returned to inform the Muslims that the con­centration of Roman legions was proceeding apace. Soon they would have a vast army of 90,000 imperial soldiers at Ajnadein. This acted as a reminder to Khalid that there was no time to waste.
At this time Yazeed was still south of the River Yarmuk;
1Waqidi: p. 23.
















328 The Sword of Allah
Amr bin Al Aas was still at the Valley of Araba; and several detachments of the corps of Abu Ubeida and Shurahbeel were spread over the District of Hauran. Khalid wrote to all com­manders to march at once and concentrate at Ajnadein; and the Muslims marched, taking with them their wives and child­ren and vast herds of sheep which served as a moving supply depot. At Ajnadein would be fought the first of the mighty battles between Islam and Christendom.














29: THE BATTLE OF AJNADEIN
In the third week of July 634, the Muslim army marched from Busra; and the march of this army was an amazing sight— one that would earn the immediate disapproval of any regular, disciplined soldier. It had none of the appearance of a normal army. Its advance was more like the movement of a caravan than the march of a military force.
The soldiers of this army had no uniform of any kind, and there was no similarity in the dress that they wore. The men could wear anything they chose, including captured Persian and Roman robes. There were no badges of rank and no insignia to distinguish the commander from the commanded. In fact there were no officers so far as rank was concerned; officership was an appointment and not a rank. Any Muslim could join this army, and regardless of his tribal status would consider it an honour to serve in the ranks. The man fighting as a simple soldier one day could next day find himself appointed the com­mander of a regiment, or even a larger force. Officers were appo­inted to command for the battle or the campaign; and once the operation was concluded, they could well find themselves in the ranks again. The army was organised on the decimal system—a system started by the Holy Prophet at Madina.1 There were com-

1Tabari: Vol. 3, p. 8.
























330 The Sword of Allah
manders of 10, 100 and 1,000 men, the latter corresponding to regiments. The grouping of regiments to form larger forces was flexible, varying with the situation.
Even in weapons and equipment there was no standard scale for this army. Men fought with whatever weapons they possessed, and had to find their own weapons either by pur­chase or by taking them from fallen foes. They could have any or all of the normally used weapons of the time—the lance, the javelin, the spear, the sword, the dagger and the bow. For armour they wore coats of mail and chain helmets. And these could be of any colour or design; in fact many of them had been taken from the Persians and the Romans. Most of the men mounted camels; those who possessed horses formed the cavalry.
One remarkable feature of the movement of this great army was that it was independent of lines of communication. Behind it stretched no line of supply, since it had no logistical base. Its food trotted along with the army; and if it ran out of meat, the men, women and children could live for weeks on a simple ration of dates and water. This army could not be cut off from its supplies, for it had no supply depots. It needed no roads for its movement, for it had no wagons and everything was carried on camels. Thus this army could go anywhere and traverse any terrain so long as there was a path over which men and animals could move. This ease of movement gave the Muslims a tremendous edge on the Romans in mobility and speed.
Although this army moved like a caravan and gave the impression of an undrilled horde, from the point of view of mili­tary security it was virtually invulnerable. The advance was led by a mobile advance guard consisting of a regiment or more. Then came the main body of the army, and this was followed by the women and children and the baggage loaded on camels. At the end of the column moved the rear guard. On long marches the horses were led; but if there was any danger of enemy inter­ference on the march, the horses were mounted, and the cavalry thus formed would act either as the advance guard or the rear guard or move wide on a flank, depending on the direction from which the greatest danger threatened. In case of need, the entire army could vanish in an hour or so and be safe at a distance beyond terrain which no other large army could traverse. In this
The Battle of Ajnadein 331
fashion the Muslims marched from Busra.
The route of the army has not been recorded; but it undoubtedly lay north of the Dead Sea, for the army arrived at Ajnadein before the corps of Amr bin Al Aas, who joined the army at Ajnadein. Had the army travelled south of the Dead Sea, Amr bin Al Aas, who was still at the Valley of Araba, would have been picked up en route. The army probably marched via Jarash and Jericho, then by-passed Jerusalem, which was strongly garrisoned by the Romans, and crossed the Judea Hills stretching south of Jerusalem. Beyond this range it descended into the plain of Ajnadein, arriving there on July 24. The follow­ing day Amr bin Al Aas, moving up from the Valley of Araba on the orders of Khalid, arrived at Ajnadein, and his joy knew no bounds. He had been in a state of anxiety for several weeks, expecting the Roman storm gathering at Ajnadein to break over his head any day.
The Muslims now established a camp which was a vast affair in view of the strength of the army—32,000 men, the largest Muslim force yet assembled for battle. The camp stood about a mile away from the Roman camp, which was even lar­ger and lined the road from Jerusalem to Beit Jibreen. The oppos­ing camps ran like two parallel lines, so laid out as to enable the armies to take the field at a moment's notice without unneces­sary movement.
The Muslims had taken a week to concentrate their army at Ajnadein, a task which took the Romans more than two months. The Roman army, like any regular, sophisticated military force, needed time for its movement, and had to spend weeks in preparation—in collecting supplies, wagons and horses, and in issuing weapons and equipment. Since it travelled with thousands of wagons and carriages, it needed good roads for its movement. But over these two months the Romans had suc­cessfully concentrated an army of 90,000 men at Ajnadein under the command of Werdan, Governor of Emessa. Another general, one named Qubuqlar, acted as the Chief of Staff or the Deputy Commander-in-Chief.
The Muslims had marched to Ajnadein as a matter of choice. So long as the Roman army remained at Ajnadein, it posed no immediate threat to the Muslim corps. Only if a for­ward movement were undertaken by the Romans could a threat
332 The Sword of Allah
to the Muslims arise; and then the normal Arab strategy would be to pull back to the eastern or southern part of Jordan and fight a battle with their backs to the desert, into which they could withdraw in case of a reverse. The Muslims could have waited for the Romans to start the first move.
In this case, why did the Muslim army move away from the desert and enter deep into a fertile, inhabited region towards a Roman army three times its size? The answer lies in the charac­ter of Khalid. It was his destiny to fight battles, and the promise of battle drew him like a magnet. Twelve centuries later another illustrious general, Napoleon, would say, “Nothing pleases me more than a great battle.” So it was with Khalid. If anyone else had been the commander of the Muslim army, it is doubtful that the Muslims would have moved to Ajnadein.
In the long run, Khalid's decision was the right one. With a large Roman army poised at Ajnadein, the Mulims would have remained tied down to the area occupied by them, which in itself was of little importance. This Roman threat, cleverly engineered by Heraclius, had to be eliminated before the invasion could proceed deeper into Syria.
So it came about that the Romans and the Muslims faced each other in their respective camps at Ajnadein. Guards and outposts were positioned by both armies to prevent surprise. The officers rode across the land, carrying out reconnaissances, while the men made their preparations for battle.
*
The sight of the gigantic Roman camp had a somewhat disturbing impact on the Muslims. Everyone knew the strength of the Roman army—a staggering figure of 90,000. The majority of the Muslims had never taken part in a great battle. The only men who were left unmoved by the sight of the Roman camp were Khalid's 9,000 veterans, who had fought regular battles with large armies in Iraq; but even they had never before faced an army of this size.
Khalid went round visiting the various units in the camp and spoke to their commanders and men. He said, “Know, O Muslims, that you have never seen an army of Rome as you see now. If Allah defeats them by your hand, they shall never again
The Battle of Ajnadein 333
stand against you. So be steadfast in battle and defend your faith. Beware of turning your backs on the enemy, for then your punishment will be the Fire. Be watchful and steady in your ranks, and do not attack until I give the order”1 The per­sonality of their commander and the supreme confidence which emanated from him had a marvellously steadying effect on the Muslims.
In the opposing camp, Werdan called a council of war and spoke to his generals. “0 Romans,” he said, “Ceasar has placed his trust in you. If you are defeated, you will never again be able to make a stand against the Arabs; and they shall con­quer your land and ravish your women. So be steadfast. When you attack, attack as one man—do not disperse your efforts. Seek the help of the Cross; and remember that you are three to each one of them”2
As part of his preparations for battle, which in fact did not take place until some days later, Khalid decided to send a brave scout to carry out a close reconnaissance of the Roman camp. Zarrar volunteered for the job and was sent forward accordingly. The youth stripped to the waist and rode up to a little hillock not far from the centre of the Roman camp. Here he was seen, and a body of 30 Romans rode out to catch him. As they approached, Zarrar began to canter back to the Muslim camp; and when they drew nearer, Zarrar increased his pace. His purpose was to draw these Romans away from their camp, so that others should not be able to come to their assistance. When he had reached a spot between the two armies, Zarrar turned on his pursuers and attacked the one nearest him with his lance. After bringing him down, Zarrar assaulted a second and a third and a fourth and so he continued, throughout the combat manoeuvring his horse in such a way that he should not have to tackle more than one man at a time. Against some he used his sword also; and it is believed that he killed 19 of the Romans before the remainder turned and galloped back to their camp. That night the Roman camp was full of stories of the dreaded Naked Champion.
On his return Zarrar was greeted with joy by the Muslims;
but Khalid looked at him sternly and rebuked him for engaging
1Waqidi: p.35.
2Ibid.
334 The Sword of Allah
in combat when the task given to him was reconnaissance. To this Zarrar replied that he was conscious of the possible disap­proval of his commander, and that but for this he would have pursued the fleeing Romans to kill every one of them!
Following this incident, Qubuqlar, the Roman deputy commander, sent a Christian Arab to enter the Muslim camp, spend a day and a night with the Muslims and gather all possible information about the strength and quality of the Muslim army. This Christian Arab had no difficulty in entering the Muslim camp, as he was taken for a Muslim. The following day he slipped out and returned to Qubuqlar, who questioned him about the Muslims. “By night they are like monks, by day like warriors”, said the spy. “If the son of their ruler were to commit theft, they would cut off his hand; and if he were to commit adultery, they would stone him to death. Thus they establish righteousness among themselves.”
“If what you say be true”, remarked Qubuqlar, “it would be better to be in the belly of the earth than to meet such a people upon its surface. I wish it were my portion from God to stay away from them, so that He would not have to help either me against them or them against me.”1
Werdan, the Commander-in-Chief, was full of fight; but Qubuqlar had lost his nerve.
*
Early in the morning of July 30, 634 (the 28th of Jamadi-ul-Awwal, 13 Hijri), as the men finished their morning prayers, Khalid ordered the move to battle positions, detailed instruc­tions for which had been given the day before. The Muslims moved forward and formed up for battle on the plain a few hundred yards ahead of the camp. Khalid deployed his army fac­ing west on a front of about 5 miles, stretched sufficiently to prevent the more numerous Roman army from overlapping his flanks. The army was deployed with a centre and two strong wings. On either side of the army, next to the wing, as an exten­sion of the front, was positioned a flank guard to counter any Roman attempt to envelop the Muslim flanks or to outflank their position entirely.
The centre was placed under Muaz bin Jabal, the left wing
1Tabari: Vol. 2, p 610.
The Battle of Ajnadein 335
under Saeed bin Amir and the right wing under Abdur Rahman, the Caliph’s son. We also know that the left flank guard was commanded by Shurahbeel, but the name of the commander of the right flank guard is not recorded. Behind the centre, Khalid placed 4,000 men under Yazeed, as a reserve and for the close protection of the Muslim camp in which the women and children stayed. Khalid's place was near the centre, where he kept a number of officers near him to be used as champions or as commanders of groups needed for any specific task in battle. These included Amr bin Al Aas, Zarrar, Rafe and Umar's son, Abdullah.
When the Romans saw the Muslims moving, they also rushed out and began to form up in their battle positions about half a mile from the Muslim front line. They formed up on about the same frontage, but had much greater depth in their dispositions, the detailed layout of which is not known. Werdan and Qubuqlar stood surrounded by their bodyguards in the centre. The massive formations of the Romans, carrying large crosses and banners, were an awe-inspiring sight.
When his men had been formed up for battle, Khalid rode along the front, checking units and urging his warriors to fight in the way of God. In the few words that he said to each unit, he laid emphasis on concentrating their efforts in time and attacking as one man. “When you use your bows,” he said, “let the arrows fly from your bows as if shot by a single bow to land like a swarm of locusts on the enemy.” He even spoke to the women in the camp and told them to be prepared to defend themselves against any Romans who might break through the Muslim front. They assured him that this was the least that they could do, considering that they had not been allowed to fight in the forefront of the Muslim army!
Forming their positions took the two armies a couple of hours. When all was in readiness, an old bishop wearing a black hat emerged from the Roman centre, walked up half-way to­wards the Muslim army and called out in perfect Arabic, “Which of you will come forth and and talk with me?”
Muslims have no priests; and in those days the com­mander himself acted as the Imam1 of the army. Hence Khalid rode forward, and the bishop asked, “Are you the commander
1One who leads the prayer.
336 The Sword of Allah
of this army?” Khalid replied, “So they regard me as long as I obey Allah and follow the example of His Prophet; but if I fail in this, I have no command over them and no right to be obeyed.” The bishop thought for a moment, then remarked, “It is thus that you conquer us.”
He then continued: “Know, O Arab, that you have in­vaded a land which no king dares to enter. The Persians entered it and returned dismayed. Others also came and fought with their lives, but could not attain what they sought. You have won over us up till now, but victory does not belong permanently to you.
“My master, Werdan, is inclined to be generous with you. He has sent me to tell you that if you take your army away from this land, he will give each of your men a dinar, a robe and a turban; and for you there will be a hundred dinars and a hundred robes and a hundred turbans.
“Lo, we have an army numerous as the atoms, and it is not like the armies that you have met before. With this army Caesar has sent his mightiest generals and his most illustrious bishops.”1
In reply Khalid offered the usual three alternatives;
Islam, the Jizya or the sword. Without the satisfaction of one of these alternatives, the Muslims would not leave Syria. As for the dinars and the fine clothes, Khalid pointed out that the Muslims would soon possess them anyway, by right of conquest!
With this reply, the bishop returned and informed Werdan of his talks. The Roman commander was furious and swore that he would crush the Muslims with one all-destroying attack.
Werdan now ordered a line of archers and slingers to be positioned ahead of the Roman front within range of the Muslim army. As this line formed up, Muaz, the commander of the Muslim centre, began to order his men to attack, but was stop­ped by Khalid who stood nearby. “Not till I give the order”, said Khalid. “And not till the sun has passed its zenith.”2
Muaz had wished to attack because the Roman archers, with their better bows, outranged the Muslim bows, and to the slingers the Muslims had no effective counter. The only way to deal with the situation would be to get closer to the Romans—­to come to grips. But Khalid did not wish to risk a reverse by
1Waqidi: p. 36.           2Ibid.
The Battle of Ajnadein 337
launching a premature attack against the well-formed legions of the Romans. Thus a couple of hours before noon, the battle began with the action of the Roman archers and slingers.
This phase of the battle went against the Muslims, several of whom were killed while many were wounded. This suited the Romans very well; and for some time the missiles continued to fly from their bows and slings. The Muslims, unable to do any­thing to offset this Roman advantage, became impatient to attack with sword and lance, but still Khalid restrained them. Finally the impetuous Zarrar came to Khalid and said, “Why are we waiting when God, the Most High, is on our side? By Allah, our enemies will think that we are afraid of them. Order the attack, and we shall attack with you.” Khalid decided to let individual champions go into combat against Roman champions. In this duelling the Muslims would have the advantage, and it would be useful to eliminate as many of the Roman officers as possible, as this would in turn reduce the effectiveness of the Roman army. “You may attack, Zarrar”, he said.1 And the delighted Zarrar urged his horse forward.
Because of the Roman archers, Zarrar kept on his coat of mail and helmet, and in his hand carried a shield made of elephant hide, which had once belonged to a Roman. Having gone halfway to the Roman line, he stopped and raising his head, gave his personal battle cry:
I am the death of the Pale Ones;
I am the killer of the Romans;
I am a scourge sent upon you;
I am Zarrar bin Al Azwar !2
As a few of the Roman champions advanced to answer his challenge, Zarrar quickly disrobed; and the Romans knew him at once as the Naked Champion. In the next few minutes Zarrar killed several Romans, including two generals, one of whom was the governor of Amman and the other the governor of Tiberius.
Then a group of 10 officers emerged from the Roman army and moved towards Zarrar. At this move, Khalid picked 10 of his stalwarts, and riding up, intercepted and killed the Romans. Now more champions came forward from both sides, some individually, others in groups. Gradually the duelling in-
1Ibid.          2Ibid, p. 37.
338 The Sword of Allah
creased in extent and intensity, and continued for about two hours, during which the Roman archers and slingers remained inactive. This phase more than restored the balance in favour of the Muslims, for most of the Roman champions were killed in combat.
While this duelling was still in progress—and it was now past midday—Khalid ordered a general attack; and the entire Muslim front moved forward and hurled itself at the Roman army. The main battle was now on with sword and shield.
This was a frontal struggle with no fine manoeuvre and neither side attempting to outflank the other. It was a hard slog­ging match at close quarters, and continued for some hours. Then in the late afternoon both sides, now very tired, broke con­tact and fell back to their original lines. No more could be done on this day.
*
The losses of the Romans were staggering. Werdan was shocked to learn that thousands of his soldiers lay dead on the battlefield, while very few Muslims had been accounted for. He called a council of war, at which he expressed his misgivings about the outcome of the battle, but his generals swore that they would fight to the last. Werdan asked for ideas; and of the various suggestions made, the one that appealed to him most was a plot to kill the Muslim commander. According to this plan, Werdan would personally go forward in the morning, offer peace and ask for Khalid to come forth and discuss the terms with him. When Khalid had approached near enough Werdan would engage him in combat; then, on his signal, 10 men, suitably concealed nearby, would rush up and cut the Muslim commander to pieces. It was as simple as that. Werdan was a brave general and agreed to the plan. The men would be positioned during the night, and would be carefully briefed for their role.
The Roman commander then sent a Christian Arab named David, who was a member of his staff, with instructions to proceed to the Muslim army and seek Khalid. He was to say to the Muslim commander that sufficient blood had been shed; that there should be no more fighting; that they should make
The Battle of Ajnadein 339
peace; and that Khalid should meet Werdan early next morning between the two armies to discuss terms of peace. Both generals would appear alone.
David was horrified to hear these instructions, as they appeared to be against the orders of Heraclius to fight the Mus­lims and throw them back into the desert. He therefore refused to carry out this mission. Werdan then told him the entire plan of the plot in order to convince him that he intended no disobe­dience of the instructions of the Emperor. And this, as we shall see, was a mistake.
The sun had not yet set when David walked up to the Muslim army, which was still arrayed in battle order, and asked to see Khalid on a matter of peace proposed by Werdan. As soon as Khalid was informed, he came out to David and stood glaring at him.
The sight of Khalid with his 6 feet and more of bone and muscle could have an unnerving effect on any man at whom Khalid glared. His hard, weather-beaten, battle-scarred face and his piercing eyes gave the impression of pitilessness to those whom Khalid regarded as enemies. The effect on poor David was de­vastating. Wilting under the gaze of the Sword of Allah, he blurted out: “I am not a man of war! I am only an emissary!”
Khalid drew closer. “Speak!” he ordered. “If you are truthful you will survive. If you lie you shall perish.”
The Christian Arab spoke: “Werdan is pained by all this unnecessary bloodshed and wishes to avoid it. He is prepared to sign a pact with you and spare those who still live. There should be no more fighting until the talks are completed. He proposes that you and he meet alone between the two armies in the morning and discuss terms of peace.”
“If what your master intends is deceit,” replied Khalid, “then by Allah, we ourselves are the root of trickery and there is none like us in stratagem and guile. If he has a secret plot, it will only hasten his own end and the annihilation of the rest of you. If on the other hand he is truthful, then we shall not make peace except on the payment of the Jizya. As for any offer of wealth, we shall soon take it from you anyway.”1
Khalid's words, uttered with unshakeable conviction, had a profound effect on David. Saying that he would go and con-
1Ibid, p. 39.
340 The Sword of Allah
vey Khalid's message to Werdan, he turned and began to walk away while Khalid stood staring after him and sensing that all was not as it seemed. David had not gone far before it suddenly struck him that Khalid was right; that victory would go to the Muslims, and the Romans would perish no matter what tricks they tried. He decided to save himself and his family by con­fessing the truth. Consequently he retraced his steps and once again stood before Khalid, to whom he revealed the entire Roman plot, including the place at which the 10 Romans would lie concealed—below a hillock a little to the right of the Roman centre. Khalid promised to spare David and his family on con­dition that he did not tell Werdan that the Muslims now knew of his plot. To this David agreed.
On his return to the Roman army, David informed Wer­dan of the initial talks he had had with Khalid and Khalid's agreement to the rendezvous as planned; but he said nothing of his second conversation with the Muslim.  Werdan was delighted.
*
At first Khalid thought of going alone to the hillock and killing all 10 Romans himself. His adventurous soul thrilled at the prospect of a glorious fight. But when he discussed the matter with Abu Ubeida, the latter dissuaded him and suggested that he should detail 10 valiant fighters instead.  To this Khalid agreed. The 10 men he chose included Zarrar, who was appointed the leader of the party. He instructed Zarrar to be prepared next morning to dash out from the front rank of the Muslims and intercept and kill the 10 Romans when they appeared. But Zar­rar was no less adventurous in spirit than Khalid and insisted that he and his men be allowed to use the hours of darkness to find the Romans in their place of concealment and kill them in their lair. Knowing Zarrar as he did, Khalid acceded to his request. Shortly before midnight Zarrar and his nine comrades set off from the camp.
Soon after sunrise Werdan came forward in full imperial regalia, wearing bejewelled armour with a bejewelled sword hanging at his side. Khalid walked up from the Muslim centre and stopped in front of Werdan. The two armies were already
The Battle of Ajnadem 341
arrayed in battle order as on the previous day.
Werdan started the negotiations with an attempt to brow­beat the Muslim. He expressed his low opinion of the Arabians;
how wretched the conditions in which they lived were, and how miserably starved they were in their homeland. Khalid's res­ponse was sharp and aggressive. “O Christian dog!” he snapped. “This is your last chance to accept Islam or pay the Jizya.”1 At this, Werdan, without drawing his sword, sprang at Khalid and held him, at the same time shouting for the 10 Romans to come to his aid.
From behind the hillock he saw, out of the corner of his eye, 10 Romans emerge and race towards him. Khalid also saw them and was horrified, for he was expecting to see Muslims emerge from behind the hillock. He had made no other arrange­ments for his own protection, and he wondered, with a sense of deep sorrow, if Zarrar had at last met his match. As the group of 10 got nearer, however, Werdan noticed that the leader of these ‘Romans’ was naked above the waist; and then the terrible truth dawned upon him.
During the night Zarrar and his nine comrades had got to the hillock, killed all 10 Romans noiselessly, and then, such was Zarrar's impish sense of humour, put on the garments and the armour of the Romans. Later, however, Zarrar discarded the garments and reverted to his normal fighting dress! As the first light of dawn appeared, these 10 Muslims said the prayer of the morning and then awaited the call of the Roman com­mander.
Werdan left Khalid and stepped back, looking on help­lessly as the 10 Muslims surrounded the pair. Zarrar now advan­ced with drawn sword. At this Werdan implored Khalid, “I beseech you, in the name of whatever you worship, to kill me yourself; do not let this devil come near me.”2
In reply Khalid nodded to Zarrar, and Zarrar’s sword flashed in the sun and severed Werdan’s head.
It was Khalid's way so to time his attack as to get the maximum benefit from any tactical advantage which he had gained over his enemy. When no other advantage was possible and manoeuvre was restricted, he would exploit the psychological effect of killing the enemy commander-in-chief or some
1Ibid, p. 41.      2Ibid.
342 The Sword of Allah
other prominent general, and strike a powerful blow with the entire army while the enemy was stunned by the moral setback of such a loss. Here again Khalid did the same. As soon as Werdan was killed, he ordered a general attack: the centre, the wings and the flank guards swept forward and assaulted the Romans, who were now under the command of Qubuqlar.
As the two armies met, another phase of violent hand-to-hand fighting began. Soon the fighting became vicious, with no quarter given or taken. The Muslims struck fiercely at the Roman formations, and the Romans struggled desperately to hold the assault. Khalid and all his officers fought in front of the men, and so did many of the Roman generals who were prepared to die for the glory of the empire. The battlefield soon turned into a wreckage of human bodies, mostly Roman, as the men strugg­led mightily without respite.
At last, as the two sides were reaching the point of exhaus­tion, Khalid threw his reserve of 4,000 men under Yazeed into the centre; and with the added impetus of this reinforcement the Muslims broke through at several places, driving deep wedges into the Roman army. In the centre a Muslim group got to where Qubuqlar stood with his head wrapped in a cloth, and killed him. It is believed that Qubuqlar had ordered his head to be so wrapped because he could no longer bear to see such carnage.1 With the death of Qubuqlar, the Roman resistance weakened, and soon after collapsed entirely. The Romans fled from the field of battle.
It was safer to stand and fight the Muslim Arabs in battle than to run from them. Against a fleeing enemy, the Arab of the desert was in his element. As the Romans sought to escape, they turned in three directions; some fled towards Gaza, others to­wards Jaffa, but the largest group of fugitives made for Jerusa­lem. Khalid forthwith launched his cavalry in several regiments to pursue the enemy on all three routes; and at the hands of this cavalry the Romans suffered even more grievous damage than in the two days of fighting on the plain of Ajnadein. The pursuit and the killing of the fugitives continued till sunset, when the pursuing columns returned to camp.
The Roman army had been torn to pieces.

*
1Tabari: Vol. 2, pp. 610-611.
The Battle of Ajnadein 343
It was a complete victory. The Romans had been fought in a set-piece battle after the regular imperial fashion, and were not only defeated tactically but also slaughtered mercilessly. The Roman army assembled at Ajnadein had ceased to exist as an army, although a sizable portion of it managed to get away, especially the part that fled to Jerusalem and found safety within its walls. In the first great encounter between Islam and Byzan­tium, the followers of Mohammad had conquered.
It had been a full and fierce battle, but without any fine manoeuvres. The Roman army had not attempted any outflank­ing movement, since it was too large and too cumbersome to do so. The Muslims had not because their army was compara­tively small, and manoeuvres against the flanks and rear of the enemy could only have been carried out by weakening the centre —a clearly unjustifiable risk. Hence this had been a frontal clash of massed bodies of men in which Muslim leadership and the courage and skill of the warriors prevailed over the great size of the Roman legions. The only choice of manoeuvre available to Khalid had been to time his assaults to get the maximum benefit from the prevailing situation, which he did as has been described. And of course, when the Roman army broke, Khalid showed his typical drive by organising the pursuit to ensure that as many Romans as possible were brought down before the rest reached a place of safety.
Victory in the Battle of Ajnadein opened the way for the conquest of Syria. This land could not, of course, be conquered with a single battle; for large imperial forces remained in the cities of Syria and Palestine, and the Roman Emperor could draw on the resources of the whole Empire, which stretched from Armenia to the Balkans. But the first great clash with the Romans was over; and the Muslims could now continue their campaign with the confidence that they would have no less success in the mighty battles that undoubtedly lay ahead.
Three days after the battle, according to Waqidi, Khalid wrote to Abu Bakr and informed him of the battle, giving the Roman casualties as 50,000 dead at the cost of only 450 Mus­lims.1 The Roman Commander-in-Chief, his deputy and several top generals of the Roman army had been killed. Khalid also informed the Caliph that he would shortly march on Damascus.
1Waqidi: p. 42.
'344 The Sword of Allah
At Madina the news of this victory was received with joy and shouts of Allah-o-Akbar, and more volunteers came forward to join the holy war in Syria. These included Abu Sufyan, who, along with his wife, the redoubtable Hind, journeyed to Syria to join the corps of his son, Yazeed. In reply to Khalid's letter, Abu Bakr wrote to him to besiege Damascus until it was con­quered, and thereafter attack Emessa and Antioch.  Khalid was not, however, to advance beyond the northern frontier of Syria.
Heraclius was at Emessa when the news of the crushing defeat of the Roman army struck him like a bolt from the sky. Heraclius felt devastated. He journeyed to Antioch; and expect­ing the Muslims to advance on Damascus, ordered the remnants of the Roman army at Jerusalem (but not its local garrison) to intercept the Muslims at Yaqusa1 and delay their advance. (See Map 16.) At the same time he ordered more forces into motion towards Damascus to strengthen that city and prepare for a siege.
A week after the Battle of Ajnadein, Khalid marched with the Muslim army and, again by-passing Jerusalem from the south, moved towards Damascus. At Fahl, which held a strong Roman garrison, he left a mounted detachment under Abul A'war to keep the garrison tied down in the fort; with the rest of the army he moved on and reached the bank of the River Yarmuk at Yaqusa, where he was again faced by Roman forces on the north bank. The Romans were not in a position to offer serious resistance, as they were still shaken by their defeat at Ajnadein; their main purpose here was only a rear-guard action to gain more time for the reinforcement of Damascus. Never­theless a battle did take place at Yaqusa in mid-August 634 (mid-Jamadi-ul-Akhir, 13 Hijri), and the Romans were again defeated.2
The Romans fell back in haste; and Khalid advanced upon Damascus.
l Also known as Waqusa.
2Some early writers, including Tabari, appear to have confused this action at Yaqusa with the Battle of Yarmuk, which was fought in the same general area, and have given the year of Yarmuk as 13 Hijri, which is incorrect.











30: THE CONQUEST OF DAMASCUS
Damascus was known as the paradise of Syria. A glitter­ing metropolis which contained everything that makes a city great and famous, it had wealth, culture, temples and troops. It had history. The main part of the city was enclosed by a mas­sive wall, 11 metres high,1 but outside the battlements lay some suburbs which were not protected. The fortified city was a mile long and half a mile wide and was entered by six gates: the East Gate, the Gate of Thomas, the Jabiya Gate, the Gate of Faradees, the Keisan Gate and the Small Gate. Along the north wall ran the River Barada, which, however, was too small to be of military significance.
At the time of the Syrian campaign, the Roman Commander-in-Chief at Damascus was Thomas, son-in-law of Em­peror Heraclius. A deeply religious man and a devout Christian, he was known not only for his courage and skill in the command of troops but also for his intelligence and learning. Under him served, as his deputy, a general by the name of Harbees about whom little is known except that he was there.
The general who was in active command of the garrison, however, was Azazeer, a veteran soldier who had spent a lifetime campaigning in the East and had acquired fame in countless
1Damascus City has risen 4 metres since then, so that the wall is now only 7 metres above ground level.
346 The Sword of Allah
battles against the Persians and the Turks. He was acknow­ledged as a great champion and was proud of the fact that he had never lost a duel. Having served in Syria for many years, he knew Arabic very well and spoke it fluently.
Azazeer's garrison consisted of no less than 12,000 sol­diers, but Damascus as a city had not been prepared for a siege. Although its walls and bastions were in good order, nothing had been done for the storage of food and fodder—a task which, for a garrison and a population so large, would take weeks and months. The Romans can hardly be blamed for this neglect, for ever since the final defeat of the Persians by Heraclius in 628, there had been no threat of any kind to Syria; and it was not until the Battle ofAjnadein had been fought that the Romans realised the full extent of the danger which threatened them.
Heraclius, working from his headquarters at Antioch, now set about the task of putting things right and preparing Damascus for a siege.  Having ordered the remnants of the army of Ajnadein to delay the Muslims at Yaqusa, he sent a force of 5,000 soldiers from Antioch to reinforce the garrison of Damascus. This force was placed under a general named Kulus, who promised the Emperor that he would bring the head of Khalid on a lance.1 Kulus arrived at Damascus at about the time when the battle of Yaqusa was fought. The strength of the gar­rison at Damascus was thus raised to 17,000 men; but Kulus and Azazeer were professional rivals and there was little love lost between them. Each wished to see the downfall of the other.
Thomas worked feverishly to prepare the city for a siege. Provisions were rapidly gathered from the surrounding country­side to sustain the garrison and the inhabitants in case the lines of supply were severed by the besiegers. However, not enough could be gathered for a long siege. Scouts were sent out to watch and report on the movement of the Muslims; and the bulk of the army, leaving strong guards and a reserve in Damascus, was ordered to prepare to fight a battle outside Damascus. The idea was to defeat and drive back the Muslims before they could invest the city; but it was with mounting anxiety that the Damas­cenes awaited the arrival of Khalid.
*
1Waqidi: p. 20.
The Conquest of Damascus 347
Khalid had by now organized a military staff—a simple beginning of what later in military history would emerge as the General Staff. He had collected from all the regions in which he had fought—Arabia, Iraq, Syria and Palestine—a small group of keen and intelligent men who acted as his ‘staff officers’, mainly functioning as an intelligence staff.1 They would collect information, organize the despatch and questioning of agents, and keep Khalid up to date with the latest military situation. Intelligence was one aspect of war to which Khalid paid special attention. Ever watchful and ever ready to exploit fleeting oppor­tunities, it was said of him that “he neither slept nor let others sleep, and nothing was concealed from him.”2 But this was a personal staff rather than the staff of an army headquarters;
wherever Khalid went, this staff went with him.
Khalid had also made a notable change in the organisation of the army. From his army of Iraq, which after Ajnadein numbered about 8,000 men, he had organised a force of 4,000 horse­men, which the early historians refer to as ‘the Army of Move­ment’. For want of a better translation, it shall here be called the Mobile Guard. This force, like the army of Iraq, which now comprised just one corps of the Muslim army, was kept under his personal command by Khalid, and was earmarked as a mobile reserve for use in battle as required. The Mobile Guard was undoubtedly the finest body of men in the army—a corps d’elite.
From Yaqusa, Khalid marched with his corps of Iraq in the lead. This was followed by the other corps and the women and children. By now the families of the warriors from Iraq, which had been sent to Madina before the Perilous March, has also joined the Muslim army in Syria. After three days of marching along the Jabiya route, the leading elements arrived -at Marj-us-Suffar, about 12 miles from Damascus, and discovered a large Roman army barring their way. This Roman force, consisting of about 12,000 soldiers and commanded by Kulus and Azazeer, had been sent forward by Thomas to fight a battle in the open and drive the Muslims away from Damascus, or if that were not possible, delay the Muslim advance and thus gain more time for the provisioning of the city. For the night
1Waqidi: Vol. 2, p. 47.
2Tabari: Vol. 2, p. 626.
348 The Sword of Allah
the leading Muslim corps camped about a mile from the Roman position, while the other corps were still some distance behind.
Marj-us-Suffar (the Yellow Meadow) stretched south from Kiswa, a small town 12 miles from Damascus on the present road to Dar'a. At the southern edge of the town ran a small, wooded wadi and from this wadi stretched southwards the Marj-us-Suffar. Just west of the town rose a low ridge, and the Roman position was in front of this and south of the wadi.1
The following morning, on August 19, 634 (the 19th of Jamadi-ul-Akhir, 13 Hijri), Khalid moved up his corps; and the Muslims and the Romans marshalled their forces for the Battle of Marj-us-Suffar. The rest of the Muslim army was rushing to the battlefield, but it would be another two hours or so before it arrived. The leading corps, which was now deployed for battle, would act as a firm base on which the whole army would form up on arrival. The Romans appeared to remain on the defensive since they made no move to engage the Muslims. In the mean time Khalid started a phase of duels that would keep the Romans occupied until the arrival of the remaining Muslim corps.
This phase was rather like a tournament with gallants displaying their courage and skill, except that a good deal of blood was shed. The Romans played the game sportingly, for they too had champions as gallant as any; and among these the two generals, Kulus and Azazeer, were considered the bravest and the best. The rank and file of the two armies stood by as spectators and cheered their ‘players’.
Khalid started this bloody tournament by calling forward a number of his stalwarts, including Zarrar, Shurahbeel and Abdur Rahman bin Abi Bakr. All these cavaliers rode out from the Muslim front rank, galloped about the space between the two armies and threw their individual challenges. Against each of them a Roman officer emerged, and the champions paired off for combat. Practically every Roman was killed. After killing his opponent the Muslim champion would gallop across the front of the Roman army, taunting and challenging; and on getting a suitable opportunity, would even strike down one or two men in the front rank before retiring to the Muslim army. As in earlier encounters, Zarrar, naked above the waist, did the most
1The town, the ridge and the wadi are still there, and the plain is still yellowish in appearance.
The Conquest of Damascus 349
damage and slew the largest number of Romans, thrilling the spectators with his daredevilry.
When this had gone on for an hour or so, Khalid decided that it was time for the ‘heavy-weight bout’! He called back the Muslim officers and rode forward himself. As he got into the centre of the battlefield, he called:
I am the pillar of Islam!
I am the Companion of the Prophet!
I am the noble warrior,
           Khalid bin Al Waleed!1
Since he was the commander of the Muslim army, his challenge had to be met by a top ranking Roman general. Kulus had by now lost some of his zest for battle, because he had been intimidated by the sad fate of all the Romans who had come forward to duel with the Muslims this morning. It appears that he was unwilling to accept the challenge of Khalid; but egged on by the taunts of his rival, Azazeer, he rode out from the front of the Roman army. On getting near Khalid he indicated that he wished to talk; but Khalid paid no heed to his sign and attacked him with his lance. Kulus parried the thrust, showing uncommon skill in doing so. Khalid charged at him again, but again the thrust was parried.
Khalid decided not to use the lance any more. He came near his opponent, dropped his lance and grappled with him with his bare hands. Catching Kulus by the collar he jerked him off his horse, whereupon the Roman fell to the ground and made no effort to rise. At this Khalid signalled for two Muslims to come to him. When they came forward, he ordered them to take Kulus away as a prisoner, which they did.
While the Romans were dismayed by the sight of this encounter, Azazeer was secretly pleased and hoped that the Mus­lims would kill Kulus. Now he came forward, and regarding him­self as a greater fighter than Kulus, had no doubt that he would soon make short work of Khalid. But he would first amuse himself by making fun of the Muslim commander. Azazeer stopped a few paces from Khalid and said in Arabic, “O Arab brother, come near me so that I can ask you some questions.”
“O enemy of Allah “ replied Khalid. “Come near me yourself or I shall come and take your head.” Azazeer looked sur-
1Waqidi: pp. 41, 48.
350 The Sword of Allah
prised, but urged his horse forward and stopped at duelling distance. In a gentle, pursuasive tone he continued: “0 Arab brother, what makes you come to fight in person? Do you not fear that if I kill you, your comrades will be left without a com­mander?”
“O enemy of Allah, you have already seen what a few of my comrades have done. If I were to give them permission, they would destroy your entire army with Allah's help. I have with me men who regard death as a blessing and this life as an illu­sion. Anyway, who are you?”
“Do you not know me?” Azazeer exclaimed. “I am the champion of Syria! I am the killer of Persians! I am the breaker of Turkish armies!”
“What is your name?” asked Khalid.
“I am named after the angel of death. I am Israel!”
At this Khalid laughed. “I fear that he after whom you are named seeks you ardently... to take you to the abyss of hell!”
Azazeer ignored this remark and went on in a unconcerned way: “What have you done with your prisoner, Kulus?”
“He is held in irons.”
“What prevents you from killing him? He is the most cunning of the Romans.”
“Nothing prevents me except the desire to kill both of you together.”
“Listen,” said the Roman, “I shall give you 1,000 pieces of gold, 10 robes of brocade and five horses if you will kill him and give me his head.”
“That is the price for him. What will you give me to save yourself?”
“What do you want of me?”
“The Jizya!”
This enraged Azazeer, who said, “As we rise in honour, so you fall in disgrace. Defend yourself, for now I kill you.”
These words were hardly out of the Roman’s mouth when Khalid assailed him. He struck several times with his sword, but Azazeer, showing perfect mastery over the art, parried every blow and remained unharmed. A cry of admiration rose from the Muslim ranks at the skill with which the Roman was defending himself against their commander, who had few equals in combat and those only among the Muslims. Khalid also stopped in amazement.
The Conquest of Damascus 351
The face of the Roman broke into a smile as he said, “By the Messiah, I could easily kill you if I wished. But I am determined to take you alive, so that I may then release you on condition that you leave our land.”
Khalid was infuriated by the cool, condescending manner of the Roman general and his success in defending himself. He decided to take the Roman alive and humble him. As he moved forward to attack again, however, to his great surprise, Azazeer turned his horse and began to canter away. Believing that the Roman was fleeing from combat, Khalid pursued him and the spectators saw the remarkable spectacle of two generals galloping, one after the other, in the no-man's-land between the two armies. Several times the riders galloped round the field; and then Khalid began to lag behind, his horse sweating and winded. The Roman was better mounted, and his horse showed no sign of fatigue.
This apparently was a pre-determined plan of Azazeer, for when he saw Khalid's mount exhausted, he reined in his horse and waited for Khalid to catch up. Khalid was now in a most unforgiving mood, since in this race his opponent had got the better of him, and it did not help his temper to hear the Roman mock at him: “O Arab! Do not think that I fled in fear. In fact I am being kind to you. Lo, I am the taker of souls! I am the angel of death!”
Khalid's horse was no longer fit for combat. He dismounted and walked towards Azazeer, sword in hand. The Roman gloated at the sight of his opponent approaching on foot while he himself was mounted. Now, he thought, he had Khalid just where he wanted him. As Khalid got within striking distance, Azazeer raised his sword and made a vicious sideways swipe to cut off the Muslim’s head; but Khalid ducked to let the blade swish past harmlessly inches above his head. The next instant he struck at the forelegs of the Roman's horse, severing them completely from the body, and horse and rider came tumbling down. Now all courage left Azazeer. He got up and tried to run, but Khalid sprang at him and catching him with both hands, lifted him bodily off the ground and hurled him down. Next he caught Azazeer by the collar, jerked him up and marched him back to the Muslim army, where he joined Kulus in irons.1
1The description of these duels and the dialogue are taken from Waqidi: pp. 19-21.
352 The Sword of Allah
This grand duel was hardly over when two more Muslim corps, those of Abu Ubeida and Amr bin Al Aas, arrived at the battefield. Khalid deployed them as the wings of his army; and as soon as the battle formation was complete, ordered a general attack.
The Romans stood firm for an hour or so, but could not hold the Muslims longer. The loss of a large number of their officers, including the two top generals, had had a depressing effect on their spirits; and the fact that Damascus stood just behind, beckoning to them to come and be safe within its walls, acted as a temptation to withdraw. So they retreated, in good order, leaving behind a large number of dead. The Roman army arrived at the city and entered its walls, closing the gates behind it.
The Muslims spent the night on the plain, and the follow­ing day marched to the city. Here, on August 20, 634 (the 20th of Jamadi-ul-Akhir, 13 Hijri), Khalid launched the Muslim army into the siege of Damascus.1
*
Khalid had already left behind a mounted detachment at Fahl to keep the Roman garrison occupied and prevent it from coming to the aid of Damascus or interfering with the movement of messengers and reinforcements from Madina. Now he sent out another detachment on the road to Emessa to take up a position near Beit Lihya, about 10 miles from the city,2 and instructed its commander to send out scouts to observe and report the arrival of Roman relief columns. If unable to deal with such columns himself, the detachment commander would seek Khalid's help. Having thus arranged a blocking position to isolate Damascus from Northern Syria, which was the most likely region whence relief columns could approach Damascus, Khalid surrounded the city with the rest of the army. (See Map 17.)
1For an explanation of the details of the Battle of Marj-us-Suffar, see Note 10 in Appendix B.
2Beit Lihya no longer exists, and its exact location is not known. It was a small town in the Ghuta (Yaqut: Vol. 1, p. 780), and I have placed it at the outer edge of the Ghuta because to position a blocking force nearer the city would be militarily unsound.










MAP 17: THE CONQUEST OF DAMASCUS - I
354 The Sword of Allah
Damascus now held a Roman garrison of about 15,000 to 16,000 soldiers, a considerable civil population comprising the permanent inhabitants and a large number of people from the surrounding region who had taken refuge in the city. The Muslim strength at Damascus is not recorded, but must have been quite a bit less than in the preceding month. Muslim dead in the three battles just fought—at Ajnadein, at Yaqusa and at the Marj-us-Suffar—undoubtedly ran into four figures; and thousands more must have been wounded in these battles and rendered unable to participate in the siege. Moreover, a group had been sent out as a blocking force and a detachment left at Fahl. In view of all this, I estimate the Muslim strength at Damascus at about 20,000 men. With this strength Khalid besieged the city.
He positioned the corps of Iraq, which included elements of the Mobile Guard, at the East Gate. He placed the bulk of this corps under Rafe, and himself stayed a short distance away from the East Gate with a reserve of 400 horsemen from the Mobile Guard. He established his headquarters in a monastery which, as a result, became known as Deir Khalid, i.e. Monastery of Khalid (and it is believed that the monks living in this monas­tery helped the Muslims in various ways, including the care of Muslim wounded.)[1]1 At each of the remaining gates, he deployed a force of 4,000 to 5,000 men whose commanders were as follows (See Map 18):
Gate of Thomas                  : Shurahbeel.
Jabiya Gate                          : Abu Ubeida.
Gate of Faradees                 : Amr bin Al Aas.
Keisan Gate                         : Yazeed.

Small Gate                            :
To the corps commanders Khalid gave instructions to the effect that they would: (a) camp outside bow-range of the fort; (b) keep the gate under observation; (c) move archers up to engage any Roman archers who appeared on the battlements; (d) throw back any Roman force which sallied out from the gate; and (e) seek Khalid's help in case of heavy pressure. Zarrar was placed in command of 2,000 horsemen from the Mobile

[1]This monastery, which was also known as Deir-ul-Ahmar (the Red Monastery), no longer exists, but its general location is known. About a quarter of a mile from the East Gate, stretching eastwards stands a garden. The monastery was in this garden, and according to Waqidi (p. 43), was less than a mile from the gate.
MAP 18 : THE CONQUEST OF DAMASCUS - II
356 The Sword of Allah

Guard, and given the task of patrolling the empty spaces bet­ween the gates during the night and helping any corps attacked by the Romans.
With these instructions the Muslim corps deployed, and the siege began. Tents were pitched, and Zarrar started his patrolling. Every main avenue of relief and escape was closed, but this applied only to formed bodies of men. Individuals could still be lowered from the wall at many places during the night, and thus Thomas was able to keep in touch with the outside world and with Heraclius at Antioch.
On the day following the arrival of the Muslims, Khalid had Kulus and Azazeer brought in irons near the East Gate where they could be seen by the Romans on the wall. Here both generals were offered Islam, and both rejected the offer. Then, in full view of the Roman garrison, the two generals were be­headed, the executioner being none other than Zarrar.
For three weeks the siege continued with no major action except for a few half-hearted Roman sallies which the Muslims had no difficulty in repulsing. During the day the two sides would keep up a sporadic exchange of archery, though no great damage was suffered by either side. This was to be a siege to the bitter end. Damascus would, if necessary, be starved into submission.1
*
Soon after Heraclius heard of the defeat of the Roman army at Marj-us-Suffar by Khalid and the commencement of the siege of the city, he undertook measures to raise fresh forces. The recent blows suffered by the Empire were serious enough; but the successful advance of the Muslims had now created an even more critical situation, and Damascus itself was in danger. If Damascus fell, it would be a staggering blow to the prestige of the Byzantine Empire, one from which it could not recover without mobilizing the entire military resources of the Empire—a task not to be undertaken except in the direst emergency. And Damascus was in danger of falling not because of insufficient troops in the city but because of insufficient supplies. It had not been provisioned for a long siege.
1According to Tabari (Vol. 2, p. 626) the Muslims also used cata­pults at this siege; but this is unlikely because the Muslims had no siege equipment, nor did they know much about using it.
The Conquest of Damascus 357
Within 10 days of the start of the siege, Heraclius had raised a new army of 12,000 men drawn from garrisons in various parts of Northern Syria and the Jazeera.1 This army was laun­ched from Antioch with a large baggage-train carrying supplies, and the commander was instructed to reach Damascus at any cost and relieve the beleaguered garrison. The relief column marched via Emessa, made contact with Muslim scouts between Emessa and Damascus, and from here onwards was prepared for battle at a moment’s notice.
On September 9, 634 (the 10th of Rajab, 13 Hijri), a mes­senger came galloping into Khalid's camp to inform him that a large Roman army of undetermined strength was advancing rapidly from Emessa, and in a day or so would make contact with the blocking force deployed at Beit Lihya. Khalid was not sur­prised to hear this, for he had guessed that Heraclius would do everything in his power to relieve Damascus; and it was for this reason that Khalid had placed the blocking force on the main route by which a relief column could approach the city.
He immediately organised a mounted force of 5,000 men and placed it under Zarrar. He instructed Zarrar to proceed with all speed to the area of Beit Lihya, take command of the regiment already deployed there and deal with the relief column approaching from Emessa. He cautioned Zarrar against being rash and instructed him to seek reinforcements before committing his force to battle in case the enemy strength proved too large. Such words of caution, however, were wasted on Zarrar; if there was one quality which he did not possess, it was caution. With Rafe as his second-in-command, Zarrar rode away from Dam­ascus and picking up the blocking force, moved forward to a low ridge a little short of Saniyyat-ul-Uqab (the Pass of the Eagle) and deployed his force in ambush.
Next morning the Roman army appeared in sight. The Muslims waited. As the head of the Roman column got close to the ambush, Zarrar ordered the attack. His men rose from their places of concealment, and led by their half-naked com­mander, rushed at the Romans. But the Romans were prepared for such a contingency. They deployed so quickly in battle forma-
1Jazeera literally means island, and this name was used to designate the region lying between the rivers Euphrates and Tigris in present-day North-Eastern Syria, North-Western Iraq and South-Eastern Turkey.
358 The Sword of Allah
tion that the action became a frontal engagement, with the Muslims attacking and the Romans standing firm in defense on higher ground in front of the Pass of the Eagle. The Muslims now realised the full strength of the enemy, which amounted to twice their own. But this did not matter to Zarrar. Assaulting furiously in front of his men, he got far ahead of his comrades and before long was completely surrounded by the Romans. His enemies recognised him as the Naked Champion; and decided to take him alive and show him as a prize to their Emperor. Zarrar was wounded by an arrow in the right arm but continued to fight as the Romans closed in. At last, however, after he had suffered several wounds, he was overpowered by the Romans, who then sent him to the rear.
The loss of Zarrar had a depressing effect on the Muslims, but Rafe was a worthy successor to the dashing Zarrar. Taking command, he launched several attacks to get through to Zarrar and rescue him; but his efforts proved fruitless, and the action turned into a stalemate. Rafe realised that there was nothing that he could do to break the Roman force deployed in front of him; and in the afternoon he sent a message to Khalid telling him about the engagement, about the enemy strength and about the loss of Zarrar—probably still alive as a prisoner.
The sun was still well above the horizon when Khalid received news of this engagement. He realised that the Roman strength at Beit Lihya was too large for Rafe to tackle on his own. And this placed Khalid in a serious dilemma. The Roman relief column had to be defeated and driven back towards Emessa, and this could be done quickly only if Khalid himself took com­mand at Beit Lihya with a sizable reinforcement from Damascus. Failing this, the Roman relief column would have every chance of breaking through the Muslim blocking force, and this could have a disastrous effect on the Muslim siege of Damascus. But there was also the problem of timing. If an immediate move were made to reinforce Rafe, the Roman garrison would observe the move and sally out to break the grip of the weakened besieg­ing force. The relieving Romans at Beit Lihya had to be beaten; yet the besieged Romans in Damascus had to be kept in the dark about the movement of Muslim reinforcements from Damascus. Khalid decided to risk a delay and carry out no move till the latter part of the night, by when the beleaguered gar-
The Conquest of Damascus 359
rison would be less likely to discover the move.
Preparations were made accordingly. The command at Damascus was taken over by Abu Ubeida who would see to the siege operations during Khalid's absence. After midnight a detachment of 1,000 Muslim warriors under Meisara bin Masruq took up positions at the East Gate and some other readjust­ments were made at the other gates. Then, some time between midnight and dawn, Khalid set off with his Mobile Guard of 4,000 horse. The Guard moved swiftly through the remainder of the night and early the following morning arrived at the scene of battle between Rafe and the Romans. The fighting was con­tinuing on this second day of battle with no decision in sight. Indeed the Muslims were now tired of attacking the Romans, who stood like a rock against the Muslim assaults.
As Khalid approached the battlefield he suddenly saw a Muslim rider flash past him from behind and gallop off towards the Roman front. Before Khalid could stop him, he was gone. A slim, lightly-built person, dressed in black, this rider wore a breastplate and was armed with a sword and a long lance. He sported a green turban and had a scarf wrapped around his face, acting as a mask, with only his eyes visible. Khalid arrived on the battlefield in time to see this rider throw himself at the Romans with such fury that everyone present thought that he and his horse must both be mad. Rafe saw this rider before he saw Khalid and remarked, “He attacks like Khalid, but he is clearly not Khalid.”1 Then Khalid joined Rafe.
Khalid took a little time to organize Rafe’s group and his own Mobile Guard into one and deploy it as a combined force for battle. Meanwhile the masked rider treated the Muslims to a thrilling display of horsemanship and attacks with the lance. He would go charging on his own, strike the Roman front at one point and kill a man; then go galloping away to another part of the front, again strike someone in the Roman front line and so on. A few Romans came forward to tackle him but all went down before his terrible lance. Marvelling at this wonderous sight, the Muslims could still see nothing more of the warrior than a youthful figure and a pair of bright eyes shining above the mask. The rider appeared bent on suicide as with his clothes and lance covered with blood, he struck again and again at the Romans.
1Waqidi: p. 27.
360 The Sword of Allah
The example of this warrior put fresh courage into the men of Rafe, who forgot their fatigue and went into battle with renewed high spirits as Khalid gave the order to attack.
The masked rider, now joined by many others, continued his personal war against the Romans as the entire Muslim force attacked the Roman front. Soon after the general attack had begun, Khalid got near this rider and called, “O warrior, show us your face.” A pair of dark eyes flashed at Khalid before the rider turned away and galloped off into another assault at the Romans. Next, a few of Khalid's men caught up with him and said, “O noble warrior, your commander calls you and you turn away from him! Show us your face and tell us your name so that you may be properly honoured.” Again the rider turned away as if deliberately trying to keep his identity a secret.
As the masked rider returned from his charge, he passed by Khalid, who called to him sternly to stop. The rider pulled up his horse, and Khalid continued, “You have done enough to fill our hearts with admiration. Who are you?”
Khalid nearly fell off his horse when he heard the reply of the masked rider, for it was the voice of a girl! “0 commander, I only turn away from you out of modesty. You are the glorious commander, and I am of those who stay behind the veil. I fight like this because my heart is on fire.”
“Who are you?”
“I am Khaula, sister of Zarrar. My brother has been cap­tured, and I must fight to set him free.”
Khalid marvelled at the old man, Al Azwar, who had fathered two such dauntless fighters, a boy and a girl. “Then come and attack with us”, he said.1
The Muslim attack continued in force and at about midday the Romans began to withdraw from the battlefield in good order. The Muslims followed, keeping up a steady pressure, but there was no sign of Zarrar, dead or alive. Then, as good luck would have it, some local Arabs came to the Muslims with the information that they had seen 100 Romans riding to Emessa with a half-naked man in their midst, tied to his horse. Khalid at once guessed that Zarrar had been sent away from the battlefield and ordered Rafe to take 100 picked riders, move wide around the flank of the Romans, get to the Emessa road
1Waqidi: p.28.
The Conquest of Damascus 361
and intercept the escort taking Zarrar to Emessa. Rafe at once selected 100 stalwarts and set off, accompanied, of course, by Khaula bint Al Azwar.
Rafe got to the Emessa road at a point which the escort had not yet reached and waited in ambush. When the 100 Romans arrived at this point, Rafe and his men assailed them, killed most of the soldiers and set Zarrar free. The Naked Champion and his loving sister were happily reunited. The party again made a wide detour to avoid the Roman army, and rejoined Khalid who was very, very grateful to Rafe for rescuing Zarrar.
Under the unrelenting pressure of the Muslims, the Ro­mans increased the pace of their retreat. As the Muslims struck with greater ferocity, the retreat turned into a rout, and the Romans took to their heels and fled in the direction of Emessa.
Khalid could not pursue the fleeing enemy because he had to get back to Damascus. The Muslim forces investing the city had been weakened by 9,000 men with the departure of first Rafe's detachment and then the reinforcement of the Mobile Guard. In case the Romans should attack in strength against any Muslim corps, there would be a serious danger of their breaking through. Consequently Khalid sent only a mounted regiment under Samt bin Al Aswad to follow the Romans to Emessa. Samt got there in due course and found that the Romans had withdrawn into the fort. The local inhabitants of Emessa, however, approached Samt and let it be known that they had no desire to fight the Muslims, with whom they would make peace and even feed any soldiers quartered in their city. After a friendly exchange of messages, Samt returned to Damascus.
Meanwhile Khalid had rejoined the Muslim army at Damascus. He resumed command and re-established the Muslim dispositions as they had been before the appearance of the Roman relief column.
*
The news of the sad fate of the relief column spread among the inhabitants of Damascus, and it was a grievous blow indeed. The Damascenes had pinned their hopes on Heraclius sending such a force to save them. Heraclius had in fact done his best, but the hopes of the city had been shattered by Khalid's action at Beit Lihya. Heraclius could no doubt raise more forces, but that
362 The Sword of Allah
would take time. Meanwhile the supplies were running low and there was no fresh ray of hope to brighten the horizon and give assurance and strength to the people of Damascus.
A number of questions were raised wherever people as­sembled. Even if Heraclius raised a fresh column—and this was unlikely in the near future—what assurance did they have that it would achieve better success than the last one? If the Muslims could do what they did to an army of 90,000 men at Ajnadein, what chance did the relatively small force at Damascus have of avoiding a military defeat and the plunder and captivity which would doubtless follow? How much longer would the supplies last? Would it not be better to make peace with the Muslims on whatever terms were offered, and in this manner avoid total destruction? Spirits fell and discontent rose in Damascus, espe­cially in the non-Roman section of the population. The situa­tion was becoming increasingly more desperate, and the tension increasingly more unbearable.
Then a delegation of prominent citizens approached Tho­mas. They apprised him of their fears and suggested that he consider the possibility of making peace with Khalid; but Tho­mas assured them that he had sufficient troops to defend the city, and would soon take the offensive to drive the Muslims away. Special services were held in the churches and prayers offered for deliverance from the peril which threatened the city. Thomas decided to attempt a powerful sally from the fort. He was a brave man, and as long as there was some chance of success, he would not surrender.
The following morning, early in the third week of Sept­ember 634, Thomas drew men from all sectors of the city and formed a strong force to break out through the Gate of Thomas. His immediate opponent here was Shurahbeel with his corps of about 5,000 men. Thomas started the operation with a con­centrated shower of arrows and stones against the Muslim archers in order to drive them back and get more room for debouching from the gate. The Muslims answered the Roman salvos with their own volleys of arrows. At the very beginning of this exchange several Muslims were killed, one of whom was Aban bin Saeed bin Al Aas— a man who had only recenty got married to an unusually brave woman. As soon as she heard that she had become a widow, she took a bow and joined the Muslim archers,
The Conquest of Damascus 363
seeking revenge. On the wall of the fort, near the Gate of Thomas, stood a priest with a large cross, the sight of which was intended to give added courage to the Romans. Unfortunately for this priest, the young Muslim widow chose him as her target. The arrow she shot at him drove through the man's breast; and priest and cross came tumbling down to the foot of the wall, to the delight of the Muslims and the dismay of the Romans. However, in this exchange the Romans got the better of the Muslims; and after a while the besiegers were driven back to a line out of range of the Roman archers and slingers.
Next the gate was opened and the Roman foot-soldiers, covered by the archers and slingers on the wall, rushed through the gate and fanned out into battle formation. As soon as the deployment was complete, Thomas ordered the attack against the corps of Shurahbeel, which had also formed up a few hundred yards from the gate. Thomas himself led the assault, sword in hand, and according to the chronicler, “roared like a camel!”1
Very soon there was heavy fighting between the two bodies of men. Shurahbeel’s corps was outnumbered but held its ground, not yielding an inch, and Roman losses began to mount. Thomas now noticed Shurahbeel and guessing that he was the commander of this Muslim force, made for him. Shurahbeel saw him coming, and with a blood-covered sword in his hand prepared to meet him. But before Thomas could reach Shurahbeel, he was struck in his right eye by an arrow, again fired by the widow, and fell to the ground. He was quickly picked up by his men and carried away, while at the same moment the Romans began to fall back to the fort. Thus, under pressure from swordsmen and under the punishing fire of Muslim archers deployed on the flanks, the Romans returned to the fort, leaving behind a large number of dead, several of whom had fallen to the arrows of the widow of Aban.
Inside the fort the surgeons examined the eye of Thomas. “The arrow had not penetrated deep, but they found that it could not be extracted. They therefore cut off the shaft where it entered the eye, and Thomas, instead of being depressed by the loss of his eye and the pain of his wound, showed himself to be a man of extraordinary courage. He swore that he would take a thousand eyes in return; that he would not only defeat these Muslims
1Waqidi: p. 46.
364 The Sword of Allah
but would follow them into Arabia, which, after he had finished with it, would be fit only for the habitation of wild beasts. He ordered another great sally to be carried out that night.
Meanwhile Shurahbeel was not a little worried. He had lost quite a large number of men, killed and wounded, and feared that if another determined sally were made by the Romans, they might succeed in breaking through his corps. He consequently asked Khalid for reinforcements; but Khalid had no men to spare. He could not weaken the other corps, because the Romans could attack at any gate, and might well choose another gate for their next sally. He instructed Shurahbeel to hold on as best he could, and assured him that Zarrar with his 2,000 men would get to him in case of heavy pressure. If need be he himself, with his reserve, would come and take over the battle at the Gate of Thomas. Shurahbeel prepared for another sally by the Romans, quite determined to hold on to the last man.
For the sally of the night, Thomas again selected the Gate of Thomas as the point of main effort in order to exploit the dam­age which he had undoubtedly caused to the corps of Shurah­beel. But he planned to make sallies from other gates also. The locations of the various Muslim corps and their commanders were known in detail to the garrison. To keep the Muslim corps at other gates tied down, so that they would not be able to come to the aid of Shurahbeel, Thomas ordered sallies form the Jabiya Gate, the Small Gate and the East Gate. For the last he allotted rather more forces than for the others, so that Khalid would be unable to move to Shurahbeel’s help and take command in that decisive sector. Attacking from several gates also gave more flexibility to the operation. Thus, if success were achieved in any sector other than the Gate of Thomas, that could be converted into the main sector and the success exploited accord­ingly.
In his orders Thomas emphasised the need for swift attacks, so that the Muslims would be caught unawares and des­troyed in their camps. No quarter would be given. Any Muslim wishing to surrender would be killed on the spot—any, that is, but Khalid, who was to be taken alive. The moon would rise about two hours before midnight. Soon after, on the signal of a gong to be struck on the orders of Thomas, the gates would be flung open and the attacks launched simultaneously.
The Conquest of Damascus 365
In the moonlight the Roman attacks began as planned. At the Jabiya Gate there was some hard fighting, and Abu Ubeida himself entered the fray with drawn sword. The Son of the Surgeon was an accomplished swordsman, and several Romans fell under his blows before the sally was repulsed and the Romans hastened back to the city.
At the Small Gate Yazeed had fewer troops than were positioned at the other gates and the Romans gained some initial success. But luckily Zarrar was nearby and joined Yazeed with his 2,000 warriors. Without a moment's delay Zarrar hurled his men at the enemy, whereupon the Romans reacted as if they had been assailed by demons and hastily withdrew to the fort with Zarrar close upon their heels.
At the East Gate the situation soon became more serious, for a larger Roman force had been assigned to this sector. From the sounds of battle Khalid was able to judge that the enemy had advanced farther than he should have been allowed to; and fearing that Rafe might not be able to hold the attack, went into battle himself with his reserve of 400 veterans from the Mobile Guard. As he got to the Romans, he gave his personal battle cry: “I am the noble warrior, Khalid bin Al Waleed.” This battle cry was by now known to all the Romans, and had the effect of imposing caution upon them. In fact it marked the turning point in the sally at the East Gate. Soon the Romans were in full retreat with the Muslims cutting down the stragglers. Most of this force was able to re-enter the city and close the East Gate behind it.
The heaviest fighting, however, took place at the Gate of Thomas, where Shurahbeel's corps, having fought a hard action during the day, had to bear the brunt of the fighting of the night. The moonlight helped visibility as the Romans rushed out of the gate and began to form up for battle. In this process they were subjected to withering fire from Shurahbeel's archers, but in spite of some losses, they completed their deployment and advanced to battle. For two hours the fighting continued unabated with Shurahbeel's men struggling desperately to hold the Roman attack. And hold it they did.
Shortly after midnight Thomas, who was himself fighting in the front rank, singled out Shurahbeel. The Muslim commander could be easily identified by the orders that he was shouting
366 The Sword of Allah
to his warriors. The two commanders paired off and began to duel with sword and shield.
For some time while the rest of the soldiers were locked in wild, frenzied combat, the duel of the two champions continued with no success to either. Then Shurahbeel, seeing an opening, struck with all his might at the shoulder of Thomas; but his sword, landing on the hard metal shoulder-pad of the Roman's breastplate, broke into pieces. Shurahbeel was now at the mercy of Thomas. Luckily for him, at that very moment two Muslims came up beside him and engaged Thomas. Shurahbeel pulled back, picked up the sword of a fallen Muslim and again returned to combat. But Thomas was no longer there.
By now the Romans had had enough of battle. Seeing that there was no weakening in the Muslim front, Thomas decided that to continue the attack would be fruitless and would lead to even heavier casualties among his men. He ordered a withdrawal, and the Romans moved back at a steady pace. The Muslims made no attempt to follow, though their archers did a certain amount of damage. Again the young widow used her bow with deadly effect.
This was the last attempt by Thomas to break the siege. The attempt had failed. He had lost thousands of men in these sallies, and could no longer afford to fight outside the walls of the city. His soldiers shared his disillusionment. They would fight to defend the city, but would not venture to engage the Muslims outside the fort. Thomas now gave more authority to his deputy, Harbees, delegating to him several of the functions of command which hitherto he had himself exercised.
*
After the failure of the nocturnal sally, the despair of the Damascenes knew no bounds. The dark clouds which threatened the great city had no silver lining. There was widespread grumbling among the people who now wished for nothing but peace; and in this desire they were joined by Thomas, who had fought gallantly in defence of the city and answered the call of honour. He was prepared to make peace and surrender the fort on terms, but was Khalid prepared to make peace? He was known as a man of violence who looked upon battle as a sport; and since he un-
The Conquest of Damascus 367
doubtedly knew the internal conditions prevailing in Damascus, would he accept anything less than an unconditional surrender, by which they would all be placed at his mercy?
By now the Romans had come to know the Muslim generals very well. They knew that Abu Ubeida was next in command after Khalid, and wished he were the first in command. The Son of the Surgeon was essentially a man of peace—gentle, kind, benevolent—and looked upon war as a sacred duty rather than a source of pleasure and excitement. With him they could make peace, and he would doubtless be generous in his terms. But Abu Ubeida was not the army commander. For two or three days this dilemma continued; and then the matter was taken out of their hands by Jonah the Lover.
Jonah, son of Marcus, was a Greek who was madly in love with a girl, also Greek. Actually she was his wife. Just before the arrival of the Muslims they had been married, but the cere­mony of handing over the bride to the husband had not been completed when the Muslims arrived and laid siege to Damascus. Thereafter Jonah asked her people several times to hand over his bride to him but they refused, saying that they were too busy fighting and that this was a matter of survival; and how could Jonah think of such things at a time like this? Actually Jonah could think of little else!
Just after dusk, on or about September 18, 634 (the 19th of Rajab, 13 Hijri), Jonah lowered himself with the aid of a rope near the East Gate, and approaching the nearest Muslim guard, asked to see Khalid. As soon as he was ushered into the presence of the commander, he narrated his sad story and explained the purpose of his visit. Would Khalid help him get his bride if he gave intelligence which would lead quickly to the capture of Damascus? Khalid would. He then informed Khalid that in the city this night the people were celebrating a festival in conse­quence of which there was revelry and drunkenness everywhere, and few sentries would be found at the gates. If Khalid could scale the wall, he would have no difficulty in opening any gate he chose and forcing an entry into the city.
Khalid felt that he could trust the man. He appeared sin­cere in what he said. Khalid offered him Islam, and Jonah accepted it. During the past few years he had heard much about Islam and was favourably inclined. At the hands of Khalid, Jonah now
368 The Sword of Allah
accepted the new faith, whereafter Khalid instructed him to return to the city and wait, which Jonah did.
As soon as the Greek had departed, Khalid ordered the procurement of ropes and the preparation of rope ladders. There was no time to make a coordinated plan of attack for the whole army; and so Khalid decided that he would storm the fort by the East Gate, with just the corps of Iraq which was positioned there. The moon would rise at about midnight, and soon after that the assault would begin.
According to Khalid's plan, 100 men would scale the wall at a place near the East Gate, where it was known to be the most impregnable. Here certainly there would be no sentries. At first three men would climb up with ropes. Then rope ladders would be fastened to the ropes and hauled up by the three to be used by the rest of the picked hundred to get to the top. Some men would remain at the top, while others would descend into the fort, kill any guards found at the gate and open the gate. Thereupon the entire corps would rush in and start the attack.
The three leaders who were to scale the wall were Khalid, Qaqa and Maz'ur bin Adi. The ropes were thrown up, lassoing the epaulements on the wall, after which these three indomitable souls climbed up hand by hand. There was no guard at the top. The rope ladders were drawn up, and on these others began to climb in silence. When half the group had arrived at the top, Khalid left a few men to assist the remaining climbers, and with the rest descended into the city. A few Roman soldiers were encountered on the way down and put to the sword. There­after the party rushed to the gate, where two sentries stood on guard. Khalid killed one while Qaqa killed the other. But by this time the alarm had been raised and parties of Romans began to converge towards the East Gate. Khalid knew that it was now touch and go.
The rest of the Muslim party hastily took up a position to keep the Romans away while Khalid and Qaqa dealt with the gate, which was locked and chained. A few blows shattered both lock and chain, and the gate was flung open. The next instant the corps of Iraq came pouring in. The Roman soldiers who had converged towards the gate never went back; their corpses littered the road to the centre of the city.
All Damascus was now awake. The Roman soldiers
The Conquest of Damascus 369
rushed to their assigned positions, as per rehearsed drills, and manned the entire circumference of the fort. Only a small reserve remained in the hands of Thomas as Khalid began his last on­slaught to get to the centre of Damascus, killing all who stood in his way—the regiments defending the sector of the East Gate.
It was shortly before dawn, and now Thomas played his last card—brilliantly. He knew that Khalid had secured a firm foothold in the city, and it was only a matter of time before the entire city would lie at his feet. From the absence of activity at the other gates, he guessed that Khalid was attacking alone and that other corps were not taking part in the storming of the fort. He hoped—and this was a long shot—that the other corps com­manders, especially Abu Ubeida, would not know of the break-in by Khalid. Thomas acted fast. He threw in his last reserve against Khalid to delay his advance for as long as possible, and at the same time sent envoys to the Jabiya Gate to talk with Abu Ubeida and offer to surrender the fort peacefully and to pay the Jizya.
Abu Ubeida received these envoys with courtesy and heard their offer of surrender. He believed that they had come to him because they were afraid to face Khalid. At the distance at which he was placed from the East Gate, if he heard sounds of battle at all, he must have assumed that it was a sally by the Romans: for it could not have occured to him that Khalid would scale the wall with ropes. Abu Ubeida had no doubt in his mind that Khalid also would agree to peace to put an end to the bloodshed and ensure a quick occupation of Damascus. Consequently he took upon himself the responsibility of the decision and accepted the terms of surrender. Damascus would be entered peacefully; there would be no bloodshed, no plunder, no enslavement and no destruction of temples; the inhabitants would pay the Jizya; the garrison and any local inhabitants who wished to do so would be free to depart from the city with all their goods. After this the Roman envoys went to the corps commanders at the other gates and informed then that a peace had been arranged with the Muslim commander and that the gates would be opened shortly, through which the Muslims could enter in peace. There would be no resistance.
Soon after dawn Abu Ubeida, followed by his officers and the rest of his corps, entered Damascus in peace from the Jabiya
370 The Sword of Allah
Gate, and marched towards the centre of the city. He was accom­panied by Thomas and Harbees and several dignitaries and bishops of Damascus. Now Abu Ubeida, walking like an angel of peace, and Khalid advancing like a tornado, arrived simul­taneously at the centre of Damascus, at the Church of Mary. Khalid had just broken through the last Roman resistance. The other corps commanders had also entered the city and were moving peacefully towards the centre.
Abu Ubeida and Khalid stared at each other in amaze­ment. Abu Ubeida noted that Khalid and his men held dripping swords in their hands, and he guessed that something had hap­pened of which he was not aware. Khalid noticed the peaceful air surrounding Abu Ubeida and his officers, whose swords were in their sheaths and who were accompanied by Roman nobles and bishops.
For some time there was no movement. Then Abu Ubeida broke the tense silence. “0 Father of Suleiman,” he said, “Allah has given us this city in peace at my hand, and made it unneces­sary for the Muslims to fight for it.”
“What peace!” Khalid bristled. “I have captured the city by force. Our swords are red with their blood, and we have taken spoils and slaves.”
It was clear that there was now going to be a terrible row between these two generals, which could have serious conse­quences. Khalid was the commander and had to be obeyed; what is more, he was not a man who would take any nonsense from his subordinates. Furthermore, his towering personality and his unquestioned judgement in military matters made him difficult to argue with, especially on this occasion, when he was deter­mined to regard the conquest of Damascus as a consequence of the use of force and not of peaceful negotiation. Abu Ubeida, on the other hand, had none of the military stature or operational genius of Khalid, and would be the last person to assert other­wise. But as a Muslim he was in the topmost class, one of the Blessed Ten, the Trusted One of the Nation. He was the Al Asram, the One without the Incisors—and no one could forget how he had lost his front teeth.
Abu Ubeida was wrong in making peace without Khalid's knowledge and permission, but he was determined to see that the word of a Muslim was honoured and unnecessary bloodshed
The Conquest of Damascus 371
avoided. He respected Khalid's leadership and knew that he would have to be handled with great care. Abu Ubeida was in fact the only man in Syria with high enough standing to ques­tion any decision of Khalid. Even Khalid would not raise his voice when speaking to Abu Ubeida, no matter how great his anger. What made the situation less dangerous was the fact that these two men held each other in genuine affection and res­pect for the various qualities which made them great. Abu Ubeida also knew that he could silence Khalid with a few words, for he was armed with an authority of which Khalid was unaware. But he decided not to use this authority except as a last resort, when all manner of persuasion had failed. In this he was being kind to Khalid, but more of that later.
“O Commander,” said Abu Ubeida, “know that I have entered the city peacefully.”
Khalid's eyes flashed with anger, but he restrained himself;
and in a voice which was not without respect, he replied, “You continue to be heedless. How can they have peace from you when I have entered the city by force and their resistance is broken?”
“Fear Allah, O Commander! I have given them a guarantee of peace, and the matter is settled.”
“You have no authority to give them peace without my orders. I am commander over you. I shall not sheathe my sword until I have destroyed them to the last man.”
“I never believed,” pleaded Abu Ubeida, “that you would oppose me when I gave a guarantee of peace for every single one of them. I have given them peace in the name of Allah, exalted be He, and of the Prophet, on whom be the blessings of Allah, and peace. The Muslims who were with me agreed to this peace, and the breaking of pacts is not one of our traits.”
At this stage some of Khalid's soldiers, tiring of listening to the argument and seeing some Romans standing on one side, began to wave their swords and moved towards the Romans to kill them. Abu Ubeida saw this movement and rushing past Khalid, ordered the men to desist until the discussion between him and Khalid was over. The men obeyed. Only Abu Ubeida could have done this; and Khalid could do nothing but try and control his rising anger.
Now the other three corps commanders got together and began to discuss the situation. After a few minutes they
372 The Sword of Allah
reached agreement among themselves and conveyed their opinion to Khalid: Let there be peace, because if the Romans in Syria heard that the Muslims had given a guarantee of safety and then slaughtered those whose safety had been guaranteed, no other city would ever surrender to the Muslims, and that would make the task of conquering Syria immeasurably more difficult.
The emotions of Khalid never interfered with his reason:
and the reason of Khalid saw the military wisdom of the advice tendered by the generals. For a moment he glared at Thomas and Harbees. Then he said, “All right, I agree to peace, except for these two accursed ones.”
“These two were the first to enter my peace,” Abu Ubeida said to Khalid. “My word must not be broken. May Allah have mercy upon you!”
Khalid gave up. “By Allah!” he exclaimed, “but for your word I would certainly have killed them. Let them get out of the city, both of them, and may Allah's curse follow them wherever they go!”
Thomas and Harbees were nervously watching the alterca­tion between the two Muslim generals while interpreters were translating their statements. Thus they understood all and brea­thed a sigh of relief as they came to know of the conclusion of the dialogue. They now moved to Abu Ubeida with an interpreter and asked for permission to depart on any route they chose.
“Yes,” said Abu Ubeida. “You may go on any route you choose. But if we conquer any place at which you are residing, you will not then be under a guarantee of peace.”
Thomas, fearing a pursuit by Khalid, then requested, “Give us three days of peace; then the truce would be ended. Thereafter if you catch up with us, do as you will—kill us or enslave us.”
Here Khalid entered the talks. “Agreed, except that you may take nothing with you but food for the journey.”
“This again would amount to a breaking of the pact,” objected Abu Ubeida. “My pact with them allows them to take all their belongings.”
“Even to this I agree,” said Khalid, “but no weapons.”
Now Thomas protested: “We must have some weapons for our defence against other enemies than you. Otherwise we stay here; and you can do with us as you please.” Thomas under-
The Conquest of Damascus 373
stood very well how important it was for these Muslims to honour their pacts, and was exploiting this sense of honour.
Khalid went so far as to agree that every man could take
one weapon with him, either a sword or a lance or a bow. The last of the problems was thus settled.1
Immediately after this, and it was now shortly after sun­rise, a pact was drawn up and signed by Khalid. It read as follows:
“In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful. This is given by Khalid bin Al Waleed to the people of Damascus. When the Muslims enter, they (the people) shall have safety for themselves, their property, their temples and the walls of their city, of which nothing shall be destroyed. They have this guarantee on behalf of Allah, the Messenger of Allah, on whom be the blessings of Allah and peace, the Caliph and the Faithful, from whom they shall receive nothing but good so long as they pay the Jizya.”2
The rate of Jizya was fixed at one dinar per man and a certain amount of food to be provided to the Muslims, the scale of which was also laid down.
                                                               
*
Damascus had been taken. The greatest prize in Syria,
with the exception of Antioch, was now in Muslim hands; but those who had conquered the city looked upon their victory with mixed feelings.
The Muslims had fought hard for this prize. While their casualties were much lower than those of the Romans, they had nevertheless paid a heavy price for the conquest. They had strug­gled heroically for a month and given their blood and sweat for this victory. They had taken the city by the sword—especially the corps of Iraq, which had stormed it on the last night and crushed all resistance.  But the fruits of their labour had been snatched away by the clever diplomacy of Thomas and the simple generosity and large-heartedness ofAbu Ubeida. The Son of the Surgeon had no business to do this; but he was, after all
1The dialogue between Khalid and Abu Ubeida is taken from Waqidi: pp. 51-52.
2Balazuri: p. 128.
374 The Sword of Allah
the Trusted One of the Nation, and not a word of censure was raised against him.
The Muslims gathered in groups to see the Roman convoy march out of the city. The convoy consisted of the garrison and thousands of civilians who preferred not to remain under Muslim rule and moved out of Damascus with their wives and children. Thomas's wife, the daughter of Heraclius, travelled with her husband. With the convoy went hundreds of carriages and wagons carrying all the belongings of the travellers and the merchandise of the city, including 300 bales of the finest brocade belonging to Heraclius. Some Muslims looked in anger, others in sorrow, as they saw Damascus drained of all its wealth. It was a bitter moment for the victors of Damascus.
Khalid stood with some of his officers and men, gazing at the saddening sight. It appeared that the Romans were leaving nothing of value in Damascus. There was pain in the heart of Khalid. He was the commander of the army; he had conquered Damascus by the sword; he had stormed the fort. And Abu Ubedia had done this!
He looked at the others and saw faces red with anger. All this should have been theirs by right of conquest. All along the route stood groups of Muslims watching in silence. They could easily have pounced upon the convoy and taken what they wished, but such was the discipline of this army, and such its respect for the moral obligation of the given word, that not a single soldier stirred to interfere with the movement of the con­voy.
Khalid fought to control his rage. Then he raised his arms to heaven, and in an anguished voice prayed aloud: “O Allah? Give all this to us as sustenance for the Muslims!”1 But it was hopeless. Or was it?
Khalid heard a respectful cough behind him, and turned to see Jonah the Lover, still as sad as he had looked the night before in Khalid's tent. Jonah, meeting his bride after the sur­render, had asked her to come away with him, and at first she was willing enough. But when he had told her that he was now a friend of the Muslims and had accepted their faith, she recoiled from him and swore that she would have nothing more to do with him. She decided to leave Damascus, and was even now
1Waqidi.p. 52.
The Conquest of Damascus 375
travelling in the convoy of Thomas. Jonah, still the distracted lover maddened by his passion for the girl, had come to seek Khalid's help.
Could not the Muslims take the girl by force and deliver her to him? No, they could not. She was covered by the guara­ntee of safety and could not be touched.
Could the Muslims not pursue and attack the convoy? No, they could not. The guarantee of safety for the convoy would last three days, and during that period no pursuit could be undertaken.
After three days then? It was no use. Going at the terri­fied pace which it had adopted, the convoy would be so far away after three days that the Muslims would never catch up with it.
Oh yes, they could. He, Jonah, knew several shortcuts which fast-moving horseman could use to overtake the convoy, while the convoy itself was bound to the roads and could not shorten its route. Still no use. Several Syrian forts—Emessa, Baalbeck, Tripolis—were close enough to reach in three or four days, and the convoy would be safely within the walls of any of these before the Muslims could catch up with it.
Oh no, it would not. The convoy was not going to any of these places. He, Jonah, knew that the convoy was making for Antioch and would take many days to get there. He, Jonah, would be the guide of the Muslims. All he wanted in return was the girl!
Khalid's eyes brightened.  The possibilities which the proposal of Jonah opened up were like water to the thirsty. He beckoned to a few of his officers—Zarrar, Rafe, Abdur Rahman bin Abi Bakr. They would launch a pursuit after three days! Plans were formulated, orders issued, preparations made. When the three days' grace period was over, the Mobile Guard would dash out in pursuit and go at breakneck speed. On Jonah's sug­gestion it was decided that all would be dressed like local Arabs, so that any Roman units encountered on the way would mistake them for such and not intercept their movement. Hope stirred in the hearts of the Faithful!
On the morning of the fourth day, shortly after sunrise, at the exact time when the period of grace ended, the Mobile Guard galloped away from Damascus with Khalid and Jonah in the lead. Abu Ubeida was left as commander at Damascus.
376 The Sword of Allah
The route taken by the Mobile Guard is not recorded. It is stated by Waqidi that the Muslims caught up with the convoy a short distance from Antioch, not far from the sea, on a plateau beyond a range of hills called Al Abrash by the Arabs and Barda by the Romans.1 Here there had been a heavy downpour, and the convoy had dispersed on the plateau, seeking shelter from the inclement weather, while the goods lay all over the place. The Romans had not the least suspicion of the thunderbolt that was about to strike them. So many bundles of brocade lay scattered on the ground that this plain became known as Marj-ud-Deebaj, i.e. the Meadow of Brocade, and for this reason the action des­cribed has been named the Battle of the Meadow of Brocade.
The weather had now cleared. Jonah and other scouts established the location of the convoy without being spotted and brought sufficient intelligence for Khalid to plan his attack. He took a few hours to give his orders and position the Mobile Guard for its task. Khalid, the master of movement and sur­prise, here again showed his superb skill in the application of these military principles.
The Romans received their first indication of the presence of the Muslims when about a regiment of cavalry came charging at them from the south, along the road from Damascus, led by the half-naked Zarrar. The Romans were surprised that Zarrar had caught up with them, but seeing that he had only a small force, they decided to make mincemeat of him and then rest again. They formed up to meet the Muslim charge, and began to fight like the brave Romans that they were.
Half an hour later another body of Muslim cavalry, 1,000 horse led by Rafe, appeared from the east; and the Romans now realised the mistake that they had made in believing that only a regiment had caught up with them. The Muslims no doubt had two regiments. The first was a feint to draw the atten­tion of the Romans, while the second delivered the main blow from a flank. But it did not matter; they would make mincemeat of two regiments instead of one. The Romans re-formed and re­ceived the charge of Rafe also.
1This range was probably what is now known as Jabal Ansariya, the northern end of which stretches to the south of Antioch.  Travelling across this range from Aleppo to Latakia one sees many stretches of level ground on the higher parts of the range.
The Conquest of Damascus 377
Half an hour later, when another regiment of cavalry made its appearance from the north, i.e. from the direction of Antioch, under the command of Abdur Rahman, the Romans were seri­ously alarmed. This was more dangerous than they had imagined They were cut off from Antioch, and would have to deal quickly with these three regiments in order to break out to the north or retreat to the west, the latter being the only way left open to them. The Romans again re-formed, though their spirits now were not so high. The Muslim regiments struck at the massed Romans with sword and lance and played havoc; but the Romans were able to hold their position, and the fighting pro­ceeded fiercely for another hour.
Then from the west appeared a fourth Muslim regiment which charged at a gallop at the Roman mass. From the battle cry of its leader, the Romans knew who was the commander of this last group:
I am the noble warrior, Khalid bin Al Waleed!
There was much slaughter—in the usual manner of Khalid. Khalid himself killed Thomas and Harbees in single combat, and at one time got so deep into the Roman army that he was separated from his comrades and surrounded by his enemies. He would not have come out alive but for Abdur Rahman, who broke through with a party of horsemen and rescued him.
After some more fighting, Roman resistance collapsed. Since the Muslims were too few to completely surround the Roman army and the fighting had become confused as it increa­sed in violence, thousands of Romans were able to escape and make their way to safety. But all the booty and a large number of captives, both male and female, fell to the Muslims. Jonah found his beloved. He moved towards her to take her by force; but she saw him coming, and drawing a dagger from the folds of her dress, plunged it into her breast. As she lay dying, Jonah sat beside her with silent tears running down his cheeks. He swore that he would remain true to the memory of the bride he was not destined to possess, and would not look at another girl.
When Khalid came to know of the loss suffered by Jonah, he sent for him and offered him another young woman who stood nearby—one who was both beautiful and rich, judging by the
378 The Sword of Allah
clothes and the jewellery which she wore. His first look at the young woman left Jonah dumbfounded. When he found his speech again, he informed Khalid that this woman was none other than the daughter of Heraclius, widow of Thomas. He could not possibly take her, for soon Heraclius would send either an army to get her back by force or envoys to arrange for her ransom.
The Muslims now marched back with spoils and captives enough to delight any conquering army. Their return route also is not recorded, but there was no mishap on the journey. When a day's march from Damascus, they saw a small cloud of dust approaching along the road from Antioch. As this cloud got nearer, it revealed a small party of riders, obviously not intending battle, since they were too few for such a purpose. From this party a Roman noble rode forth and approached Khalid. “I am the ambassador of Heraclius”, he said. “He says to you, 'I have come to know what you have done to my army. You have killed my son-in-law and captured my daughter. You have won and got away safely. I now ask you for my daughter. Either return her to me on payment of ransom or give her to me as a gift, for honour is a strong element in your character'. This is what Heraclius says.”
Honour was indeed a strong element in the make-up of Khalid. So was gallantry and so was generosity. Throughout his life he had been generous in giving—a generosity which later would get him into serious trouble. Now he decided to be generous to the Emperor of Rome. “Take her as a gift”, he said grandly. “There shall be no ransom.”1 The ambassador took the daughter of Heraclius, and with profuse thanks, returned to Antioch.
Jonah remained inconsolable. Nothing would cheer him up. Khalid offered him a large reward from his own share of the spoils, with which he could procure another wife, by purchase if necessary; but Jonah declined. He would remain true to his promise of celibacy. He also remained true to his new faith, and fought under the banner of Islam for two years until the Battle of Yarmuk, where he fell a martyr.
*

1Waqidi: p. 58.
The Conquest of Damascus 379
The return of the Mobile Guard loaded with spoils was  greeted with joy by the Muslims at Damascus. The Sword of Allah had done it again! The force had been absent for about 10 days, and the Muslims had been seriously perturbed; but now all was well. Khalid at once sent off a letter to Madina, addressed to Abu Bakr, informing him of the conquest of Damascus and how Abu Ubeida had been 'deceived by the Romans'; of his pursuit of the Roman convoy, the killing of Thomas and Harbees and the capture of the spoils and captives; of the daughter of Heraclius and her release. This letter was written on October 1, 634 (the 2nd of Shaban, 13 Hijri).1
The messenger carrying this letter had not gone many hours when Abu Ubeida called Khalid aside and told him that Abu Bakr was dead and Umar was now Caliph. He held out a letter which the new Caliph had written him (i.e. Abu Ubeida). Hesitantly Khalid took the letter and began to read. The most important line seemed to stand out mockingly: “I appoint you commander of the army of Khalid bin Al Waleed ...” Khalid looked up from the letter...
1For an explanation of the dates of the siege and conquest of  Damascus, see Note 11 in Appendix B.



















31: THE UNKIND CUT
In Madina, as the old Caliph lay dying, he sent for  writing materials and wrote an order: After him Umar would be the Caliph and the Believers would swear allegiance to him. This was the last order of Abu Bakr.
On August 22, 634 (22nd Jamadi-ul-Akhir, 13 Hijri), Abu Bakr died and Umar became Caliph. On the same day the new Caliph issued his first order: Khalid was dismissed from the command of the Muslim army in Syria! He wrote to Abu Ubeida as follows:
In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful.
In urge upon you the fear of Allah who lives eternally while everything else perishes; who has guided us away from wrongdoing and taken us out of darkness into light.
I appoint you commander of the army of Khalid bin Al
Waleed. So take charge as is your duty.
Send not the Muslims to their destruction for the sake of plunder; and place not the Muslims in a camp without reconnoitring it and knowing what is there.
Send not expeditions except in properly organised units. And beware of taking any steps which may lead to the annihilation of the Muslims.
Allah has tried me with you and tried you with me. Guard against the temptations of this world lest they destroy you
The Unkind Cut 381
as they have destroyed others before you; and you have seen how they fell.1
The letter was given to a messenger with instructions to proceed to Syria and hand it personally to Abu Ubeida.
The next day Umar led the congregational prayer in the mosque of the Prophet. When the prayer was over, he addressed the congregation—the first public address of his caliphate. He started by praising Allah and invoking His blessings on the Prophet; then he continued: “Lo! The Arab is like a camel which follows its master and waits for him wherever it is made to sit. And by the Lord of the Ka'ba, I shall carry you on the right path.”
In the rest of his sermon he emphasised various virtues and duties enjoined upon Muslims, and pledged to do his best to further the interests of Islam. Coming to the end of his sermon, he informed the congregation that he had removed Khalid from the command of the army in Syria and appointed Abu Ubeida in his place.
This announcement was received by the Muslims in hushed silence. Everyone knew that in the heart of Umar there was little love for Khalid, but none had expected Umar to act so harshly against the Sword of Allah, and in such haste, especially after the great victories which Khalid had won for Islam during the last three years. However, Umar was a much feared, albeit respected man, and few would dare to cross him. Moreover, as Caliph he had the authority to appoint and dismiss commanders as he chose, and his decision had to be accepted and obeyed. All remained silent, with a silence more eloquent than words.
But one youth who was present could not contain himself
and leapt to his feet. “Do you dismiss a man”, he shouted at Umar, “in whose hand Allah has placed a victorious sword and with whom Allah has strengthened His religion? Allah will never forgive you, nor will the Muslims, for sheathing the Sword and dismissing a commander whom Allah has appointed to com­mand.”
Umar knew this youngster, he was from the Bani Makhzum—the clan of Khalid. He could also sense the mood of the congregation and knew that its reaction to his announcement was anything but favourable. He decided not to say any more on the subject for the moment. He merely retorted: “The young
1Tabari: Vol. 2, p. 622.        2Ibid.
382 The Sword ofAllah
man is angry on account of the son of his uncle,”1 and walked away from the mosque.
Over the day Umar reflected a great deal on the matter of Khalid's dismissal. He came to the conclusion that he would have to explain his action to the Muslims in order to convince them of its justice. Such a dazzling light as Khalid could not be extinguished without offering adequate justification. The following day he again addressed the Muslims:
I am not averse to Khalid being in command. But he is wasteful and squanders his wealth on poets and warriors, giving them more than they deserve, which wealth could be better spent in helping the poor and the needy among the Muslims. Let none say that I have dismissed a strong man and appointed a mild man to command, for Allah is with him (i.e. Abu Ubeida) and will help him.”2
This time no one said anything.
*
The messenger carrying the fateful letter arrived at Dama­scus while the siege was in progress and the action against the Roman relief column was still a few days away. He knew the contents of the letter, and being an intelligent man guessed that its effect on the embattled Muslims would be far from healthy. So he told everyone whom he met that all was well and that reinforcements were on their way. Arriving at the tent of Abu Ubeida, where no one else was present, he handed over the letter.
Abu Ubeida read the letter and was astounded. He would not have wished this to happen to Khalid. He knew that Khalid was the idol of the army and his presence as Commander-in-Chief was a factor of the highest importance in making the Mus­lims so confident of victory against all odds. The impact of the change of command would be most adverse, especially whilst the Muslims were engaged in a stubborn siege which showed no sign of turning in their favour. It would be difficult to convince them of the justice of Khalid's dismissal or the wisdom of its timing. Moreover, Abu Ubeida did not feel inclined to take over command in the middle of the operation when Khalid had every-
lWaqidi: p. 61.        2Ibid.
The Unkind Cut 383
thing so well organised.  He therefore decided to say nothing about the death of Abu Bakr or the change of command until after the siege had been successfully concluded. The messenger, on being questioned, assured him that he had not divulged the contents of the Caliph's letter to anyone; and Abu Ubeida cautioned him to keep the matter to himself.
The Muslims at Damascus remained ignorant of the change of command during the rest of the siege. Even on the day of conquest Abu Ubeida made no reference to it in his altercation with Khalid, for doing so would have amounted to hitting below the belt and would have belittled Khalid in the presence of friend and foe. Thus it was Khalid who signed the pact with the Damas­cenes and not Abu Ubeida. In fact it was not until a few hours after Khalid's return from the raid at the Meadow of Brocade that Abu Ubeida drew him aside, told him of the death of Abu Bakr and the appointment of the new Caliph, and gave him Umar's letter to read.
Slowly Khalid read the letter. It was quite clear: he had been sacked! Abu Ubeida was the new Commander-in-Chief. Perhaps he should have expected that this would happen if Umar became Caliph; but he had not expected it because he had never considered the possibility of Abu Bakr's death or of Umar's becoming Caliph.
From the date on the letter Khalid saw that it was more than a month old and must have reached Abu Ubeida at least three weeks before now. He looked up at Abu Ubeida and asked, “Why did you conceal this from me? May Allah have mercy upon you!” Abu Ubeida replied, “I did not wish to weaken your authority while you were engaged with the enemy.”1
For a few moments Khalid remained lost in his thoughts— thoughts of Abu Bakr, his friend, guide and benefactor. Abu Ubeida looked at him, partly in sympathy, partly in embarrass­ment. Then Khalid remarked: “May Allah have mercy upon Abu Bakr! Had he lived, I would not have been removed from command.”2 Slowly, with bowed head, the Sword of Allah walked away to his tent.
That night Khalid wept for Abu Bakr.3
                                                        *
1Balazuri: p. 122.           2Yaqubi: Tareekh, Vol. 2, p. 140.
3Waqidi: p. 62.
384 The Sword of Allah
The following morning, October 2, 634 (3rd Shaban, 13 Hijri), the army was assembled and informed of the two chan­ges—in the Caliphate and in the command in Syria. On this day the Muslims in Damascus took the oath of allegiance to the new Caliph.
If any resentment or bitterness existed in Khalid's heart— and some must undoubtedly have existed—he showed no sign of it. He remarked casually to his friends, “If Abu Bakr is dead and Umar is Caliph, then we hear and obey.”1 There was nothing that Khalid could do to air his grievance without causing serious harm to the Muslim army and the Muslim cause in Syria, for any anti-Umar action would probably have split the army, and this was the last thing that the true soldier and true Muslim would wish.
Once a commander-in-chief is dismissed from his com­mand, he normally does not serve, if he serves at all, in the same theatre where he has been in command. He retires. Or he asks to be transferred or is transferred anyway in consideration for his feelings. Sometimes he is “kicked upstairs” But it was Khalid's destiny to fight and to conquer, and nature had gifted him with all the military virtues needed to fulfil that destiny. Thus we see here the remarkable phenomenon of the greatest general of the time (indeed the greatest general of the first millennium of the Christian Era) being prepared to serve in a lower capacity, even as a common soldier, with the same drive and zeal which he had shown as an army commander. This willingness to serve also reflects the Muslim spirit of the time. And all this became evident a fortnight later in the crisis ofAbul Quds.
A week after Abu Ubeida assumed command of the army, a Christian Arab, seeking the favour of the Muslims, came to the new Commander-in-Chief and informed him that in a few days a great fair would be held at Abul Quds. At this fair visitors and merchants from all the lands in the Asian zone of the Byzantine Empire would come with costly wares to buy and sell. Should the Muslims wish to acquire more spoils, they only had to send a raiding column to pick up all the wealth they wanted. (Abul Quds is now known as Abla and lies at the eastern foothills of the Lebanon Range, near Zahle, about 40 miles from Damascus
lWaqidi:p.62.
The Unkind Cut 385
on the road to Baalbeck.)1 The informer could not say if there would be any Roman soldiers guarding the fair, but there was a strong garrison at Tripolis, on the Mediterranean coast.
Abu Ubeida spoke to the warriors who sat around him, and asked if anyone would volunteer to take command of a column and raid Abul Quds. He was hoping that Khalid would offer his services for the task, but Khalid remained silent. Then a youth, on whose face the beard had only just begun to grow, volunteered himself with bubbling enthusiasm. This boy was Abdullah, son of Jafar, the Prophet's cousin who had been marty­red at Mauta. This young nephew of the Prophet had only just arrived from Madina and was anxious to win glory in the field. Abu Ubeida accepted the youth's offer and appointed him com­mander over a body of 500 horsemen.
On October 14, 634 (the 15th of Shaban, 13 Hijri), the column marched by the light of a bright full moon. With young Abdullah rode a dedicated and saintly soldier by the name of Abu Zar Al Ghifari. The following morning the impetuous boy launched his small group against a Roman force of 5,000 men which was guarding the fair. Since Abdullah sought glory and Abu Zar sought martyrdom, there was no one to restrain the Muslims; and the result was disastrous. After some heroic fighting, the Muslims were surrounded by the Romans, and it became evident that none would escape. But when the Muslim turned at bay he was a deadly fighter. The veteran soldiers knew how to defend themselves and quickly formed a tight ring to keep the Romans out; and thus surrounded, they continued to fight, their desperate courage imposing caution on the Romans. But their annihilation was only a matter of time.
One Muslim, however, had escaped the Roman encircle­ment, and realising the gravity of the situation, he galloped off to Damascus for help.  Abu Ubeida was sitting with his generals when this man arrived to report the disaster and ask for imme­diate help, without which not a single Muslim would return from Abul Quds. Abu Ubeida was aghast. His thoughts flew to the words of Umar: “Send not the Muslims to their destruction for the sake of plunder.” Moreover, this was his first military decision as Commander-in-Chief and if Abdullah and his men were not
1Gibbon (Vol. 5, p. 321) calls this place Abyla. It may have been so named in his time, but it is now called Abla.
386 The Sword of Allah
saved, the effect on the army would be devastating. And who could do the job but the Sword of Allah!
Abu Ubeida turned to Khalid: “O Father of Suleiman, I ask you in the name of Allah to go and rescue Abdullah bin Jafar. You are the only one who can do so.”
 “I shall certainly do so, God willing”, replied Khalid. “I waited only for your command.”
“I felt hesitant to ask you”, remarked Abu Ubeida, alluding to the embarrassment which he felt over the recent change of command.
Khalid continued: “By Allah, if you were to appoint a small child over me, I would obey him. How could I not obey you when you are far above me in Islam and have been named the Trusted One by the Prophet? I could never attain your status. I declare here and now that I have dedicated my life to the way of Allah, Most High.”
In a voice choking with emotion, Abu Ubeida said, “May Allah have mercy upon you, 0 Father of Suleiman. Go and save your brothers.”1
Within half an hour the Mobile Guard was galloping in the direction of Abul Quds with Khalid and Zarrar in the lead. Of course Khalid saved the trapped Muslims, though many of them had been killed by the Romans. And not only that; he also raided the market of Abul Quds and brought back an enviable amount of booty! He also brought back many wounds on his person, but getting wounded was now such an everyday affair in Khalid's life that he took little notice of them.
The result of the action at Abul Quds left no doubt (if there ever was any) about Khalid's reaction to his dismissal. Abu Ubeida wrote an account of this action to Umar, giving generous praise to Khalid for the part that he had played in it. But the windows through which the light of such praise could shine at Madina were closed. They would never open again.
                                         *
This dual change of personalities—the Caliph at Madina and the Commander-in-Chief in Syria—was to have its effect on the conduct and pace of military operations. Umar's methods were very different from his predecessor's. While Abu Bakr would give his commanders their mission and area of operations
1Waqidi: p. 66.
The Unkind Cut 387
and leave to them the conduct of the campaign, Umar would order specific objectives for each battle. Later in his caliphate he would even lay down such details as who should command the left wing, who should command the right wing, and so on. He also started a system of spies to watch his own generals. These spies were placed in all armies and corps, and everything that any officer said or did was promptly reported to the Caliph.1
Umar confirmed the various corps commanders in the roles allotted to them by Abu Bakr. Amr bin Al Aas would command in Palestine, Yazeed in Damascus, Shurahbeel in Jordan and Abu Ubeida in Emessa—after it was taken. These roles included not only the military command of the various corps, but also political control over the provinces. Thus, for instance, Shurahbeel was not only the corps commander for operations in Jordan but also the governor of the District of Jordan. And yet Abu Ubeida remained the Commander-in-Chief of the army as a whole, although he would command the army only when the corps fought together against the Romans. For Khalid there was no role. By the order of Umar he would operate under Abu Ubeida, and the latter confirmed him as the commander of the corps of Iraq which included the Mobile Guard. In military status Khalid was equal to the other corps commanders; but politically he was now a nobody.
There was inevitably a slowdown in the pace of operations. Abu Ubeida was a great man and personally a fearless and skilful fighter. Over the next few years he would also become a good general as a result of Khalid's coaching. He would rely heavily on the advice of Khalid, whom he kept beside him as much as possible, but he never possessed the strategic vision or the tactical perception of Khalid. More often than not, he would hold councils of war or write to Madina to seek the Caliph's decision regarding his next objective. Whereas Khalid would rush like a tornado from battle to battle, using surprise, audacity and violence to win his battles, Abu Ubeida would move slowly and steadily. Yet, he too would win his battles.
With this new arrangement, with the mutual respect and affection between Abu Ubeida and Khalid unimpaired, and with Khalid throwing the great weight of his genius behind the new Commander-in-Chief, the conquest of Syria continued.
lTabari:Vol.2, p.658.














32: THE BATTLE OF FAHL
More will be said in a later chapter about the character and abilities of Heraclius and the strategy he used for his attempt to crush the Muslim invaders of his Empire. Here it may just be noted that as an enemy, Heraclius was a man to be reckoned with—not one to give up the struggle while the least hope re­mained. His next move after the affair of Abul Quds was to put another army in the field, consisting of fresh contingents from Northern Syria, the Jazeera and Europe. This army in­cluded the survivors of the Meadow of Brocade. Part of the army gathered at Antioch, while part landed by sea at the Mediter­ranean ports in Syria and Palestine.
The concentration of this army at Beisan, west of the Jordan River, began in late December 634 (early Zu Qad, 13 Hijri). From here the army would strike eastwards and cut Muslim communications with Arabia. According to this plan —which was typical of Heraclius—he would avoid a head-on clash with the Muslims at Damascus, put them in a position of strategical disadvantage, and force them to evacuate Damascus. Fahl, just east of the Jordan River, was already occupied by a Roman garrison of moderate size which was engaged by a Muslim cavalry detachment under Abul A'war.
The Muslims received intelligence of the movement of Roman contingents from local agents; and before the concen-
The Battle of Fahl 389
tration of the Romans at Beisan was complete, they knew that the strength of this new army would be about 80,000 men, and that its commander was Saqalar, son of Mikhraq. It was evident that this force would move eastwards and place itself astride the Muslim lines of communication. A council of war was held by Abu Ubeida, and it was decided that the Muslims should move and crush this new Roman army, leaving behind a strong garrison to hold Damascus against any threat from the north and west. By now the Muslims had fully rested after their heroic labours. Soon after Abul Quds, more reinforcements had been received from Arabia, while a large number of those who had been wounded in earlier battles had rejoined the Muslim ranks as fit soldiers. This raised the strength of the army to something like 30,000 men, organised in five corps of varying strength.
Now the command arrangement made by Abu Bakr and confirmed by Umar came into effect in a rather unusual way. Yazeed was the commander and governor of the Damascus region, and was consequently left in Damascus with his corps. Shurahbeel was the commander appointed for the district of Jordan in which lay Beisan and Fahl. Hence Abu Ubeida, carry­ing out the Caliph's instructions to the letter—farther than was probably intended—handed over the command of the army to Shurahbeel for the forthcoming operation. In about the second week of January 635, the Muslim army, leaving behind the corps of Yazeed, marched from Damascus under the com­mand of Shurahbeel, with Khalid and the corps of Iraq forming the advance guard. In the middle of January the Muslims arrived at Fahl to find the Roman garrison gone, Abul A'war in occupa­tion of the town, and what looked like a marsh stretching on both sides of the Jordan River.1
As soon as the Roman garrison of Fahl had heard of the advance of the Muslim army from Damascus, it had left the place in haste, and withdrawing across the river, joined the main body of the Roman army at Beisan. Immediately after, the Romans, not wishing to be disturbed at Beisan before their preparations were complete, dammed the river a few miles south of the Beisan-Fahl line and flooded the low-lying belt which stretched along both
1Fahl is below sea level, and from the town the hillside slopes even farther down to the bed of the Jordan Valley. In this area the Jordan River is about 900 feet below sea level.
390 The Sword of Allah
banks of the river. The flooded area was determined by the contour line and in places was up to a mile from the river. There were some routes across this inundated area, but they were known only to the Romans. The Muslims knew the desert; they had come to know the hills; but this belt of water and mud which stretched along their front was a new experience and left them nonplussed. However, they decided to attempt a crossing.
Shurahbeel deployed the army at the foot of the slope below Fahl, facing north-west, with Abu Ubeida and Amr bin Al Aas commanding the wings. Zarrar was appointed commander of the Muslim cavalry, while Khalid with his corps was placed in front to lead the advance to Beisan. In this formation the Muslims advanced. But they had not gone far when the Advance Guard got stuck in the mud and had considerable difficulty in extricating itself. Cursing the Romans for this stratagem, the Muslims returned to Fahl and waited. Thus a whole week passed.
Now Saqalar, the Roman commander, decided that the time had come to strike. His preparations were complete and he hoped to catch the Muslims off guard since the marsh would give them, he hoped, a false sense of security. His guides would lead the army through the marsh which the Muslims regarded as impassable. Soon after sunset on January 23, 635 (the 27th of Zu Qad, 13 Hijri), the Roman army formed up west of the river and began its advance towards Fahl, intending to surprise the Muslims in their camps at night.
But the Muslims had not relaxed their guard. Shurahbeel was a watchful general and had deployed the Muslim camp to correspond to the battle positions of the corps, and kept a large portion of each corps in its battle positions during the night. He had also placed a screen of scouts along the marsh to watch and report any movement by the Romans towards Fahl. Thus, as the Romans neared Fahl, they found an army, not resting in its camp, but formed up in battle array. Immediately on contact the battle began.
The two armies fought all night and the whole of the next day—January 24, 635. The Muslim army remained on the defensive and beat off all attempts by the Romans to break through, during one of which Saqalar was killed. By the time darkness had set in again, the Romans decided that they had had enough. They had suffered heavily at the hands of the
The Battle of Fahl 391
Muslims, who had stood like a wall of steel in their path; and this wall had not been breached at a single place. Under cover of darkness the Romans disengaged and began to with­draw across the marsh towards Beisan.
This was the moment that Shurahbeel was waiting for. He had fought the Romans until they were exhausted, and suffering from the adverse psychological impact of repeated repulses, had started to withdraw. Now was the time to launch the counterstroke. Shurahbeel ordered the advance; and in the darkness, the desert-dwellers leapt upon the backs of the Romans!
This time the Roman ‘traffic control plan’ failed. Thou­sands of them were lost in the marsh, and as the screaming masses of the Muslims came after them, they gave way to panic and lost all order and cohesion. The Muslims set to with gusto to finish this army and played havoc with their terrified enemy. About 10,000 Romans perished in the Battle of Fahl, which is also known in Muslim history as the Battle of Mud.1 Some of the Romans arrived safely at Beisan while others, fleeing for their lives in total disorder, dispersed in all directions.
With the defeat of this Roman army, the Muslim army also broke up. Abu Ubeida and Khalid remained at Fahl, whence they would shortly set out for Damascus and Northern Syria. Shurahbeel, with Amr bin Al Aas under command, crossed the marsh and the river, routes through which had now been found, and laid siege to Beisan. After a few days the Romans in the fort made a sally but were slaughtered by Shurahbeel. Soon after this sally Beisan surrendered and agreed to pay the Jizya and certain taxes. Shurahbeel then went on to Tabariyya, which also surrendered on similar terms. This last action was over be­fore the end of February 635 (Zul Haj, 13 Hijri). There was now no opposition left in the inland part of the District of Jordan.
                                             *
With the beginning of the fourteenth year of the Hijra, Amr bin Al Aas and Shurahbeel turned their attention to Pales­tine. Here again a change of command took place. Palestine was the province of Amr, and consequently he assumed command of the army, while Shurahbeel served under him as a corps
1Most early historians have said that the bulk of the Roman army was destroyed in this battle. Balazuri, however, has placed Roman losses at 10,000 (p. 122); and this is here accepted as the most conservative estimate.
392 The Sword of Allah
commander. But it was some time before this small army of two corps entered Palestine.
While still in Jordan, Amr had written to the Caliph and given him the latest intelligence about Roman dispositions and strengths in Palestine. The strongest Roman force was at Ajnadein. Umar gave detailed instructions to Amr about the objectives which he was to take, and also wrote to Yazeed to capture the Mediterranean coast. In pursuance of these ins­tructions the Muslim army, excluding the corps of Abu Ubeida and Khalid, operated against the Romans in Palestine and on the coast as far north as Beirut. The corps of Amr and Shurahbeel marched to Ajnadein, and with Amr as army commander, fought and defeated a Roman army in the second Battle of Ajnadein. Thereafter the corps separated. Amr went on to capture Nablus, Amawas, Gaza and Yubna, thus occupying all Palestine, while Shurahbeel thrust against the coastal towns of Acre and Tyre, which capitulated to him. Yazeed, with his brother Muawiya playing an important role under him, advanced from Damascus and captured the ports of Sidon, Arqa, Jabeil and Beirut.
The place which took the longest to capture was Caesarea. Umar had given this as an objective to Yazeed; and he and Muawiya laid siege to it, but Caesarea, reinforced and supplied by the Romans by sea, could not be captured in spite of their best efforts. The siege was raised when the Muslims had to regroup for the Battle of Yarmuk, but was resumed after that battle and continued until the port fell in 640 (19 Hijri).
By the end of 14 Hijri (roughly 635 A.D.), Palestine, Jordan and Southern Syria, with the exception of Jerusalem and Caesarea, were in Muslims hands.













33 :  THE CONQUEST OF EMESSA
In early March 635 (early Muharram, 14 Hijri), Abu Ubeida and Khalid set off from Fahl to carry the war to the north. They had waited at Fahl while Shurahbeel was dealing with Beisan and Tabariyya, in case a large scale battle should develop necessitating their participation.  Once Tabariyya was taken, the possibility of such a battle in Jordan vanished and they were free to depart.
A few miles west and south west of Damascus stretched a grassy plain known in Muslim history as Marj-ur-Rum, i.e. the Meadow of Rome, and towards this plain Abu Ubeida and Khalid moved with the intention of bypassing Damascus and continuing the advance to Emessa. Yazeed was still in peaceful occupation of Damascus and would remain there a few months yet, before receiving orders from Umar to operate against the Mediterranean coast.  At Marj-ur-Rum, Abu Ubeida again made contact with sizable Roman forces.
On hearing of the Muslim operations at Beisan and Taba­riyya, Heraclius surmised that the Muslims had chosen Jordan and Palestine as their next strategic objectives and were not interested in Northern Syria.  He also heard that only a weak corps of the Muslim army remained at Damascus, and this corps was showing no sign of aggressive intent. He therefore determined to retake Damascus rapidly. With this object in view,
394 The Sword of Allah
he sent a Roman force under a general named Theodorus to fight and defeat the Muslim garrison in Damascus and re-occupy the city. This force set off from Antioch, and moving via Beirut, approached Damascus from the west. This movement, how­ever, had hardly begun when Heraclius was informed that Abu Ubeida and Khalid had left Fahl and were moving north again. They would arrive at Damascus at about the same time as Theodorus, and the Romans would then not have a chance to retake the city. To strengthen the Roman force, Heraclius ordered the detachment of a part of the large garrison of Emessa to reinforce Theodorus. This detachment, under the command of Shans, marched from Emessa on the direct route to Damascus.
The Muslims arrived at Marj-ur-Rum to find Theodorus waiting for them. On the same day Shans also arrived from Emessa and the two armies deployed in battle formation facing each other. In this deployment Abu Ubeida stood opposite Shans while Khalid stood opposite Theodorus. The strength of the Roman forces here is not known, but it may be assumed that it amounted roughly to two strong corps. It could not have been much less, otherwise it is doubtful if the Romans would have accepted battle with the two Muslim corps facing them. For the rest of the day the two armies remained in their battle positions, each waiting for the other to make the first move.
As night fell, Theodorus decided to carry out a skilful stra­tegical manoeuvre. Leaving Shans to face the Muslims, he pulled back his corps under cover of darkness, moved it round the flank of Khalid and by dawn on the next day arrived at Damascus. His intention was to keep the main Muslim army busy at Marj-ur-Rum with the corps of Shans, while with his own corps he quickly destroyed the Muslim garrison of Damascus. It was a very clever plan, and the movement was carried out with such perfect organization that it was not until the latter part of the night that the Muslims came to know that half the Roman army facing them was no longer there.
At Damascus, Yazeed's scouts brought word at dawn of the coming of the Romans. On receiving this news, Yazeed immediately deployed his small corps outside the fort facing south-west. Feeling more at home in the open and unused to being besieged in a fort, the Muslims preferred to fight in the plain rather than in the city. Just after sunrise began the battle
The Conquest of Emessa 395
between Theodorus and Yazeed, and soon the Muslims found themselves hard pressed, for the Roman force vastly outnum­bered them. But they held their own till about mid-morning. Then, just as the situation had become desperate for Yazeed, the Romans were struck in the rear by a furious mass of Muslim horsemen. This was the corps of Iraq, spearheaded by the Mobile Guard. In a very short time Khalid and his fearless verterans, attacking from the rear, had chopped the Roman corps to pieces. Few Romans escaped the slaughter, and Khalid killed Theodorus in a duel. A large amount of booty, mainly weapons and armour, fell into Muslim hands and was shared by the warriors of Khalid and Yazeed, except for the usual one-fifth reserved for Madina.
Late in the preceding night, when he discovered that half the Roman army had left Marj-ur-Rum, Khalid had correctly guessed that it had gone to Damascus to fight Yazeed. Fearing that Yazeed might not be able to hold out for long, he proposed to Abu Ubeida that he take his corps to Damascus to help Yazeed while Abu Ubeida dealt with the remaining Romans under Shans. Abu Ubeida agreed and early in the morning, Khalid left Marj-ur-Rum to save Damascus, as has just been described. While Khalid was liquidating the corps of Theodorus, Abu Ubeida attacked the Romans on the Meadow of Rome. Abu Ubeida killed Shans in a duel, and the plain was littered with Roman dead, but the bulk of the Roman corps got away and withdrew in haste to Emessa.
This action was fought some time in March 635 (Muharram 14 Hijri), and is known as the Battle of Marj-ur-Rum.
*
Some time was spent at Marj-ur-Rum and Damascus, dealing with the captives and spoils of war and making arrange­ments for the wounded Muslims. Once these matters had been attended to, Abu Ubeida sent Khalid with his corps on the direct route to Emessa, while he himself advanced to Baalbeck. The garrison of Baalbeck surrendered peacefully, and Abu Ubeida proceeded to Emessa to join Khalid, who had laid siege to the fort.1
1There are other versions of how Baalbeck was taken, including Waqidi’s, according to which a great battle was fought by Abu Ubeida before Baalbeck surrendered to the Muslims. Other historians, however, have said that Baalbeck surrendered peacefully, and I too feel that this is what happened.
396 The Sword of Allah
Within a few days of the commencement of the siege a truce was agreed upon. Emessa would pay 10,000 dinars and deliver 100 robes of brocade, and in return the Muslims would not attack Emessa for one year. If, however, any Roman reinforcements arrived to strengthen Emessa, the truce would be­come invalid. The gates of Emessa were opened as soon as the truce was signed, and thereafter there was free movement of Muslims in and out of the market of Emessa, the inhabitants of which were pleasantly surprised to find that the Muslims paid for whatever they took!
The people of Qinassareen (the ancient Calchis) now heard of the peaceful way in which the citizens of Emessa had avoided battle with the Muslims, and decided to do the same. A truce was not as dishonourable as surrender and was a con­venient way of postponing a difficult decision. Consequently an envoy was sent to Emessa by the governor of Qinassareen, who made a similar truce with Abu Ubeida for one year. But both governors, of Emessa and Qinassareen, made the truce for reasons of expediency. Both hoped that their garrisons would before long be reinforced by Heraclius, and as soon as that happened they would resume hostilities against the Muslims. The common man in the region, however, was completely won over by the kindness and fair dealing of the Muslims and the absence in them of the arrogance and cruelty which had charac­terised Roman rule over Syria.
Having temporarily solved the problems of Emessa and Qinassareen, Abu Ubeida despatched the bulk of his army, in groups, to raid Northern Syria. Muslim columns travelled as far north as Aleppo, and leaving the District of Qinassareen unmolested, raided any locality through which they passed and brought in captives and booty to the Muslim camp near Emessa. Thousands of these captives, however, begged for their freedom and all who agreed to pay the Jizya and pledge loyalty to the Muslims were freed, with their families and goods, and allowed to return to their homes with a guarantee of safety from Muslim raiding columns.
This went on for some months and most of the summer was spent in this manner. Meanwhile Umar was getting impatient at Madina. The campaign was progressing satisfactorily in Pales­tine, but in Northern Syria, i.e. in Abu Ubeida's sector, there
The Conquest of Emessa 397
seemed to be a lull. Consequently, some time in the autumn of 635, Umar wrote a letter to Abu Ubeida in which he hinted that the general should get on with the conquest of Syria. On receipt of this letter Abu Ubeida held a council of war, at which it was agreed that the Muslim army should proceed north and conquer more territory. Emessa and Qinassareen could not be touched as they were secure under the terms of the truce: but for other places there was no such truce, and they could be attacked and taken.
About early November 635 (middle of Ramazan, 14 Hijri), the Muslim army marched from Emessa to Hama, where the citizens came out of their city to welcome the Muslims. The city surrendered willingly, and the army marched on. One by one the cities of Sheizar, Afamiya (known today as Qalat-ul-Muzeeq) and Ma'arra Hims (now Ma'arrat-un-Noman) surrendered in peace to the Muslims and agreed to pay the Jizya. (See Map 28). At some places the Muslims were received by musicians playing instruments as a sign of welcome. In these areas now, for the first time in Syria, large-scale conversions took place among the local inhabitants. The personality of the gentle, benevolent Abu Ubeida played an important part in these conversions to Islam.
It was while the Muslims were at Sheizer that they heard of reinforcements moving to Qinassareen and Emessa.  The truce was thus violated by the Romans. The arrival of these reinforcements put fresh courage in the hearts of the Romans at Emessa and Qinassareen, and the arrival of winter gave them a further assurance of success. In their forts they would be better protected from the cold than the Muslim Arabs, who were not used to intense cold, and with only their tents to give them shelter, would suffer severely from the Syrian winter. In fact Heraclius wrote to Harbees, the military governor of Emessa: “The food of these people is the flesh of the camel and their drink, its milk. They cannot stand the cold. Fight them on every cold day so that none of them is left till the spring.”1
Abu Ubeida decided to take Emessa first, and thus clear his rear of the enemy before undertaking more serious operations in Northern Syria. Consequently the Muslims marched to Emessa with Khalid and the corps of Iraq in the lead. On arrival at the
1Tabari: Vol. 3, pp. 96-97.
398 The Sword of Allah
city Khalid found a strong Roman force deployed across his path, but with a quick, violent attack his corps drove it back into the fort. These Romans had followed Heraclius' instructions to “fight them on every cold day”, but after their experience in this first clash with Khalid, they decided to let winter do the job! As the Romans withdrew into the fort and closed the gates, Abu Ubeida arrived with the rest of the army and deployed it in four groups opposite the four gates of Emessa.
Emessa was a circular fortified city with a diameter of rather less than a mile, and it was surrounded by a moat. There was also a citadel atop a hillock inside the fort. Outside the city stretched a fertile plain, broken only on the west by the River Orontes (now Asi).
Abu Ubeida himself, together with Khalid and his Mobile Guard, camped on the north side, a short distance from the Rastan Gate.1  The Muslim strength at Emessa was about 15,000 men against which the Roman garrison consisted of something like 8,000 soldiers. Abu Ubeida left the conduct of the siege in the hands of Khalid, who thus acted as the virtual com­mander of the Muslims for this operation. It was now late November or early December (about the middle of Shawwal), and the winter descended like a heavy blanket over Emessa.
For more than two months the siege continued with un­broken monotony. Every day there would be an exchange of archery, but no major action took place which could lead to a decision either way. The Romans gloated over the exposed situation of the Muslims, and felt confident that the cold itself would be sufficient to destroy the desert-dwellers or drive them away to warmer climes. The Muslims undoubtedly suffered from the cold but not as severely as the Romans imagined. There was no slackening in their guard and no weakening in their resolve to take Emessa, no matter how long they had to wait.
When another few weeks had passed and there was no further retrograde movement by the Muslims, the Romans
1The only gate which still exists is the Masdud Gate, to the south­west. The visitor to Emessa today is shown the sites of three other gates: Tadmur (north-east), Dureib (east) and Hud (west); but while the present inhabitants of the city have heard of the Rastan Gate, its location is not known. It was no doubt somewhere in the northern wall, because it faced Rastan, which lies on the road to Hama. Early historians have named the Rastan Gate as one of four, and we do not know which one of the present four gates, as named above, did not then exist. The moat too is still there in many places.
The Conquest of Emessa 399
realised that their opponents had no intention of raising the siege. It was now about the middle of March 636 (the beginning of Safar, 15 Hijri), when the worst of the winter was over. The Roman hope of the cold driving the Muslims away vanished. Supplies were running low, and with the coming of spring and better weather the Muslims would receive further reinforcements and would then be in an even stronger position. Something had to be done quickly. The local inhabitants were all for peace, but Harbees was a loyal son of the Empire and sought glory in battle. He decided to make a surprise sally and defeat the Muslims in battle outside the fort; and with this decision of Harbees matters came to a head. The end was now in sight, though not the kind of end which Harbees had in mind.
Early one morning the Rastan Gate was flung open and Harbees led 5,000 men into a quick attack on the unsuspecting Muslims facing that gate. The speed and violence of the attack took the Muslims by surprise, and although this was the largest of the four groups positioned at the four gates, it was driven back from the position where it had hastily formed up for battle. A short distance back the Muslims reformed their front and held the attack of the Romans, but the pressure became increasingly heavy and the danger of a break-through became clearly evident.
Abu Ubeida now asked Khalid to restore the situation. Khalid moved forward with the Mobile Guard, took the hard-pressed Muslims under his command and re-disposed the Muslim army for battle. The surprise of the morning had had a depress­ing effect on the Muslims, who had already been distressed by the discomfort of the cold; and they took some time to recover from it, but with Khalid present in their midst, they soon regained their spirits and began to give as well as they took. This situation continued till midday. Then Khalid took the offensive and steadily pushed the Romans back, though it was not till near sunset that the Romans were finally driven back into the fort. The sally had proved unsuccessful, but it had the effect of making the Muslims feel a special respect for Harbees and the Roman warriors of Emessa.
The following morning Abu Ubeida held a council of war. The Muslim officers were in a restrained mood, and did not show their usual enthusiasm. Abu Ubeida expressed his dissatis­faction with the manner in which the Muslims had given way
400 The Sword of Allah
before the Roman attack, whereupon Khalid remarked that these Romans were the bravest he had ever met. “Then what do you advise, 0 Father of Suleiman ?” asked Abu Ubeida. “May Allah have mercy upon you!”
“O Commander”, replied Khalid, “tomorrow morning let us move away from the fort and ... “1
*
Early the following morning, the Romans saw hectic activity in the Muslim camps around Emessa. Tents were being struck and bundles packed to be loaded onto the camels. Before their eyes the main body of the Muslims began to march away to the south, leaving behind small parties to see to the movement of the families, the baggage and the flocks. Here was deliverance! The Muslims were raising the siege and withdrawing to the south. The winter had got them after all! The Roman soldiers rejoiced at this sight, but Harbees was not a man to be content with a drawn battle. His trained eye could see a military oppor­tunity when it appeared; and such an opportunity had clearly presented itself. He immediately collected 5,000 Roman warriors and led them out of the fort to chase the Muslims. As the Romans approached the main Muslim camp, the few Muslim warriors who were there looked at them with horror and with cries of fear fled southwards, leaving behind the families and the flocks and the baggage!
Harbees decided to leave the camp alone for the moment. The camp could wait. He launched his mounted force into a fast pursuit to catch up with the retreating enemy and strike him down as he fled. He caught up with the Muslims a few miles from Emessa. His leading elements were about to pounce up­on 'the retreating enemy' when the Muslims suddenly turned and struck at the Romans with such ferocity that they were taken aback and hard put to defend themselves. As the Muslims turned on the Romans, Khalid shouted a command at which two mounted groups detached themselves from the Muslim army, galloped round the flanks of the surprised Romans and met behind them. The plan proposed by Khalid and universally accepted the day before at the council of war had worked; the Romans were now
1Waqidi: p. 103.
The Conquest of Emessa 401
trapped in a ring of steel! Ruefully Harbees thought of the words of a local priest who had tried to warm him as he was leaving Emessa to pursue the Muslims. The priest had said, “By the Messiah, this is a trick of the Arabs. The Arab never leaves his camels and his family behind!”1 But it was now too late.
Steadily and systematically the Muslims closed in from all sides, striking with spears and swords. Heaps of Roman bodies began to accumulate on the bloody earth. At first the Romans fought with the courage of wild animals at bay, but as more and more of them fell, their mood turned to dismay and hopelessness. Khalid, striking left and right with his sword, got through with a small group to the centre of the Roman army; and here he saw Harbees still fighting, still refusing to give up. Khalid made for Harbees, but was intercepted by a huge Roman general. The Romans did not know that even if they escaped from this trap they would have nowhere to go. At the time when the Muslims started their attack on the encircled Romans, a group of 500 horsemen under Muaz bin Jabal had galloped back to Emessa to see to it that no escaping Roman got into the fort. As these horsemen neared Emessa, the terrified inhabitants and the rem­nants of the Roman garrison which had not joined the pursuit hastily withdrew into the fort and closed the gates. Muaz deploy­ed his men in front of the gates to prevent the Romans in Emessa from coming out and the Romans outside Emessa from getting in. The Muslim camp was now safe.
Khalid and the Roman general squared off. This general has been described by eye-witnesses as a man 'roaring like a lion.’2 Khalid was the first to strike, and brought down his sword with all his strength on the heavily-armoured head of the Roman; but instead of piercing the helmet, the sword broke and Khalid was left with the hilt in his hand.   Before the Roman could strike, Khalid closed in and grappled with him. The two giants held each other in a pitiless embrace; and then Khalid did some­thing that he had never done before: he began to crush the chest of the Roman in his arms. The Roman turned red in the face and was unable to breathe as Khalid's grip tightened. Gasping for breath, the Roman struggled frantically to break the steel-like grip of the Muslim, but the terrible grip only grew tighter. Then
lWaqidi: p. 104.
2Ibid: p.102.
402 The Sword of Allah
the Roman's ribs splintered and the jagged ends plunged into his own flesh. When all movement had ceased in the body of the Roman, Khalid relaxed his grip, and what fell to the ground was a lifeless corpse. Khalid had literally crushed his adversary to death in his arms!1 He now took the Roman general's sword and again his battle cry rang out over the battlefield.
When offering his plan for this feigned withdrawal, Khalid had promised Abu Ubeida that the Muslims would “tear the Romans apart and break their backs”. In this they were eminently successful. It is recorded that only about a hundred Romans got away.2 The Muslims, on the other hand, lost only 235 dead in the entire operation against Emessa, from the be­ginning of the siege to the end of this last action.
As soon as this action was over the Muslims returned to Emessa and resumed the siege, but those who were in Emessa had now no stomach for fighting. The local inhabitants offered to surrender on terms, and Abu Ubeida accepted the offer. This happened around the middle of March, 636 (beginning of Safar, 15 Hijri). The inhabitants paid the Jizya at the rate of one dinar per man, and peace returned to Emessa. No damage was done to the city and nothing was taken by the Muslims as plunder.
Soon after the surrender of Emessa, the Muslims set out once again for the north, intending to take the whole of Northern Syria this time, including Aleppo and Antioch. They went past Hama and arrived at Sheizer. Here a Roman convoy taking provisions to Qinassareen and escorted by a small body of sol­diers was intercepted and captured by Khalid. The prisoners were interrogated, and the information they provided stopped the Muslims in their tracks!
The Muslims had fought and defeated every force that Heraclius had thrown against them—all the armies, all the relief columns, all the fortress garrisons. All had bowed before the superior military quality of the Muslim army. But what Her­aclius now evidently planned was to unleash a veritable tornado against them, which, if they were not careful, would hurl them in pieces into the Arabian desert.

1Ibid.  
2Waqidi: p. 104.











34: THE EVE OF YARMUK
The Syrian theatre of operations was like an arena entered by the contestants from opposite sides. Beyond each entrance stretched a sea which was the home ground of the contestant entering from that side. On the west of Syria and Palestine lay the blue expanse of the Mediterranean which was a 'Roman Lake’. On the east and south stretched the desert in whose wastes the Arab was master. The Romans could move with freedom over the Mediterranean in fleets of ships without interference by the Muslims, while the Muslims could move in the desert on fleets of camels with a similar freedom from interference by the Romans. Neither could the Muslims venture into the sea of water nor the Romans into the sea of sand. Within the total arena both sides could manoeuvre with ease.
Thus, for the purpose of fighting a battle in this arena, the ideal location for each side was its home bank where it could deploy with its back to its sea and withdraw in safety in case of a reverse, while at the same time, if victorious, it could pursue and destroy its opponent before he could escape to his refuge. But this advantage favoured the Muslims more than the Romans, for the former could give up the theatre of operations and withdraw to the edge of the desert without loss of face or wealth or territory. The Romans could not give up the theatre of operations as it was their Empire and had to be defended.
404 The Sword of Allah
And this strategical advantage which the Muslims enjoyed, of being able to fight on their home ground, was very much in the mind of Heraclius when he planned the next and greatest opera­tion of this campaign.
Heraclius had come to the throne in 610 when the affairs of the Eastern Roman Empire were at their lowest ebb and the Empire consisted of little more than the area around Constanti­nople and parts of Greece and Africa. At first he had had to swallow many bitter pills, but then fortune smiled on him, and over a period of almost two decades he re-established the Empire in all its former greatness. He defeated the barbarians of the north, the Turks of the Caucasus and the highly civilised Persians of the Empire of Chosroes; and he did this not only with hard fighting, but also—and this was more important—by masterly strategy and superb organization. Heraclius was a strategist to the finger tips, and it was only his extraordinary organizational ability which made it possible for the Romans to create and put into the field a vast but closely knit imperial army consisting of more than a dozen nations from the Franks of Western Europe to the Armenians of the Southern Caucasus.
Now Heradius was again being made to swallow bitter pills, and what made the pills still more bitter was the fact that they had been thrust down his throat by a race which the Romans had detested and scorned and regarded as too backward and too wretched to constitute any kind of military threat to the Empire. All the manoeuvres against the Muslims, though strategically flawless, had ended in defeat. The first concentration of the Roman army at Ajnadein, whence it was to have struck in the rear of the Muslims, was destroyed by Khalid in the first Battle of Ajnadein. Heraclius' attempt to limit Muslim success by a stout defence of Damascus had failed in spite of his best efforts to strengthen the beleaguered garrison. His next offensive mano­euvre, the concentration of a fresh Roman army at Beisan, whence it was again intended to strike in the rear of the Muslims, had also failed, his army being trounced by Shurahbeel. There­after not only had his attempt to retake Damascus been defeated by Abu Ubeida and Khalid, but his other defences also crumbled as the Muslims went from victory to victory and took almost all of Palestine and Syria as far north as Emessa.
Heraclius decided to organize a massive and overwhelm-
The Eve of Yarmuk  405
ing retaliation. He would raise such an army as had never been seen in Syria, and with this army he would bring the Muslims to battle in such a way that few, if any, would escape his clutches. This was to turn defeat into a glorious triumph.
In late 635, while Emessa was under siege, Heraclius began preparations for this great manoeuvre. Entire corps were gathered from all parts of the Empire and these were joined by princes and nobles of the realm and dignitaries of the church. By May 636, an army of a 150,000 men had been put under arms and concentrated in the area of Antioch and in parts of Northern Syria.  This powerful military force consisted of contingents of Russians, Slavs, Franks, Romans, Greeks,  Georgians, Armenians and Christian Arabs.1 No people of the Cross living in the Byzantine Empire failed to send warriors to the new army to fight the invaders in the spirit of a Christian crusade. This force was organised into five armies, each of about 30,000 soldiers. The commanders of these armies were: Mahan, King of Armenia; Qanateer, a Russian prince; Gregory; Deirjan; and Jabla bin Al Eiham, King of the Ghassan Arabs. Mahan2 commanded a purely Armenian army; Jabla had an exclusively Christian Arab force under him; and Qanateer commanded all the Russians and Slavs. The remaining contin­gents (all European) were placed under Gregory and Deirjan.3 Mahan was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the entire im­perial army.
At this time the Muslims were split in four groups: Amr bin Al Aas in Palestine, Shurahbeel in Jordan, Yazeed at Ceasarea, and Abu Ubeida and Khalid at Emessa and to the north. In this dispersed situation the Muslims were so vulner­able that each of their corps could be attacked in turn without the least chance of fighting a successful battle. And this situa­tion was fully exploited by Heraclius in the plan which he put into execution.
Ceasarea was reinforced by sea and built up to a strength of 40,000 men. This force was to tie down Yazeed and his besieg­ing corps so that he would be unable to move to join his com­rades. The rest of the imperial army would operate on the
1Waqidi: p. 100.
2This monarch's name has also been given as Bahan.
3Waqidi:p.l06.
406 The Sword of Allah
following plan:
a. Qanateer would move along the coastal route up to Beirut, then approach Damascus from the west and cut off AbuUbeida.
b. Jabla would march from Aleppo on the direct route to Emessa via Hama, and hold the Muslims frontally in the Emessa region. The Christian Arabs would be the first to contact the Muslim Arabs, and this was probably in the fitness of things. As Heraclius said to Jabla: “Everything is destroyed by its own kind, and nothing cuts steel but steel.”1
c. Deirjan would move between the coast and the Aleppo road and approach Emessa from the west, thus striking the Muslims in their flank while they were held frontally by Jabla.
d. Gregory would advance on Emessa from the north-east and attack the Muslims in their right flank at the same time as they  were struck by Deirjan.2
e. The army of Mahan would advance behind the Chris­tian Arabs and act as a reserve.
Thus the Muslim army would be swallowed up at Emessa by a force perhaps 10 times its size, attacking from all directions, with its escape routes severed. (See Map 19.) This would be more than even Khalid could handle! After the annihilation of the Muslims at Emessa, the imperial army would advance south while the garrison of Ceasarea would advance from the coast; and in several battles the Roman armies would attack and destroy each Muslim corps in turn, concentrating against each corps in overwhelming strength.
Special services were held all over the Empire for the victory of the imperial army. Generals and bishops exhorted the men to fight in defence of their faith and save their land and its people from the alien invaders. And on this masterly design the imperial army was launched from Antioch and Northern Syria some time in the middle of June 636.
When the leading elements of Jabla's army arrived at Emessa they found no Muslims. The army of Qanateer hit
1Ibid.
2Waqidi (p. 107) gives the route of Gregory as “from Iraq”. Since most of Western Iraq was now in Muslim hands, this could only mean such an approach as I have suggested.
The Eve of Yarmuk 407
Damascus from the west in joyful anticipation of the destruction of the Muslims thus trapped in Damascus and the north. But there was not a single Muslim soldier in Damascus and the north. The birds had flown!
*
It was at Sheizar, through Roman prisoners, that the Muslims first came to know of the preparations being made by Heraclius. The Muslims had established an excellent intelligence system in the land, and no major movement or concentration of enemy forces remained concealed from them. In fact they had agents within the Roman army. As the days lengthened into weeks, the pieces of intelligence brought in by agents were put together like a jigsaw puzzle, and the movement of the Roman armies had hardly got under way when the Muslims knew of it and of the directions taken by the armies. Even the reinforcement of Ceasarea and its strength were known.
The Muslims were staggered by the reports, each of which seemed worse than its predecessor. The horizon became darker and darker. Khalid, however, with his unerring sense of strategy at once saw the design of Heraclius and realized how terribly vulnerable the Muslim army was at Emessa and Sheizar. The soundest course was to pull back from North and Central Syria, as well as from Palestine, and concentrate the whole army so that strong, united opposition could be put up against the Roman juggernaut, preferably not far from the friendly desert. Khalid advised Abu Ubeida accordingly and the Army Commander accepted the proposal. He ordered the withdrawal of the army to Jabiya, which was the junction of routes from Syria, Jordan and Palestine. Moreover, exercising his authority as Commander-in-Chief in Syria, he ordered Shurahbeel, Yazeed and Amr bin Al Aas to give up the territory in their occupation and join him at Jabiya.  Thus, before the Romans reached Damascus, Abu Ubeida and Khalid, with elements of Yazeed's corps, were at Jabiya while the other corps were moving to join them. They had safely extricated themselves from the jaws of death.
The remarkably generous treatment of the populace of Emessa by Abu Ubeida, when the Muslims left that city, throws light on the sense of justice and truth of this brave and noble
MAP 19 : THE ROMAN OFFENSIVE BEFORE YARMUK
The Eve of Yarmuk 409

general. On the conquest of Emessa, the Muslims had collected the Jizya from the local inhabitants. This tax, as has been explained before, was taken from non-Muslims in return for their exemption from military service and their protection against their enemies. But since the Muslims were now leaving the city and were no longer in a position to protect them, Abu Ubeida called a meeting of the people and returned all the money taken as Jizya. “We are not able to help and defend you”, said Abu Ubeida. “You are now on your own.” To this the people replied, “Your rule and justice are dearer to us than the oppression and cruelty in which we existed before.”1 The Jews of Emessa proved the most loyal in their friendship, and swore that the officers of Heraclius would not enter the city except by force. Moreover, not content with doing total justice in the matter of the Jizya in his own province, Abu Ubeida also wrote to the other corps commanders in Syria to return the Jizya to the people who had paid it, and this was done by every Muslim commander before he marched away to join Abu Ubeida at Jabiya.2 Such an extraordinary and volun­tary return by an all-conquering army of what it has taken according to mutually arranged terms, had never happened be­fore. It would never happen again.
In the middle of July 636, the forward elements of the imperial army, consisting of Christian Arabs, made contact with Muslim screens between Damascus and Jabiya. Abu Ubeida was now deeply worried. A battle was certain, and one that would decide the fate of the Muslims in Syria. The enemy strength, believed by the Muslims to be 200,000, seemed like a horrible nightmare. Abu Ubeida worried not for himself but for the Muslim army and the Muslim cause. He called a council of war to brief the officers about the enemy situation and get ideas.
The officers sat in silence, weighed down by the forbidding prospect which faced them. One spoke in favour of a withdrawal into Arabia where the army could wait until this Roman storm has passed and then re-enter Syria, but this proposal was re­jected as being tantamount to abandoning all the Muslim con­quests in Syria and exchanging the good life of this land for the hardship and hunger of the desert. Others spoke in favour of fighting “here and now”, trusting to Allah for victory, and most
1Balazuri: p. 143.         2Abu Yusuf: p. 139.
410 The Sword of Allah
of the assembled officers favoured this proposal. The mood of the council, however, was not of happy enthusiasm but of grim determination to fight, and if necessary, go down fighting.
Khalid remained silent while this discussion was in pro­gress. Then Abu Ubeida turned to him and said, “O Father of Suleiman! You are a man of courage and resolve and judgement. What do you think of all this?”
“What they say is good”, replied Khalid. “I have different views, but shall not oppose the Muslims.”
“If you have other views, speak”, said Abu Ubeida, “and we shall do as you say”.
Khalid then gave his plan: “Know, O Commander, that if you stay at this place, you will be helping the enemy against you. In Caesarea, which is not far from Jabiya, there are 40,000 Romans under Constantine, son of Heraclius.1 I advise you to move from here and place Azra behind you and be on the Yarmuk. Thus it would be easier for the Caliph to send rein­forcements, and ahead of you there would be a large plain, suitable for the charge of cavalry.”2
Khalid did not specifically say so, but the inference was that Constantine, advancing from Ceasarea, could attack the Muslims in the rear at Jabiya while they faced the imperial army from the north. The plan was accepted unanimously and the move put into effect. Khalid, with the Mobile Guard of 4,000 horsemen, was left behind as a rear guard; and instead of staying at Jabiya, he moved forward and clashed with the leading elements of the Roman army. He struck at the head of the Roman column and drove it back towards Damascus. This imposed caution on the Romans, who thereafter made no effort to interfere with the retrograde move of the Muslims. A few days later Khalid re­joined the main body of the Muslim army.
*
The Muslims, having moved a few miles south-east, established a line of camps in the eastern part of what, for want of a better name, we shall call the Plain of Yarmuk. The location

1According to Gibbon (Vol. 5, p. 333) Constantine, commanding at Caesarea, was the eldest son of Heraclius.
2Waqidi:p. 109.
The Eve of Yarmuk 411
of these camps is not known but they were probably south of the present Nawa-Sheikh Miskeen line with a north-west-facing front, so that the Muslims could deploy to receive a Roman attack from the north (Jabiya axis) as well as the north-west (direction of Quneitra). Here Abu Ubeida was joined by the corps of Shurahbeel, Amr bin Al Aas and Yazeed. Some distance to the east of the Muslims sprawled the lava hills which stretch from north to east of Azra, and the mountains of Jabal-ud-Druz, north and east of Busra.
A few days later the Roman army, preceded by the lightly armed Christian Arabs of Jabla, moved up and made contact with Muslim outposts on the Plain of Yarmuk. The route of the main body of the Roman army is not recorded, but it was almost certainly from the north-west, because the Romans established their camps just north of the Wadi-ur-Raqqad. (Khalid's clash with the Romans on the Jabiya axis may have caused them to switch their axis.) The Roman camp was 18 miles long, and bet­ween it and the Muslim camp lay the central and west-central parts of the Plain of Yarmuk.1 With the arrival of the Romans and the establishment of their camps, the direction of the Roman attack became obvious and Abu Ubeida adjusted the Muslim camps to correspond to a battle front running from the Yarmuk to the Jabiya Road. This is what Khalid had advised: the rear towards Azra and a flank on the Yarmuk.
Now the two armies settled down in their respective camps and began to make preparations for battle: reconnaissances, plans, orders, checking of equipment etc. To the Muslims the Romans looked like 'a swarm of locusts'.2
Hardly had the Romans settled down in camp when a messenger arrived from Heraclius with instructions to the Com-mander-in-Chief, Mahan the Armenian, not to start hostilities until all avenues of peaceful negotiation had been explored. Mahan was to offer generous terms to the Muslims if they would agree to retire to Arabia and not come back again. Consequently Mahan sent one of his army commanders, Gregory, to hold talks with the Muslims. Gregory rode out to the Muslim camp, in
1According to Waqidi (p. 109), the Roman camp was near Jaulan (which is the area between the Wadi-ur-Raqqad and Lake Tiberius and the area to the north), and the distance between the opposing camps was appro­ximately 11 miles (three farsakh. A farsakh equals 6000 metres.)
2Waqidi:p.ll8.
412 The Sword of Allah
front of which he held a discussion with Abu Ubeida. The Roman offered to let the Muslims go in peace, taking with them every­thing which they had acquired in Syria, as long as they would give up all intention of invading Syria again. Abu Ubeida's answer was in the negative, and the Roman returned empty-handed.
Mahan next sent Jabla, hoping that as an Arab he would have more success in talking the Muslims into leaving Syria in peace. Jabla tried his best to pursuade the Muslims, but like Gregory, returned unsuccessful.
Mahan now realized that a battle was inevitable and nothing could be done to avoid it. Consequently he sent Jabla forward with the bulk of his Arab army to put in a probing attack on the Muslims. This was not so much an offensive as a recon­naissance in force to test the strength of the Muslim front. For such an action the mobile Christian Arab was better suited than his more heavily equipped comrades of the imperial army. This happened some time in late July 636 (middle of Jamadi-ul-Akhir, 15Hijri).
Jabla moved up with his Arabs and found the Muslims arrayed in battle order. Cautiously the Christian inched his way forward, wanting to get as close as possible before ordering a general attack; but before he could give such an order, he found himself assailed by powerful groups of Muslim cavalry operating under the Sword of Allah. After a certain amount of half-hearted resistance the Christian Arabs withdrew, confirming Mahan's fear that battle with these Muslims would not be an easy matter.
Thereafter, for almost a month, there was no major action on the Plain ofYarmuk. The cause of this inactivity is not known. We can only guess that the Muslims were not strong enough to take the initial offensive, and the Romans did not feel brave enough to do so. The respite, however, proved beneficial to the Muslims, as during this period a fresh contingent of six thousand Muslims arrived to join them, the majority of whom were from the Yemen. The Muslims now had an army of 40,000 warriors, including 1,000 Companions of the Prophet, and these in turn included 100 veterans of the Battle of Badr—the first battle of Islam. The army included citizens of the highest rank, such as Zubeir (the Prophet's cousin and one of the Blessed Ten), Abu Sufyan and his wife Hind.
The Eve of Yarmuk 413
When a month had passed after the repulse of Jabla, Mahan felt strong enough to take the offensive, but decided to make one more attempt at peace. This time he would hold talks himself. He asked for a Muslim envoy to be sent to his head­quarters, and in response to his request, Abu Ubeida sent Kha­lid with a few men. Khalid and Mahan met in the Roman camp, but nothing came of these talks as the positions taken by the two sides were too rigid to allow for adjustment. Mahan threatened Khalid with his great army and offered a vast sum of money to all the Muslims, including the Caliph at Madina; but this made no impression on Khalid, who offered the three alternatives: Islam, the Jizya or the sword. The Armenian chose the last. It appears, however, that as a result of this discussion, both commanders were favourably impressed by each other and the Muslims began to regard Mahan as a fine man except that, to quote Abu Ubeida: “Satan has got hold of his reason!”1
As the two leaders parted, they knew that henceforth there would be no parleys. The point of no return had been re­ached, and the following day the battle would begin.
*
The rest of the day was spent in feverish activity. Both sides prepared for battle. Plans were finalized and orders issued. Corps and regiments were placed in position so that everyone would know his place in the forthcoming battle. Officers and men checked their armour and weapons.
Both sides offered fervent prayers for victory, beseeching
God for His help to 'the true faith', and of course they prayed to the same God! On the Roman side the priests brandished crosses and exhorted the soldiers to die for Jesus. Tens of thou­sands of Christians took the oath of death, swearing that they would die fighting and not flee from the enemy. Many of them would remain true to their oath.
The battlefield which stretched between the two camps consisted of the Plain of Yarmuk which was enclosed on its western and southern sides by deep ravines. On the west yawned the Wadi-ur-Raqqad which joined the Yarmuk River near Yaqusa. This stream ran north-east to south-west for 11 miles through a deep ravine with very steep banks, though less so at its upper end.
1Ibid: p. 128.
414 The Sword of Allah
The ravine was crossable at a few places but there was only one main crossing, at a ford, where the village of Kafir-ul-Ma stands today. South of the battlefield ran the canyon of the Yarmuk River, starting at Jalleen and twisting and turning for 15 miles, as the crow flies, down to its junction with the Wadi-ur-Raqqad, beyond which it continued on its way to join the Jordan River south of Lake Tiberius (Sea of Galilee). At Jalleen a stream called Hareer, running from the north-east, flowed into, and became the Yarmuk River. On the north the plain continued beyond the battlefield, while to the east it stretched for a distance of about 30 miles from the Wadi-ur-Raqqad to the foot of the Azra hills. The western and central part of this plain was the battlefield.
The most significant feature of the battlefield was the exis­tence of the two ravines—the Wadi-ur-Raqqad and the Yarmuk River. Both had banks 1,000 feet high, and while the steepness of the banks was sufficient to make the ravines serious obstacles to movement, they were made even more frightening by the precipices which lined the banks along most of their length. These precipices were sometimes at the bottom, sometimes at the top and sometimes half-way up the bank and created sheer, vertical drops 100 to 200 feet in height. Near the junction of the two ravines, the banks became steeper and the precipices higher—a fearful prospect for anyone who had to cross in haste.
The only dominating tactical feature on the plain of Yarmuk was one named on maps as the Hill of Samein, 3 miles south­west of the present village of Nawa. There was also the Hill of Jabiya, north-west of Nawa, but it lay outside the battlefield and was to play no part in the battle. The Hill of Samein, 300 feet high, so dominated the area around it, and gave such excellent observation over the entire plain, that no general would fail to occupy it should he be the first to deploy his forces on this part of the plain. As a result of this battle the hill was named the Hill of Jamu’a (gathering), because part of the Muslim army was concentrated on it. There was no other dominating ground on the plain of Yarmuk.
The plain itself was generally flat, sloping gently from north to south with a certain amount of undulation. One stream which formed an important tactical feature was Allan, running southwards across the plain to join the Yarmuk, and
The Eve of Yarmuk 415
in the last 5 miles of its journey this stream also formed a ravine with steep sides though it was not such a serious obstacle as the bigger ravines.  The battlefield was ideal for the manoeuvre of infantry and cavalry and, except for the southern portion of Allan, offered no impediment to movement.
Mahan deployed the imperial army forward of Allan. He used his four regular armies to form the line of battle which was 12 miles long, extending from the Yarmuk to south of the Hill of Jabiya.1 On his right he placed the army of Gregory and on his left the army of Qanateer. The centre was formed by the army of Deirjan and the Armenian army of Mahan—both under the command of Deirjan. The Roman regular cavalry was distributed equally among the four armies, and each army deployed with its infantry holding the front and its cavalry held as a reserve in the rear. Ahead of the front line, across the entire 12-mile front, Mahan deployed the Christian Arab army of Jabla, which was all mounted—horse and camel. This army acted as a screen and skirmish line, and was not con­cerned with serious fighting except as its groups joined the army in front of which they were positioned.
The army of Gregory, which formed the right wing, used chains to link its 30,000 foot soldiers.2 These chains were in 10-men lengths, and were used as a proof of unshakeable courage on the part of the men who thus displayed their will­ingness to die where they stood. The chains also acted as an insurance against a break-through by enemy cavalry, as has been explained in the chapter on The Battle of Chains. All these 30,000 foot soldiers had taken the oath of death.
Although the imperial army established a front of about the same length as the Muslim front, it had the advantage of having four times as many troops and Mahan exploited this numerical superiority by establishing a whole army (Jabla's) as a forward screen and achieving much greater depth in the solid, orderly formations. The Roman ranks stood 30 deep.
1In terms of present-day geography, the Roman line started from about two miles west of Nawa, and went south-south-west to just west of Seel, then over Sahm-ul-Jaulan to the Yarmuk bank forward of Heet. Of course, these villages probably did not exist then as there is no mention of them in the narrative of this battle.
2There is also talk of a deep ditch here; but I cannot place it or see its significance, as the Romans are said to have deployed forward of it rather than behind it. It may have been an anti-retreat measure!
416 The Sword of Allah

Thus the magnificent army of Caesar was arrayed for battle.
*
When Khalid returned from his talks with Mahan, he informed Abu Ubeida and the other generals that there would be no more talks, that the issue would be decided by the sword, that the battle would begin the next day. Abu Ubeida took the news with his usual stoical acceptance of the will of God. As Commander-in-Chief he would organise the army for battle and con­duct the operation according to his tactical judgement. His military skill was not, however, very great, and he knew it. Khalid knew it, and most of the officers of the army knew it. Abu Ubeida would fight the battle in a sensible manner, and would react to changing tactical situations like the good, steady general that he was. But with the enemy four times superior in strength, soundness and common sense were not enough. A much finer quality of generalship was required for this battle, and Khalid decided to offer his services to act as the real commander in battle.
“O Commander”, said Khalid to Abu Ubeida, “send for all the commanders of regiments and tell them to listen to what I have to say.”1
Abu Ubeida got the point. He himself could wish for nothing better. He at once sent an officer to call the regimental and corps commanders to his headquarters; and the officer rode to all the commanders, conveying the message:  “Abu Ubeida commands that you listen to whatever Khalid says and obey his orders.”2 The officers understood the meaning of the message and gathered at the headquarters to receive the orders of Khalid. On this tactful note the command of the army was taken over by Khalid, and everyone was satisfied with the arrangement.
Abu Ubeida remained the nominal commander and some­what more than that. He continued to deal with matters of ad­ministration, led the prayers and saw to various other details of command. He also gave certain orders when his ideas did not clash with the plans and orders of Khalid. But for the purpose of battle, Khalid was now the commander of the Muslim army
1Waqidi:p.l29.       2Ibid.
The Eve of Yarmuk 417
in Syria, and would remain so until this battle was over.
Khalid immediately set about the reorganization of the army into infantry and cavalry regiments within each corps. The army consisted of 40,000 men, of which about 10,000 was cavalry. This force was now organised by Khalid into 36 infantry regiments of 800 to 900 men each, three cavalry regi­ments of 2,000 horse each and the Mobile Guard of 4,000 horse­men. The commanders of the cavalry regiments were Qeis bin Hubeira, Meisara bin Masruq and Amir bin Tufeil. Each of the four corps had nine infantry regiments, which were all re-­formed on a tribal and clan basis, so that every man would fight next to well known comrades. Much of Khalid's corps of Iraq was absorbed in the other four corps, while the best of it re­mained with him as the Mobile Guard.
The army was deployed on a front of 11 miles corresponding roughly to the front of the Roman army. The army's left rested on the Yarmuk River, a mile forward of where the ravine began, while its right lay on the Jabiya road.1 On the left stood the corps of Yazeed and on the right the corps of Amr bin Al Aas, and each of these flanking corps commanders was given a cavalry regiment under command. The centre was formed by the corps of Abu Ubeida (left) and Shurahbeel (right). Among the regimental commanders of Abu Ubeida were Ikrama bin Abi Jahl and Abdur Rahman bin Khalid. Behind the centre stood the Mobile Guard and one cavalry re­giment as a central reserve for employment on the orders of Khalid. At any time when Khalid was busy with the conduct of the battle as a whole, Zarrar would command the Mobile Guard. Each corps pushed out a line of scouts to keep the Romans under observation. (For the dispositions of the two armies, see Map 20.)
Compared with the Romans, the Muslim army formed a thin line, only three ranks deep, but there were no gaps in the ranks which stretched in unbroken lines from edge to edge. All the spears available in the army were issued to the front rank, and in battle the men would stand with the long spears at the ready, making it impossible for an assailant to get to grips without braving the frightening points of the spears.   The archers,
1In terms of present-day geography, the Muslim line started from about a mile west of Nawa and went south-south-west to over the Hill of Jamu'a, then between Seel and Adwan, then between Sahm-ul-Jaulan and Jalleen, to just short of the Yarmuk.
MAP 20 : THE DISPOSITIONS AT YARMUK
The Eve of Yarmuk 419

most of whom were Yemenis, stood interspersed in the front rank. On the first approach of the enemy the archers would open up and bring down as many of the Romans as possible. As the assailants clashed with the Muslims, they would be killed with spears, and thereafter the men would draw their swords.
The flanking corps would use their own cavalry regiments
as corps reserves to re-establish their positions in case they were pushed back by the Romans.  Khalid with his Mobile Guard and one cavalry regiment would provide the local reserve for the two central corps and also be available as an army reserve to intervene in the battle of the flanking corps as required.
The situation of the two armies with regard to flanks was similar. Each had its southern flank on the Yarmuk and this flank could not be turned. The northern flank of both armies was exposed, and on this side outflanking movements were possible. The difference in the situation of the two armies lay in their respective rears.  Behind the Muslims stretched the eastern extension of the Plain of Yarmuk, beyond which rose the broken Azra hills and the Jabal-ud-Druz; and into this region the Muslims could withdraw in safety and be invulnerable in case of a reverse. Behind part of the Roman position, however, lay the forbidding ravine of the Wadi-ur-Raqqad—deep and precipitous. As a discouragement to retreat this was fine and would probably make the Romans fight more desperately; but in case the Romans were worsted in battle and cut off from the northern escape route, the ravine would prove an abyss of death. Against it they would be caught like mice in a trap. However, the Romans had no intention of losing this battle.
This topographical situation was uppermost in Khalid's mind when he formulated his plan of battle. Initially the Mus­lims would stand on the defensive and receive and hold the Roman attack until it had lost its impetus and the enemy was worn out. Then the Muslims would go on to the offensive and drive the Romans towards the Wadi-ur-Raqqad. The terrible ravine would be the anvil on which the Muslim hammer would fall, crushing the Roman army to powder! At least, so Khalid planned!
The women and children were placed in camps stretching
1According to some reports, the families were put on a hill well to the rear. This, as we shall see from the course of battle, could not have been so.
420 The Sword of Allah
in a line in the rear of the army. Behind the men of each regiment stood their women and children.1 Abu Ubeida went round the camps and addressed the women: “Take tent poles in your hands and gather heaps of stones. If we win all is well. But if you see a Muslim running away from battle, strike him in the face with a tent pole, pelt him with stones, hold his children up before him and tell him to fight for his wife and children and for Islam.”1 The women prepared accordingly.
As the army formed up in its battle position, Khalid, Abu Ubeida and other generals rode round the regiments and spoke to the officers and men. Khalid gave a set speech before each regiment: “O men of Islam! The time has come for stead­fastness. Weakness and cowardice lead to disgrace: and he who is steadfast is more deserving of Allah's help. He who stands bravely before the blade of the sword will be honoured, and his labours rewarded, when he goes before God. Lo! Allah loves the steadfast!”2
While Khalid was going past one of the regiments, a young man remarked, “How numerous are the Romans and how few are we!” Khalid turned to him and said, “How few are the Romans and how numerous are we! An army's strength lies not in numbers of men but in Allah's help, and its weakness lies in being forsaken by Allah.”3
Other commanders and elders, while exhorting the men to fight, recited verses from the Quran, the most popular one being:”How many a small group has overpowered a large group by Allah's help, and Allah is with the steadfast.”4 They spoke of the fire of hell and the joys of paradise, and quoted the example set by the Holy Prophet in his battles. For good measure they also reminded the soldiers of the hunger of the desert and the good life of Syria!
The night that followed was hot and sultry. It was the third week of August 636, (second week of Rajab, 15 Hijri.)5 The Muslims spent the night in prayer and recitation of the Quran, and reminded each other of the two blessings which
1Waqidi: pp. 129-30.                  2Ibid: p. 137.
3Tabari: Vol. 2, p. 594.               4Quran: 2:249.
5The only thing recorded in the early accounts about the date of this battle is the month—Rajab, 15 Hijri. My statement regarding the week in which the battle began, is the result of calculations made from the timing of earlier events narrated in this chapter.
The Eve of Yarmuk 421
awaited them: either victory and life or martyrdom and paradise. “The Holy Prophet had established a tradition after Badr of recit­ing the chapter of Al Anfal from the Quran before battle, and all night the verses of this chapter could be heard wherever Muslims sat, singly and in groups.
The fires in the two camps burned merrily the whole night and could be seen for miles like twinkling stars descended to earth. But there was no merriment in the hearts of those who sat in the light of these fires. The thought of the ordeal that awaited them had driven all joy from their minds. They were brave men, these soldiers who awaited the morrow, these Romans and Arabs, these Europeans and Asians, these Christians and Muslims. They were lions and eagles and wolves. But they were also human beings and thought of their wives and children to whom they would bid farewell in a few hours—perhaps for the last time.
This was the eve of Yarmuk …the greatest battle of the
Century … one of the decisive battles of history … and per­haps the most titanic battle ever fought between the Crescent and the Cross.














35: ALYARMUK
At dawn the Muslim corps lined up for prayers under their respectives commanders. As soon as the prayers were over, every man rushed to his assigned place. By sunrise both armies stood in battle order, facing each other across the centre of the Plain of Yarmuk, a little less than a mile apart.
There was no movement and little noise in the two armies. The soldiers knew that this was a fight to the finish, that one of the two armies would lie shattered on the battle­field before the fight was over. The Muslims gazed in wonder at the splendid formations of the Roman legions with banners flying and crosses raised above the heads of the soldiery. The Romans looked with something less than awe at the Muslim army deployed to their front. Their confidence rested on their great numbers, but during the past two years the performance of the Muslims in Syria had instilled a good deal of respect in the hearts of the Romans. There was a look of caution in Roman eyes. Thus an hour passed during which no one stirred and the soldiers awaited the start of a battle which, according to the chroniclers, “began with sparks of fire and ended with a raging conflagration”, and of which “each day was more violent than the day before.”1
Then a Roman general by the name of George emerged
1Waqidi:p. 133.
Al Yarmuk 423
from the Roman centre and rode towards the Muslims. Halting a short distance from the Muslim centre; he raised his voice and asked for Khalid. From the Muslim side Khalid rode out, de­lighted at the thought that the battle would begin with himself fighting a duel. He would set the pace for the rest of the battle.
As Khalid drew near, the Roman made no move to draw his sword, but continued to look intently at Khalid. The Muslim advanced until the necks of the horses crossed, and still George did not draw his sword. Then he spoke, in Arabic: “O Khalid, tell me the truth and do not deceive me, for the free do not lie and the noble do not deceive. Is it true that God sent a sword from heaven to your Prophet?.... and that he gave it to you ?.... and that never have you drawn it but your enemies have been defeated?”
“No!” replied Khalid.
“Then why are you known as the Sword of Allah?”
Here Khalid told George the story of how he received the title of Sword of Allah from the Holy Prophet. George pondered this a while, then with a pensive look in his eyes, asked, “Tell me, to what do you call me?”
“To bear witness”, Khalid replied, “that there is no God but Allah and Muhammad is His Slave and Messenger; and to believe in what he has brought from Allah.”
“If I do not agree?”
“Then the Jizya, and you shall be under our protection.”
“If I still do not agree?”
“Then the sword!”
George considered the words of Khalid for a few moments, then asked, “What is the position of one who enters your faith today?”
“In our faith there is only one position. All are equal.”
“Then I accept your faith !”1
To the astonishment of the two armies, which knew nothing of what had passed between the two generals, Khalid turned his horse and Muslim and Roman rode slowly to the Muslim army. On arrival at the Muslim centre George repeated after Khalid:
“There is no God but Allah; Muhammad is the Apostle of Allah!” (A few hours later the newly-converted George would fight heroically for the faith which he had just embraced and
lTabari:Vol.2, p.595.
424 The Sword of Allah
would die in battle.) On the auspicious note of this conversion began the Battle ofYarmuk.
Now came the phase of duels between champions and this suited both sides, for it acted as a kind of warming up. Scores of officers rode out of the Muslim army, some on instructions from Khalid and others on their own, and throwing their indivi­dual challenges, engaged the Roman champions who emerged to fight them. Practically all these Romans were killed in combat, the honours of the day going to Abdur Rahman bin Abi Bakr, who killed five Roman officers, one after the other.
This duelling went on till midday. Then the Roman Com-mander-in-Chief, Mahan, decided that he had had enough of this and that if it went on very much longer, not only would he lose a large number of officers, but also the moral effect on his army would be quite bad. He would have a better chance of suc­cess in a general battle in which sheer weight of numbers would favour his army. But he was rightly cautious, for a false step at the beginning of battle could have far-reaching effects on its course. He would attempt a limited offensive on a broad front to test the strength of the Muslim army, and if possible, achieve a breakthrough wherever the Muslim front was weak.
At midday the 10 forward ranks of the Roman army, i.e. one-third of the infantry of each of the four armies, advanced to battle. This human wave moved slowly forward, and as it came within range of the Muslim archers, was subjected to intense archery, which caused some casualties. The wave continued to advance and before long struck the Muslim front rank. Soon the Muslims had dropped their bloody spears and drawn their swords, and both sides were locked in combat.
But the Roman assault was not a determined one, and the soldiers, many of whom were unused to battle, did not press the attack, while the fury with which the hardened Muslim veterans struck at them imposed caution. On some parts of the front the fighting was more violent than on others, but on the whole the action of this day could be described as steady and moderately hard. The Muslims held their own. The Romans did not reinforce their forward infantry, and at sunset the action ended with the two armies separating and returning to their respective camps.  Casualties were light on this day, though higher among the Romans than the Muslims.
Al Yarmuk 425
The night was spent in peace. The Muslim women gree­ted their men with pride, and wiped the sweat and blood from their faces and arms with their head coverings. The wives said to their husbands: “Rejoice in tidings to paradise, O Friend of Allah!”1 The Muslims now felt more confident for they had in­flicted worse punishment on the enemy than they had taken themselves, and prayers and recitation of the Quran continued for most of the night. During the night, however, a few Roman parties came forward into the no-man's-land to pick up their dead and this led to some patrol clashes, but otherwise there was no engagement to disturb the peace of the night.
Mahan had got nowhere. He called a council of war at which plans for the next day were discussed. He would have to do something different if success were to be achieved and Mahan decided to launch his next attack at the first light of dawn, after forming up during the hours of darkness, in the hope of catching the Muslims off their guard, before they were prepared for battle. Moreover, he would attack in greater strength. The two central armies would put in holding attacks to tie down the Muslim centre, while the two flanking armies would launch the major thrusts and either drive the flanking corps off the battle­field or push them into the centre. To have a grand stand view of the battle, Mahan had a large pavilion placed on a hillock behind the Roman right, from where the entire plain could be seen. Here Mahan positioned himself with his court and a bodyguard of 2,000 Armenians, while the rest of the army prepared for the surprise dawn attack.
*
Soon after dawn the Muslims were at prayer when they heard the beating of drums. Messengers came galloping from the outposts to inform the commanders that the Romans were attacking. The Muslims were certainly caught unawares, but Khalid had ordered the placing of a strong outpost line in front during the night, and these outposts caused sufficient delay in the Roman advance to enable the Muslims to don their armour and weapons and get into battle position before the flood hit them. Moreover, the speed with which the Muslims got into
lWaqidi:p. 133.










426 The Sword of Allah
position was faster than the Romans had anticipated. The sun was not yet up on this second day of battle when the armies clashed.
The battle of the central corps continued steadily for most of the day with no break in the Muslim line. Here, in any case the Romans were not pressing hard as this was meant to be a limited attack to hold these Muslim corps in their position. Thus the centre remained stable. But on the flanking corps fell the heaviest blows of the Roman army, and these corps bore the brunt of the fighting.
On the Muslim right the army of Qanateer, consisting mainly of Slavs, attacked the corps ofAmr bin Al Aas. The Muslims held on bravely and the attack was repulsed. Qanateer attacked for the second time with fresh troops, and again the Muslims repulsed him. But when Qanateer attacked for the third time, again using fresh regiments, the resistance of the now tired Muslims broke, and the bulk of the corps fell back to the camp, while part of it retired to the centre, i.e. towards the corps of Shurahbeel.
As the corps fell back in some disorder, Amr ordered his cavalry regiment of 2,000 horse to counter-attack and throw back the Romans. The cavalry went into battle with great dash and for some time checked the Roman advance, but was unable to hold it for long. It was repulsed by the Romans and turned away from battle, also making for the Muslim camp. As the horsemen reached the camp along with the foot soldiers, they found a line of women waiting for them with tent poles and stones in their hands. The women screamed: “May Allah curse those who run from the enemy!” And to their husbands they shouted: “You are not our husbands if you cannot save us from these infidels.”1 Other women began to beat drums and sang an improvised song:
O you who run from a constant woman
Who has both beauty and virtue;
And leave her to the infidel,
The hated and evil infidel,
To possess, disgrace and ruin!2
What these Muslims received from their women was not just stinging rebukes; they were actually assaulted! First came

1Waqidi : p. 140                2Ibid.
Al Yarmuk 427
a shower of stones, then the women rushed at the men, striking horse and rider with tent poles; and this was more than the proud warriors could take. Indignant at what had happened, they turned back from the camp and advanced in blazing anger toward the army of Qanateer. Amr now launched his second counter-attack with the bulk of his corps.
The situation on the Muslim left was only a little less serious. Here too the initial Roman attack was repulsed, but in a second attack the Romans broke through the corps of Yazeed. This was the army of Gregory, with chains, more slow moving than the others but also more solid. Yazeed too used his cavalry regiment to counter- attack and it too was repulsed, and after a period of stiff resistance the warriors of Yazeed fell back to their camp, where the women awaited them, led by Hind and Khaula. The first Muslim horseman from the left wing to arrive at the camp was Abu Sufyan, and the first woman to meet him was none other than Hind! She struck at the head of his horse with a tent pole and shouted: “Where to, O Son of Harb? Return to battle and show your courage so that you may be forgiven your sins against the Messenger of Allah.”1
Abu Sufyan had experienced his wife's violent temper before and hastily turned back. Other warriors received the same treatment from these women as the soldiers of Amr had received from theirs, and soon the corps of Yazeed returned to battle. A few women ran forward alongside the horses and one of them actually brought down a Roman with her sword. As the warriors of Yazeed turned again to grapple with the army of Gregory, Hind took up her song of Uhud:
We are the daughters of the night;
We move among the cushions
With a gentle feline grace
And our bracelets on our elbows.
If you advance we shall embrace you;
And if you retreat we shall forsake you
With a loveless separation.2
One may question the propriety of Hind singing such a provocative song, but she felt that she was young enough to do so. After all, she was not a day over 50!
1lbid: p. 141.              2Ibid: p. 140.
428 The Sword of Allah
It was now about midday. While the Muslim flanking corps were fighting their battle, Khalid was watching these actions from his position in the centre. So far he had done nothing to help these corps, and had refused to be drawn into battle with his central reserve before it was absolutely necessary. But as the corps returned to battle from the camps to which they had retreated, Khalid decided to launch his cavalry reserve to assist them and quicken the re-establishment of the Muslim positions.
He first turned to the right wing and with his Mobile Guard and one cavalry regiment struck at the flank of the army of Qanateer at the same time as Amr counter-attacked again from the front. Very soon the Romans, attacked from two sides, turned and beat a hasty retreat to their original position. Amr regained all the ground that he had lost and reorganized his corps for the next round.
As soon as this position was restored, Khalid turned to the left wing. By now Yazeed had begun a major counter-attack from the front to push the Romans back. Khalid detached one regiment under Zarrar and ordered him to attack the front of the army of Deirjan in order to create a diversion and threaten the withdrawal of the Roman right wing from its advanced position. With the rest of the army reserve he attacked the flank of Gregory. (See Map 21.) Here again the Romans withdrew under the counter-attacks from front and flank, but more slowly because with their chains the men could not move fast.
While the Roman right was falling back, Zarrar broke through the army of Deirjan and got to its commander who stood well forward with his body-guard. Here Zarrar killed Deirjan. But soon after, the pressure against him became so heavy that he was forced to retire to the Muslim line.
Before sunset the two flanking armies of the Romans had been pushed back. At sunset the central armies also broke contact and withdrew to their original positions and both fronts were restored along the lines occupied in the morning. The Muslims had faced a critical situation but had regained their lost ground. The right wing of the Muslims suffered more severely than the other corps, as the most vicious fighting had taken place in the sector of Amr. However, the day's fighting ended with the Muslims winning this bout on points.








Al Yarmuk 429
The night that followed was again a quiet one. The Muslim women got busy dressing wounds, preparing food, carrying water and so on. On the whole, Muslim spirits were high as they had been attacked by the bulk of the Roman army and had thrown the attackers back from their positions. The Muslims had re­mained on the defensive, the counter-attacks being no more than part of the general defensive posture.
In the Roman camp, however, the mood hardened. Thou­sands of Romans had been slain on this day, and the Muslims had not only repulsed the flanking armies which had penetrated their positions but had actually attacked the Roman centre (Zarrar's charge) and broken through, killing the army com­mander. This was a great loss, for Deirjan was a distinguished and highly esteemed general. Mahan appointed another general, one by the name of Qureen, to command Deirjan's army, and transferred the command of the Armenians to Qanateer, the commander of the Roman left. This was necessary, for in the next day's battle the major Roman effort would be made against the Muslim right and right centre.
*
The battle had got beyond the stage of ‘sparks of fire’. It had not yet reached the stage of ‘raging conflagration’, but the fire was nevertheless burning with fearful heat as the battle entered its third day. This was to be, for the Muslims, a right-handed action.
The army of chains made no move on this day as it had suffered more heavily on the previous day than the army of Qanateer. The army of Qureen made a limited effort on the front of Abu Ubeida as a diversionary measure to tie down the Muslim reserves. But the Armenians and the left wing of the Roman army, both now under the command of Qanateer, struck with extreme severity at the Muslim right and the corps of Shurahbeel, selecting as the main point of attack the junction between Shurahbeel and Amr bin Al Aas.
The initial attack was again repulsed by Amr and Shurah­beel, but the Roman advantage of numbers, against which the Muslims could only put up the same tired soldiers, soon began to tell. Thus, shortly before midday, Qanateer broke though in several places. The corps of Amr fell back to the camp, and the
MAP 21 : AL YARMUK – SECOND DAY
AI Yarmuk 431
right part of Shurahbeel’s front was also pushed back, while his left still held firmly to its position. Several gaps now appear­ed in the Muslim front.
Again the Muslim women came into action with tent poles and stones and sharp tongues; and again the Muslims recoiled from them to face the Romans. One of these Muslims con­fided to his comrades: “It is easier to face the Romans than our women!”1 The bulk of the two corps re-established a second line and held the Roman efforts to break through. Amr even took the offensive and struck at the Romans with his cavalry and in­fantry, intending to dislodge them from their forward positions, but had little success.
At this stage a Muslim lady came running to Khalid. She had suddenly got a bright military idea and wanted Khalid to get the benefit of it—just in case he did not know. “O Son of Al Waleed” said the lady, “you are among the noblest of the Arabs. Know that the men only stay with their commanders. If the com­manders stand fast the men stand fast. If the commanders are defeated the men are defeated.”2
Khalid thanked her politely for the advice and assured her that in this army the commanders would not be defeated!
Now Khalid launched his cavalry reserve against the flank of Qanateer. At the same time Amr's cavalry regiment man­oeuvred from the right and struck Qanateer in his left flank, while the infantry of Amr and Shurahbeel counter-attacked frontally. (See Map 22.) This time the Roman opposition to the Muslim counter-attack proved much more stubborn and hun­dreds of Muslims fell in combat, but by dusk the Romans were pushed back to their own position and the situation restored as at the beginning of the battle.
This had proved a harder day than the day before. How­ever, the losses of the Romans far outnumbered those of the Muslims, and at the end of the day's fighting Muslim spirits were even higher, while Roman morale had suffered a serious blow. The Romans were now getting desperate. All their attacks had failed, in spite of a heavy toll in human lives, and they were in no better position than at the start of the battle. Mahan upbraided his generals, who promised to do better the next day. The next day would in fact be the most critical day of the battle.
1Ibid: p. 142.               2Ibid.
MAP 22 : AL YARMUK – THIRD DAY
Al Yarmuk 433

Khalid and Abu Ubeida spent the night walking about the Muslim camp, offering encouragement to the tired Muslims and speaking to the wounded. Being wounded in this battle did not mean getting evacuated to the rear. A Muslim had to be badly wounded indeed before he could expect to rest from fighting. A moderate wound meant a few hours' rest, and then back to the front!
*
The fourth day of battle dawned with an atmosphere tense with expectation. The Romans knew that this day would prove decisive, for now they were going to make their greatest effort to shatter the Muslim army which had so far withstood all assaults. If even this attack failed, then all prospects of further offensive action would disappear. It was now or never.
Khalid also knew that the battle had reached a critical stage, and that this day's operations would give a final indication of success or failure. Thousands of Romans had been killed so far, and if on this day also the Romans were repulsed with bloody losses, they would be unlikely to take the initiative again. Thereafter the counter-offensive could be launched. The Muslim strength was now somewhat depleted. The archers, positioned in the front rank, had suffered the heaviest losses, and now only 2,000 of them remained in fit state for battle. These were re-allocated at the scale of 500 to each corps. The Muslims were also more tired than the Romans because of their fewer numbers, but courage was never higher in the Muslim army.
Khalid's greatest concern was for his right. However, he was reassured by the thought that the commander of the Muslim right was Amr bin Al Aas, who in generalship was second only to Khalid. Amr had so far seen the heaviest fighting of this battle and was destined to continue to do so. Anyway, known as the shrewdest of the Arabs, Amr was more than a match for any Roman general.
Mahan decided to start the day's operation with an attack on the right half of the Muslim front as was done the day before. Once this part of the front was driven back and Muslim reserves committed in this sector, he would strike with the rest of his army at the left half of the Muslim front. With this plan of battle, the
434 The Sword of Allah
two armies of Qanateer were set in motion, and the Slavs and the Armenians sprang at the corps of Amr and Shurahbeel. Amr was pushed back again, but not as far as on the previous day; this time the Muslims were not going to face the ire of their women! Some distance behind its original position, the corps of Amr held the Slavs; and here manoeuvre gave way to a hard slogging match in which the Muslims, led by Amr with drawn sword, gave better than they took and inflicted severe losses on their opponents.
In the sector of Shurahbeel, however, the Armenians broke through and pushed the Muslims back towards their camp. The Armenians were strongly supported by the Christian Arabs of Jabla, and this proved the most serious penetration of the Muslim front. Shurahbeel was able to slow down the advance of the Armenians but could not repulse it. Soon it was clear that the corps would not be able to hold out for very long. It now be­came necessary for Khalid to enter this sector with his reserve.
What Khalid feared most was an attack in strength on a broad front. In case the enemy broke through at several places, there would be no way of expelling him as the army reserve could not be everywhere at the same time. On the second day of battle Khalid had been able to restore the situation on both flanks by first striking at one and then at the other penetration; but if the Romans got through in strength at many places, this could not be done. Consequently, when he saw the initial success of the enemy against Amr and Shurahbeel, he ordered Abu Ubeida and Yazeed to attack on their front and thus forestall a Roman attack on the Muslim left in case such an attack was intended. This was to be a spoiling attack. By mid-morning the corps of Abu Ubeida and Yazeed had engaged the armies of Qureen and Gregory, and at the time when Shurahbeel’s position became delicate, both these corps were pressing hard against the right half of the Roman front.
Khalid, feeling more assured about his left, decided to strike against the Armenians. He divided the army reserve into two equal groups of which he gave one to Qeis bin Hubeira and kept the other with himself. Leading his own cavalry group, Khalid galloped round behind the corps of Shurahbeel and appeared against the northern flank of the Armenian salient. Now began a three-pronged counter attack against the Armenians and Chris-
Al Yarmuk 435
tian Arabs: Khalid from the right, Qeis from the left and Shurahbeel from the front. (See Map 23.) The fighting became vicious in this part of the battlefield as the enemy resisted stoutly, and for several hours a bitter struggle raged between the Muslims and the Christians; but at last the Armenians broke under the blows of the Muslim cavalry and infantry and fell back to their own posi­tion, losing heavily in the process. In this action, which lasted the whole afternoon, the Christian Arabs proved the heaviest losers.
As the Armenians pulled back, Amr bin Al Aas renewed his efforts to dislodge the Slavs from the position which they had taken; and the Slavs, denied the support of the Armenians on their flank, also retired. The positions of Shurahbeel and Amr were now restored. But this action on the Muslim right was not completed till the evening; and while it was in progress an equally critical and more fierce battle was being fought on the left side of the Muslim front. What made the latter action so dangerous was the fact that the army reserve was heavily committed on the right and could do nothing to help Abu Ubeida and Yazeed, who had to rely entirely on their own resources.
On the orders of Khalid, the two left corps had advanced to attack the Romans on their front and were in contact when Khalid moved the Mobile Guard to deal with the Armenians. Initially these corps enjoyed some success and the Romans were pushed back, but this action had not proceeded far when the Muslims found themselves subjected to a merciless barrage of archery. Thousands of Roman archers opened up on the Muslims, and so rapid and intense was the flight of arrows that according to some accounts, “arrows fell like hailstones and blocked the light of the sun!”1 Many a Muslim was wounded by these arrows, the wounds varying from light to severe, and each of 700 Muslims lost an eye. From the sectors of Abu Ubeida and Yazeed rose the lament: “O my eye! O my sight!”2 Abu Sufyan also is belie­ved to have lost an eye in this action.3 As a result of this calamity, this fourth day of battle became known as the Day of Lost Eyes,4 a tribute to Roman marksmanship. And this was undoubtedly
1Ibid: pp. 146, 148.         2Ibid: p. 149.
3We have already noted the loss of Abu Sufyan's eye at Taif. How­ever, some sources indicate that this happened at Yarmuk and not at Taif.
4Ibid: p. 148.
MAP 23: AL YARMUK—FOURTH DAY
Al Yarmuk 437
the worst day of battle for the Muslim army.
The Muslims of the left now fell back. Their own bows were ineffective against the Roman archers because of their shor­ter range and fewer numbers; and the only way to avoid further casualties was to withdraw out of range of the Roman archers, which Abu Ubeida and Yazeed promptly did. As the two sides disengaged, both fronts stood still and the Muslims wisely re­frained from advancing again. There was in fact a certain amount of consternation among the Muslims as a result of the arrow wounds and lost eyes.
But Mahan and his army commanders, Gregory and Qureen, had seen how the Muslims had suffered and decided to exploit their advantage. The two armies now advanced to assault the Muslims before they could recover from their repulse and the two bodies of men clashed again. As a result of the Roman assault the Muslims fell back to their own position and here the Romans, knowing that this was the decisive day of battle, attacked with even greater fury. The corps of Abu Ubeida and Yazeed were again pushed back a short distance, except for the regiment of Ikrama which stood at the left edge of Abu Ubeida's sector.
The fearless Ikrama refused to retreat, and called to his men to take the oath of death with him, i.e. that they would go down fighting and not surrender their position. In response to his call 400 of his men immediately took the oath and fell upon the Romans like hungry wolves. Not only did Ikrama repulse the Romans on his front but he also lashed out at the Roman regiments passing on his flanks. This position was never lost by the Muslims. Of the 400 dedicated men who had taken the oath of death, everyone was either killed or seriously wounded, but they accounted for many times their number of Romans. Ikrama and his son, Amr, were mortally wounded.
The corps of Abu Ubeida and Yazeed did not this time reach the camp. They did not have to, for the women themsel­ves, many of them carrying swords, rushed forward and joined their men. Even the women understood that on this phase hung the fate of the battle. They came with swords and tent poles for the Romans and water for the Muslim wounded and thirsty. Among them were Khaula and the wife of Zubeir and Umm Hakeem, who shouted to the women: “Strike the uncircumcised
438 The Sword of Allah
ones in the arm!”1 The women rushed through the Muslim corps to the front rank, determined to fight ahead of their men this time; and this proved the turning point in this sector.
The sight of their women fighting alongside, and some even ahead of them, turned the Muslims into raging demons. In blind fury they struck at the Romans in an action in which there was now no manoeuvre and no generalship—only individual soldiers giving of their superhuman best. Striking with sword and dagger, the valiant men of Abu Ubeida and Yazeed hurled the Romans back from their positions, and the Romans retreated fast before the terrible blows of the infuriated Muslims. (See Map 23.)
The battle of this day reached its climax along the entire front in the late afternoon. At this time all the generals were engaged in combat like their men, and every corps commander proved his right to be the leader of brave men. Several Romans bit the dust under the blows of Muslim women. Khaula took on a Roman warrior, but her adversary proved a better swords­man and struck her on the head with his sword, as a result of which she collapsed in a heap with blood dying her hair red. When the Romans were pushed back, and the other women saw her motionless body, they wailed in sorrow and searched fran­tically for Zarrar, to inform him that his beloved sister was dead. But Zarrar could not be found till the evening. When he did arrive where his sister lay, Khaula sat up, smiling. She was all right, really!                               
By dusk the days' action was over. Both armies stood once again on their original lines. It had been a terrible day—one that the veterans of Yarmuk would never forget and on which the Romans came very near victory. But many of them paid with their lives for a success which they were not destined to gain. The most crippling losses had been suffered by the chained men, the Armenians and the Christian Arabs. The Muslims had suffered more than on previous days, and those who were not wounded were fewer in number than those who were, but a glow of pride and satisfaction warmed their hearts, especially Khalid's, who knew that the crisis was over. The tide had tur­ned.
1Ibid: p. 149. According to Balazuri (p. 141) these words were uttered by Hind.
Al Yannuk 439
One incident remains to be narrated before we come to the end of this account of the Day of Lost Eyes. During a pause in the fighting in Shurahbeel’s sector, Khalid suddenly appeared deeply worried, and this suprised his men who had never seen him so. But they understood when he ordered the men to look for his red cap which he had dropped on the battle­field. A search was at once carried out and the cap found, for which Khalid was profuse in his thanks. There were some men who did not know about this cap and asked Khalid what was so wonderful about it. Thereupon Khalid told the story of the red cap:
When the Messenger of Allah had his head shaved on the last pilgrimage, I picked up some of the hair of his head. He asked me, “What will you do with this, O Khalid?” I replied, “I shall gain strength from it while fighting our enemies, O Messenger of Allah.” Then he said, “You will remain victorious as long as this is with you.”
I had the hair woven into my cap, and I have never met an enemy but he has been defeated by the blessing of the Messenger of Allah, on whom be the blessings of Allah and peace.1
This is the story of Khalid's red cap—the one possession with which he would not part.
Darkness had fallen when Khalid sat on the blood-spat­tered earth at the left edge of Abu Ubeida's sector. On one knee rested the head of Ikrama, his nephew and dear, dear friend. On the other knee lay the head of Amr, son of Ikrama. Life was ebbing fast from the bodies of father and son. Khalid would now and then dip his fingers into a bowl of water and let the water drip into the half-open mouths; and he would say: “Does the Son of Hantama think we do not get martyred?”2 Thus died Ikrama and his son, in the dearly loved arms of the Sword of Allah. The man who for years had been the most blood-thirsty enemy of Islam earned final redemption in martyrdom. The greatest glory on the Day of Lost Eyes, a day such as the Mus­lims would never again see in Syria, went to Ikrama bin Abi Jahl.
1Waqidi: p. 151.
2Tabari: Vol. 2, p. 597. The Son of Hantama was Umar, and by ‘we’ Khalid meant the Bani Makhzum.
440 The Sword ofAllah
The night was spent in peace, if there could be peace for exhausted, wounded men who had driven their bodies to perform feats of strength and endurance which the human body was never intended to perform. Normally Abu Ubeida would nominate a general as duty officer for the night, whose task it would be to go round the guards and the outposts and check the vigilance of the sentries. But on this night the generals themselves were so tired that Abu Ubeida, kind and considerate as ever, did not have the heart to ask any of them to carry out this onerous task. Although his own sword dripped with the blood of several Romans and his need for rest was no less than that of the others, Abu Ubeida decided to act as duty officer himself. Along with a few selected Companions of the Prophet he began his round. But he need not have worried. Everywhere that he went he found the generals up and mounted, going about and talking to the sentries and the wounded. Zubeir was doing the rounds accom­panied by his wife, also on horseback!
*
Early on the fifth day of battle the two armies again for­med up on their lines—the same lines which they had adopted before the start of battle. But on this day the soldiers did not stand so erect, nor look so imposing. Next to each unwounded man stood a wounded one. Some could hardly stand, but stand they did. Khalid looked intently at the Roman front for any sign of movement and wondered if the Romans would perhaps attack once again. But there was no movement, not for an hour or two. Then one man emerged from the Roman centre. This was an emissary of Mahan who brought a proposal for a truce for the next few days so that fresh negotiations could be held. Abu Ubeida nearly accepted the proposal but was restrained by Khalid. On Khalid's insistence he sent the envoy back with a negative reply, adding: “We are in a hurry to finish this busi­ness!”1
Now Khalid knew. He had guessed right. The Romans were no longer eager for battle. The rest of the day passed uneventfully while Khalid remained busy giving orders for the counter-offensive and carrying out some reorganisation. All the cavalry regiments were grouped together into one powerful
1Waqidi: p.153.
Al Yarmuk 441
mounted force with the Mobile Guard acting as its hard core. The total strength of this cavalry group was now about 8,000 horse.
The next day the sword of vengeance would flash over the Plain of Yarmuk.
*
The sixth day of battle dawned bright and clear. It was the fourth week of August 636 (third week of Rajab, 15 Hijri). The stillness of the morning gave no indication of the holocaust that was to follow. The Muslims were now feeling more re­freshed, and knowing of their commander's offensive intentions and something of his plans, were eager for battle. The hopes of this day drowned the grim memories of the Day of Lost Eyes. To their front stretched the anxious ranks of the Roman army —less hopeful but still with plenty of fight in them.
As the sun rose over the dim skyline of the Jabal-ud-Druz, Gregory, the commander of the army of chains, rode forward, but from the centre of the imperial army. He had come with the mission of killing the Muslim army commander in the hope that this would have a demoralising effect on the Muslim rank and file. As he drew near the Muslim centre, he shouted a challenge and asked for “none but the commander of the Arabs”.1
Abu Ubeida at once prepared to go forth. Khalid and the others tried to dissuade him, for Gregory had the reputation of being a powerful fighter, and looked it too. All felt that it would be better if Khalid went out in response to the challenge, but Abu Ubeida was adamant. He gave the army standard to Khalid, and with the words, “If I do not return you shall com­mand the army, until the Caliph decides the matter,” set out to meet his challenger.2
The twd generals met on horseback, drew their swords and began to duel. Both were splendid swordsmen and treated the spectators to a thrilling display of swordsmanship with cut, parry and thrust. Romans and Muslims held their breath. Then, after a few minutes of combat, Gregory drew back from his adversary, turned his horse and began to canter away. Shouts of joy rose from the Muslim ranks at what appeared to be the
1Ibid: p. 153.           2Ibid.
442 The Sword of Allah
defeat of the Roman, but there was no such reaction from Abu Ubeida. With his eyes fixed intently on the retreating Roman, he urged his horse forward and followed him.
Gregory had hardly gone a few hundred paces when Abu Ubeida caught up with him. Now Gregory, who had deliberately controlled the pace of his horse to let the Muslim overtake him, turned swiftly and raised his sword to strike at Abu Ubeida. His apparent flight had been a trick to throw his opponent off guard. But Abu Ubeida was no novice; he knew more about sword play than Gregory would ever learn. The Roman raised his sword, but that is as far as he got. He was struck at the base of his neck by Abu Ubeida, and the sword fell from his hand as he crashed to the ground. For a few moments Abu Ubeida sat still on his horse, marvelling at the enormous size of the Roman general. Then, leaving behind the bejewelled and gold-encrusted armour and weapons of the Roman, which he ignored with his habitual disregard for wordly possessions, the saintly soldier turned and rode back to the Muslim front.
On the return of Abu Ubeida, Khalid galloped off to join the cavalry which had been positioned behind the corps of Amr bin Al Aas. As he arrived at his place he gave the signal for the general attack and the entire Muslim front surged forward. The Muslim centre and left engaged the Roman armies on their front but did not press the attack. On the right the cavalry gal­loped round to the flank of the Roman left. From here Khalid despatched a regiment to engage and hold the Roman cavalry of the left, and with the rest of the Muslim cavalry struck at the flank of the Roman left wing (the Slavs) at the same time as Amr assaulted their front with extreme violence. The Slavs were stout fighters, and for some time defended themselves courageously, but getting no support from their cavalry and assailed from front and flank, they at last gave way. Recoiling from the blows of Khalid and Amr, they fell back into the centre —the Armenians.
As the Roman left wing crumbled, Amr moved his corps forward, swung it to the left, and came up against the left and now exposed flank of the Armenians, in whose ranks there was considerable disorder as a result of the disorganised arrival of the broken Slavs.  Meanwhile Khalid wheeled his cavalry and engaged the Roman cavalry of the left, which had
Al Yarmuk  443
been held in check by the regiment he had detached a little earlier. The second phase of the Muslim offensive began with Shurahbeel attacking the front of the Armenians while Amr assailed their flank. Then Khalid struck at the Roman cavalry of the left and drove it back from its position. This cavalry group, having got a severe mauling from Khalid, galloped away to the north and to safety. It had had enough of battle. (See Map 24.)
I shall not attempt to explain Khalid's plan as it will be­come evident to the reader as we proceed with the course of the battle. But one point that needs especial mention is Khalid's intention with regard to the enemy cavalry. He had determined to drive the Roman cavalry off the battlefield so that the infantry, which formed the bulk of the Roman army, would be left without cavalry support and thus be helpless when attacked from flank and rear. In fast moving operations the cavalry was the do­minant partner, and without it the infantry would be at a great disadvantage, unable to move fast or to save itself by a rapid change of position.
At about the time when the Roman cavalry of the left was being driven away by Khalid, Mahan had concentrated the remainder of his cavalry into one powerful, mobile army behind the Roman centre to counter-attack and regain lost posi­tions. But before the massed Roman cavalry could start any manoeuvre, it was assailed in front and flank by the Muslim cavalry. For some time, urged on by the intrepid Mahan, the Romans fought gallantly; but in this type of fluid situation the regular, heavy cavalry was no match for the light, fast-moving horsemen of Khalid who could strike, disengage, manoeuvre and strike again. At last the Roman cavalry, seeing no other way of survival, broke contact and fled to the north, taking with it the protesting Mahan. In this manner the Roman cavalry abandoned the infantry to its fate. With Mahan, altogether 40,000 mounted troops got away, consisting partly of regular Roman cavalry and partly of the mobile Christian Arabs of Jabla bin El Eiham.
In the cavalry actions of this morning there was no sign of Zarrar. The Muslims missed the familiar sight of the half-naked warrior in the kind of battle in which he would have re­velled. They did not know where he was; and Khalid  would not
MAP 24 : AL YARMUK – SIXTH DAY, I
Al Yarmuk 445
tell!
Meanwhile the Armenians were stoutly resisting Amr and Shurahbeel's attempts to crush them. The two Muslim corps had made some headway but not much; and this is understand­able, for the Armenians were very brave fighters indeed.1 Abu Ubeida and Yazeed were also attacking the Romans on their front (though their role was as yet secondary—a holding operation), but were held by the army of Qureen and the army of chains. It was at this stage that Khalid, having driven the Roman cavalry from the battlefield, turned on the Armenians and charged them in the rear. (See Map 25.) In the face of the three-pronged attack the Armenians disintegrated. Abandoning their position, they fled to the south-west—the only direction open to them, and were much relieved and surprised that the Muslim cavalry made no effort to interfere with their movement as it could easily have done. They travelled in the direction in which they saw safety. Unknown to them, this was also the direction which Khalid wanted them to take.
As the Armenian army collapsed and, mingling in a con­fused mass with the survivors of the Slav army of Qanateer, fled towards the Wadi-ur-Raqqad, the remaining Roman armies realised the hopelessness of their position. Their flank and rear were completely exposed.  Consequently they also began to withdraw, and with discipline and good order made their way westwards. Here again the Roman movement was not intercep­ted by Khalid.
The sun had not yet reached its zenith when the Roman infantry was in full retreat—part of it fleeing in panic and part withdrawing in good order. It made for the Wadi-ur-Raqqad. After the retreating Romans came the Muslim corps, now re­-formed into orderly lines with shorter fronts.  The Muslim cavalry moved to the north of the Roman army so that none may escape in that direction, though before this escape route could be fully sealed, thousands of Slavs and Armenians did manage to get away. In this manner the Muslims closed in on the already
1Gibbon, in his Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, describes the Armenians as “the most warlike subjects of Rome”.
MAP 25 : AL YARMUK – SIXTH DAY, II
Al Yarmuk  447
defeated Army of Caesar.1
*
As the Romans fled the field of battle, their only desire was to put as much distance as possible between themselves and the Muslims. They knew that the northern escape route was closed by the Muslim cavalry; but another channel of escape was available where the Raqqad was crossed, at a ford, by a good road. Towards this ford the officers guided their men. As the leading regiment arrived at the ford, it rushed down the eastern slope of the ravine and began to cross the stream. The eastern slope was not so bad here as in other parts of the ravine; but the western slope was much steeper, and near the top it became precipitous on either side of the road, creating a bottleneck where a few brave men could hold up an army.
Overjoyed at their escape from the Plain of Yarmuk, the men in the lead laboured up the road on the western bank of the ravine. It was only when they got near the top that they noticed a group of Muslims standing above them with drawn swords. At their head stood a lean, young warrior, naked above the waist!
During the night Khalid had sent Zarrar with 500 horse­men from the Mobile Guard to make a wide detour of the Roman left, get behind the Wadi-ur-Raqqad, and occupy a blocking position on the far bank of the ravine. Zarrar, guided by a Christian Arab named Abu Jueid,2 had carried out the move with admirable efficiency. Unknown to the Romans—who had con­sidered the crossing of the Raqqad too far back to be of tactical significance—he had secured the western bank of the ravine and concealed his men near the ford. Now Zarrar stood with his
1The statement made by some later Western writers that the Roman defeat was due to Khalid's exploitation of a violent sand storm which blew in the faces of the Romans, is utterly incorrect. No Muslim historian has mentioned such a storm. Gibbon (Vol. 5, p. 327) states that according to Theophanes there was “a cloud of dust and adverse wind”, but only a child would imagine that the Muslim army, which still numbered about 30,000 fit soldiers, deployed on an 11-mile front, could be thrown into action so quickly, in such a superbly conceived manoeuvre, merely to exploit a dust storm. And this in the days when communication was by horse-rider! This is nothing but a proud Western historian's attempt to find an excuse for the Roman defeat.
2Waqidi:p. 152.
448 The Sword of Allah
men on top of the western bank, looking down at the tired, panting Romans (See Map 26.)
Soon a volley of stones hit the Romans. A few of them managed to get to the top, but were cut down instantly. Finding themselves under a hail of stones, the leading elements fell back on those behind them, these on those behind them, and these again on those behind them. As Zarrar charged at the Romans, they went sliding down—a screaming, twisting, rolling ava­lanche—to the bottom of the ravine.
The Romans still on the eastern bank stopped when they saw the horror that had befallen the leading regiment. It was clear that this escape route was also closed.  Nothing could be done to dislodge Zarrar because of the narrowness of the cross­ing which allowed no room for manoeuvre; so the Roman army turned to defend itself against the impending attack from the east. The generals who still remained with the army hastily deployed the regiments for defence with their backs to the Wadi-ur-Raqqad and their right flank resting on the Yarmuk River. They were caught between two calamities—the ravine and the Muslims—and could not decide which was worse!
In the late afternoon of this sixth day of battle, began the last phase of the Muslim attack. (See Map 27.) Only a third of the Roman army remained in this crowded corner of the Plain of Yarmuk; against it the Muslims were arranged in a neat semi-circle, with the infantry on the east and the cavalry on the north. The Muslim strength here was less than 30,000 men. The time for generalship and manoeuvre was over. The skill of the general had placed the troops in the ideal situation for combat, and it was up to the soldiers to fight and win. The generals drew their swords and became warriors like the rest, as the lions of the desert moved in for the final kill.
The attackers struck with sword and spear at the con­fused, seething mass in front of them. At places the Romans were too closely packed for elbow-room to use their weapons; but their front rank fought with heroic, if futile, courage to stem the tide. Soon it was struck down, and the next rank and the next, as the Muslims advanced—cutting, slashing, stabbing, thrusting. In the dust and confusion the Romans ran into each other, and those not agile enough fell and suffered a painful death under the trampling feet of their own comrades. The
Al Yarmuk 449
Muslim cavalry, rejoined by Zarrar's detachment, pressed the Romans farther into the corner where they lost all freedom of action. Khalid's horsemen now began to use the knees and hooves of their horses to knock down the exhausted defenders. The screams of the Romans mingled with the shouts of the Mus­lims as the last resistance collapsed, and the battle turned into butchery and a nightmare of horrors. For the last time the Romans broke and fled in disorder. Those who still retained a desire to fight were carried away by their panic-striken comrades, especially in the army of chains in which groups of 10 fought, moved and fell together.
Moving like stampeding cattle, the Roman rabble reached the edge of the ravine. The view to the bottom was terrifying, but so was the last wild charge of the Muslims. Those coming in the rear pressed blindly against those on the edge of the ravine, and rank after rank, the Roman army began to fall down the precipice. The blood-curdling screams of some continued until they hit the bottom, while the screams of others were cut short as their bodies crashed against jutting rocks and then continued their descent as shapeless, bloody lumps.
It was almost dark when the last of the Romans ceased to move. The day of 'the raging conflagration' had ended. Kha­lid's greatest battle was over.1
*
Early next morning, while the rest of the army gathered the spoils of war and buried the martyrs, Khalid set off with the Muslim cavalry on the road to Damascus in the hope of catch­ing up with Mahan. The Roman Commander-in-Chief, heart­broken at the annihilation of his army and not for a moment suspecting that a pursuit would be launched by the Muslims, was moving without haste.  Some time in the afternoon Khalid overtook the Romans a few miles short of Damascus, and at once attacked the rear-guard. Mahan rushed to the rear-guard to supervise its action, and here the King of Armenia, the Com­mander-in-Chief of the imperial army, was killed by a Muslim
1There is disagreement about two basic points in this battle: the strength of the opposing forces and the exact location of the battlefield. For an explanation see Notes 12 and 13 in Appendix B.
MAP 26 : AL YARMUK – SIXTH DAY, III
Al Yarmuk 451
horseman. Soon after his death, the Roman cavalry broke up into groups, and riding away to north and west, escaped the clutches of Khalid.
The people of Damascus now came out to greet Khalid. They reminded him of the pact which he had made with them on the surrender of the city two years before, and Khalid assured them that they were still under its protection.
The next day Khalid rejoined the Muslim army on the Plain of Yarmuk.
*
The Battle of Yarmuk was the most disastrous defeat ever suffered by the Eastern Roman Empire, and it spelled the end of Roman rule in Syria. The following month Heraclius would depart from Antioch and travel by the land route to Constantinople. On arrival at the border between Syria and what was known to the Muslims as 'Rome', he would look back towards Syria and, with a sorrowing heart, lament: “Salutations to thee, 0 Syria! And farewell from one who departs. Never again shall the Roman return to thee except in fear. Oh, what a fine land I leave to the enemy !”1
As an example of a military operation, the Battle of Yarmuk combined many tactical forms: the frontal clash, the frontal penetration, counter-attack and repulse, the flank-attack, the rear-attack and the outflanking manoeuvre. Khalid's plan of remaining on the defensive until he had worn down the Romans had worked admirably.  During the defensive phase, lasting four days, every offensive blow by Khalid had been a limited tactical manoeuvre to restore his defensive balance. Only when it was certain that the Romans were badly hurt and no longer capable of fighting offensively, did he launch his counter-offensive, on the last day of battle. On this day he had rolled up the Roman position from a flank, but only after he had separated the cavalry from the infantry and rendered the latter helpless. Then he had driven the Roman infantry into the corner formed by the Wadi-ur-Raqqad and the Yarmuk River, having already positioned Zarrar at the crossing of the ravine so that none might escape, and launched his last, all-destroying assault. Against the anvil of the Wadi-ur-Raqqad the Muslim hammer had crushed the Roman army to powder.
1Tabari: Vol. 3, p. 100; Balazuri: p. 142.
MAP 27 : AL YARMUK – SIXTH DAY, IV
Al Yarmuk 453
It is known that the Muslims lost 4,000 men in this battle, and those who did not carry wounds on their persons were few indeed; but the Roman casualty figures vary. Waqidi's estimate is exaggerated to an unacceptable degree. Tabari, in one place,1 gives the Roman dead as 120,000 but elsewhere quotes Ibn Ishaq's estimate of 70,000.2 Balazuri also gives the Roman dead as 70,000.3 This last figure appears to be reasonable—about 45 per cent of the Roman army. Of these 70,000 about half fell on the plain and half fell into the ravine. Some 80,000 men got away, most of them horse and camel-mounted, including those who escaped before the Muslim ring was closed. Many may even have succeeded in crossing the Wadi-ur-Raqqad at places where it was not so precipitous.
The Battle of Yarmuk was a glorious victory for Islam;
and the Plain of Yarmuk and the Wadi-ur-Raqqad provided ample, if gruesome, evidence of it. Tens of thousands of Roman bodies lay scattered, singly and in heaps, on the plain and at the bottom of the ravine. The worst signs of carnage were visible at the corner of the plain and in the ravine itself. Broken, maimed and mutilated bodies could be seen everywhere, lying in grotesque shapes and postures. Blood-covered bodies without limbs lay on the blood-spattered earth, staring with sightless eyes at the eternity of death. Thousands of Romans sprawled with broken swords in their hands, true to the oath of death which they had taken on the eve of battle. And mingled with the soldiers, lay countless priests, still clutching their crosses. The nauseating stench of decaying flesh rose and poisoned the air over the Plain of Yarmuk.
A vast and heroic battle had been fought; a great and terrible victory had been won.
1Tabari: Vol. 2, p. 596.
2Ibid: Vol. 3, p. 75.
3Balazuri: p. 141.














36: THE COMPLETION OF THE CONQUEST
After Yarmuk the remnants of the Roman army withdrew in haste to Northern Syria and the northern part of the Medi­terranean coast. The vanquished soldiers of Rome, those who survived the horror of Yarmuk, were in no fit state for battle. The victorious soldiers of Islam were in no fit state for battle either. Abu Ubeida sent a detachment to occupy Damascus, and remained with the rest of his army in the region of Jabiya for a whole month. During this period the men rested; spoils were collected, checked and distributed; the wounded were given time to recover. There was much to be done in matters of administration, and this kept the generals occupied.
In early October 636 (late Shaban, 15 Hijri), Abu Ubeida held a council of war to discuss future plans. Opinions of objec­tives varied between Caesarea and Jerusalem.  Abu Ubeida could see the importance of both these cities, which had so far resisted all Muslim attempts at capture, and unable to decide the matter, wrote to Umar for instructions. In his reply the Caliph ordered the Muslims to capture Jerusalem. Abu Ubeida therefore marched towards Jerusalem with the army from Jabiya, Khalid and his Mobile Guard leading the advance. The Muslims arrived at Jerusalem around early November, and the Roman garrison withdrew into the fortified city.
For four months the siege continued without a break.
The Completion of the Conquest 455
Then the Patriarch of Jerusalem, a man by the name of Sophronius, offered to surrender the city and pay the Jizya, but only on condition that the Caliph himself would come and sign the pact with him and receive the surrender. When the Patriarch's terms became known to the Muslims, Shurahbeel suggested that instead of waiting for Umar to come all the way from Madina, Khalid should be sent forward as the Caliph. Umar and Khalid were very similar in appearance;1 and since the people of Jerusalem would only know Umar by reports, they could per­haps be taken in by a substitute. The Muslims would say that actually the Caliph was already there—and lo, he comes!
On the following morning the Patriarch was informed of the Caliph's presence, and Khalid, dressed in simple clothes of the poorest material, as was Umar's custom, rode up to the fort for talks with the Patriarch. But it did not work. Khalid was too well known, and there may have been Christian Arabs in Jerusalem who had visited Madina and seen both Umar and Khalid, noting the differences. Moreover, the Patriarch must have wondered how the great Caliph happened to be there just when he was needed! Anyhow, the trick was soon discovered, and the Patriarch refused to talk. When Khalid reported the failure of this mission, Abu Ubeida wrote to Umar about the situation, and invited him to come to Jerusalem and accept the surrender of the city. In response the Caliph rode out with a handful of Com­panions on what was to be the first of his four journeys to Syria.
Umar first came to Jabiya, where he was met by Abu Ubeida, Khalid and Yazeed, who had travelled thither with an escort to receive him. Amr bin Al Aas was left as commander of the Muslim army besieging Jerusalem. Khalid and Yazeed were magnificently attired in silk and brocade and rode gaily capari­soned horses—and the sight of them infuriated Umar. Dis­mounting from his horse, he picked up a handful of pebbles from the ground and threw them at the two offending generals. “Shame on you”, shouted the Caliph, “that you greet me in this fashion! It is only in the last two years that you have eaten your fill. Shame on what abundance of food has brought you to! By Allah, if you were to do this after 200 years of prosperity, I should still dismiss you and appoint others in your place.”2
1Waqidi: p. 162,  Isfahani: Vol. 15,  pp. 12, 56.
2Tabari: Vol.3, p. l03.
456 The Sword of Allah
Umar was dressed in simple, patched garments as he was wont to wear in the time of the Holy Prophet. Becoming Caliph had made no difference to his austere and unspoiled way of life, and he continued to abhor luxury and ostentation.
Recovering from their discomfiture, Khalid and Yazeed hastily opened their robes and showed the armour and weapons which they wore underneath. “0 Commander of the Faithful!” they cried. “These are only garments. We still carry our weapons”.1 Umar was sufficiently mollified by this reply. Now Abu Ubeida walked up, dressed as simply and unaffectedly as always, and the Caliph and the Commander-in-Chief shook hands and embraced each other.
From Jabiya, Umar proceeded to Jerusalem, accompanied by his generals and the escort. His arrival at Jerusalem was a great moment for the Muslim soldiers, and they rejoiced at the sight of their ruler.
Next day, at about noon, Umar sat with a large group of Companions, talking of this and that. Soon it would be time for the early afternoon prayer. Bilal the Negro was also present. Bilal, who has been mentioned in the second chapter of this book, had suffered many tortures in the early days of Islam at the hands of the unbelieving Qureish, but had remained steadfast in his faith. When the institution of the Azan (the Muslim call to prayer) was adopted in 2 Hijri, the Prophet appointed Bilal as the Muazzin; and thereafter, five times a day, the powerful and melodious voice of Bilal could be heard at Madina, calling the Faithful to prayer. Over the years Bilal had risen in stature as a saintly Muslim, and had become one of the closest and most venerated Companions of the Prophet. But on the death of the Holy Prophet, Bilal had fallen silent; he would not call the Azan any more.
It now occurred to some of the Companions that perhaps the conquest of the holy city of Jerusalem was an important enough occasion for Bilal to break his silence. They asked Umar to urge him to call the Azan, just this one time! Umar turned to Bilal: “0 Bilal! The Companions of the Messenger of Allah implore you to call the Azan and remind them of the time of their Prophet, on whom be the blessings of Allah and peace.”2 For a few moments Bilal remained lost in thought. Then he
1Ibid.                      2Waqidi: p. 165.
The Completion of the Conquest 457
looked at the eager faces of the Companions and at the thous­ands of Muslim soldiers who were gathering for the congrega­tional prayer. Then he stood up. Bilal would call the Azan again!
The glorious voice of the illustrious Muazzin beat upon the vast multitude. As he called the opening words, Allah is Great, the minds of the Faithful turned to memories of the dearly loved Muhammad and tears welled up in their eyes. When Bilal came to the words, Muhammad is the Apostle of Allah, his audience broke down and sobbed.
On the following day the pact was drawn up.1 It was signed on behalf of the Muslims by Caliph Umar and witnessed by Khalid, Amr bin Al Aas, Abdur Rahman bin Auf and Muawiya. Jerusalem surrendered to the Caliph, and peace returned to the holy city. This happened in April 637 (Rabi-ul-Awwal, 16 Hijri). After staying 10 days at Jerusalem, the Caliph re­turned to Madina.
Following the Caliph's instructions, Yazeed proceeded to Caesarea and once again laid siege to the port city. Amr and Shurahbeel marched to reoccupy Palestine and Jordan, which task was completed by the end of this year. Caesarea, however, could not be taken till 640 (19 Hijri), when at last the garrison laid down its arms before Muawiya. Abu Ubeida and Khalid, with an army of 17,000 men, set off from Jerusalem to conquer all of Northern Syria.
*
Abu Ubeida marched to Damascus, which was already in Muslim hands, and then to Emessa, which welcomed his return. His next objective was Qinassareen, and towards this the army advanced with Khalid and the Mobile Guard in the lead. After a few days the Mobile Guard reached Hazir, 3 miles east of Qinassareen, and here it was attacked in strength by the Romans.2
The Roman commander at Qinassareen was a general named Meenas—a distinguished soldier who was loved by his men. Meenas knew that if he stayed in Qinassareen, he would be besieged by the Muslims and would eventually have to sur­render, as at present no help could be expected from the Empe-
1According to some reports, the pact was actually signed at Jabiya with representatives of the Patriarch, and after signing the pact there, Umar travelled to Jerusalem and received the surrender.
2Hazir still exists—a large farming village.
458 The Sword ofAllah
ror. He therefore decided to take the offensive and attack the leading elements of the Muslim army well forward of the city and defeat them before they could be joined by the main body. With this plan in mind, Meenas attacked the Mobile Guard at Hazir with a force whose strength is not recorded. He either did not know that Khalid was present with the leading elements of the Muslim army or did not believe all that he had heard about Khalid.
For Khalid to throw his cavalry into fighting formation for battle was a matter of minutes, and soon a fierce action was raging at Hazir. The battle was still in its early stages when Meenas was killed; and as the news of his death spread among his men, the Romans went wild with fury and attacked savagely to avenge their beloved leader's death. But they were up against the finest body of men of the time. Their very desire for venge­ance proved their undoing, for not a single Roman survived the Battle of Hazir.1 The Mobile Guard took this encounter in its stride as one of its many victories.
As soon as the battle was over, the people of Hazir came out of their town to greet Khalid. They pleaded that they were Arabs and had no intention to fight him. Khalid accepted their surrender, and advanced to Qinassareen.
When Umar received reports of the Battle of Hazir, he made no attempt to conceal his admiration for the military genius of Khalid. “Khalid is truly the commander,”2 Umar exclaimed. “May Allah have mercy upon Abu Bakr. He was a better judge of men than I have been.”3 This was Umar's first admission that perhaps he had not judged Khalid rightly.
At Qinassareen the part of the Roman garrison which had not accompanied Meenas to Hazir shut itself up in the fort. As soon as Khalid arrived, he sent a message to the garrison: “If you were in the clouds, Allah would raise us to you or lower you to us for battle.”4 Without further delay Qinassareen sur­rendered to Khalid. The Battle of Hazir and the surrender of Qinassareen took place about June 637 (Jamadi-ul-Awwal,
1Tabari: Vol. 3, p. 98.
2Literally: “Khalid has made himself commander”, i.e., that the role comes naturally to him.
3Tabari: Vol. 3, p. 98.      4Ibid.
The Completion of the Conquest 459
16Hijri).1
Abu Ubeida now joined Khalid at Qinassareen, and the army marched to Aleppo, where a strong garrison under a Roman general named Joachim held the fort. This general, following the same line of thought as the commander of Qinas­sareen, set out to meet the Muslims in the open and clashed with the Mobile Guard 6 miles south of the city. A bloody engage­ment took place here, in which the Romans were worsted; and Joachim, now wiser, pulled back in haste and regained the safety of the fort.
Aleppo consisted of a large walled city and a smaller but virtually impregnable fort outside the city atop a hill, a little more than a quarter of a mile across, surrounded by a wide moat. The Muslims moved up and laid siege to the fort. Joachim was a very bold commander and launched several sallies to break the siege, but received heavy punishment every time. After a few days of this, the Romans decided to remain in the fort and await such help as Heraclius might be able to send. Heraclius however, could send none; and four months later, around Octo­ber 637, the Romans surrendered on terms. The soldiers of the garrison were allowed to depart in peace; but Joachim would not go. He became a Muslim and elected to serve under the banner of Islam. In fact, over the next few weeks, he proved a remark­ably able and loyal officer, and fought gallantly under various Muslim generals.
Once Aleppo was taken, Abu Ubeida sent a column under Malik Ashtar to take Azaz on the route to 'Rome'. The region which the Muslims called Rome included the area which is now Southern Turkey east of the Taurus Mountains. Malik, assisted by Joachim, captured Azaz and signed a pact with the local in­habitants, whereafter he returned to Aleppo. The capture and
1Qinassareen lay in a south-south-westerly direction from Aleppo, 20 miles by road and about 18 as the crow flies. It was built on a low ridge which runs astride the present Aleppo-Saraqib road, but most of it was on the southern slope of the eastern part of the ridge, i.e. on the east side of the road. The ridge is now known as Al Laees, and this is also the name of a small village which stands on what was probably the south-eastern corner of Qinassareen.
The visitor to Qinassareen today imagines that he can see the ruins of the city—ancient ruins such as one sees in many places in Syria. But on closer examination he finds that they are not ruins but immense whitish rocks and caves shaped by nature into a semblance of ruins. Actually nothing remains of Qinassareen—not a stone, not a brick.
460 The Sword of Allah
clearance of Azaz was essential to ensure that no large Roman forces remained north of Aleppo, whence they could strike at the flank and rear of the Muslims as the next major operation was launched. As soon as Malik rejoined the army, Abu Ubeida marched westwards to capture Antioch. (See Map 28.)
The army moved via Harim and approached Antioch from the east. Some 12 miles from the city, at Mahruba, where a bridge of iron spanned the River Orontes (now known as Nahr-ul-Asi), the Muslims came up against a powerful Roman army—the defenders of Antioch. A major battle was fought here, the details of which are not recorded, and the Romans were soundly thrashed by Abu Ubeida, Khalid again playing a prominent role with his Mobile Guard. With the exception of Ajnadein and Yarmuk, the Roman casualties here are believed to have been the highest in the Syrian Campaign, and the rem­nants of the Roman army went fleeing in disorder to the city. The Muslims moved up and laid siege to Antioch, but not many days had passed before the greatest city of Syria, the capital of the Asian zone of the Eastern Roman Empire, surrendered to the Muslims. Abu Ubeida entered Antioch on October 30, 637 (the 5th of Shawwal, 16 Hijri). The defeated Roman soldiers were allowed to depart in peace.
Following the surrender of Antioch, Muslim columns moved south along the Mediterranean coast and captured Latakia, Jabia and Tartus, thus clearing most of North-Western Syria of the enemy. Abu Ubeida next returned to Aleppo, and during this move his columns subdued what remained of North­ern Syria. Khalid took his Mobile Guard on a raid eastwards up to the Euphrates in the vicinity of Munbij, but found little opposition. In early January, 638, he rejoined Abu Ubeida at Aleppo.
All of Syria was now in Muslim hands. Abu Ubeida left Khalid as commander and administrator at Qinassareen, and returned with the rest of his army to Emessa, where he assumed his duties as governor of the province of Emessa, of which Qinas­sareen was then part. From Qinassareen Khalid would keep watch over the northern marches.
*
By the end of 16 Hijri (corresponding roughly to 637











The Completion of the Conquest 461
A.D.) all of Syria and Palestine was in Muslim hands, except for Caesarea which continued to hold out. The various Muslim commanders settled down to their duties as governors of pro­vinces: Amr bin Al Aas in Palestine, Shurahbeel in Jordan, Yazeed in Damascus (but currently engaged at Caesarea) and Abu Ubeida in Emessa. Khalid had a lower appointment as administrator in Qinassareen under Abu Ubeida. This state of peace continued for a few months until the mid-summer of 638, when clouds again darkened the sky over Northern Syria. This time the Christian Arabs of the Jazeera took to the warpath.
Heraclius was no longer able to attempt a military come­back in Syria. In fact he was now more worried about the rest of his Empire, which, after the destruction of his army at Yarmuk and Antioch, was extremely vulnerable to Muslim invasion. He had few military resources left with which to defend his domains against an army which marched from victory to victory. To gain time for the preparation of his defences it was essential to keep the Muslims occupied in Syria, and he did this by inciting the Arabs of the Jazeera to take the offensive against the Muslims. Bound to him by ties of religion, they submitted to his exhorta­tions; and gathering in tens of thousands, began preparations to cross the Euphrates and invade Northern Syria from the east.
Agents brought Abu Ubeida information on the prepara­tions being made in the Jazeera. As the hostile Arabs began their move, Abu Ubeida called a council of war to discuss the situation. Khalid was all for moving out of the cities as one army and fighting the Christian Arabs in the open, but the other generals favoured a defensive battle at Emessa. Abu Ubeida sided with the majority, and pulled in the Mobile Guard from Qinassareen and other detachments from places which they had occupied in Northern Syria. He concentrated his army as Emessa and at the same time informed Umar of the situation.
Umar had no doubt that Abu Ubeida and Khalid would hold their own against the irregular army which now threatened them; but he nevertheless decided to assist them, and did so in a most unusual manner. He sent instructions to Sad bin Abi Waqqas, the Muslim Commander-in-Chief in Iraq, to despatch three columns into the Jazeera: one under Suheil bin Adi direc­ted at Raqqa, another under Abdullah bin Utban directed at Nuseibeen and a third under Ayaz bin Ghanam operating bet-
MAP 28: NORTHERN SYRIA
The Completion of the Conquest 463
ween the first two. (See Map 29.) At the same time Umar ordered the despatch of 4,000 men under Qaqa bin Amr from Iraq to Emessa, along the Euphrates route, to reinforce Abu Ubeida.
The Christian Arabs arrived at Emessa to find the Muslims safely fortified, and not knowing what else to do, laid siege to the city. But hardly had the siege begun when messengers came galloping from the Jazeera to inform them that three Muslim columns were marching from Iraq towards the Jazeera. The Christian Arabs now realised the absurdity of their situa­tion: while they were fighting the Muslims in Syria, pulling Heraclius’ chestnuts out of the fire for him, their own land was about to fall to the Muslims coming from another direction. They abandoned the siege and hastened back to the Jazeera, which was the only sensible thing to do. Qaqa arrived at Emessa three days after the departure of the Christian Arabs.
As soon as the three Muslim columns from Iraq heard of the return of the Christian Arabs, they halted on their route to await further instructions from Sad. Their mission had been accomplished. With this neat, indirect manoeuvre Umar had repulsed the invading army of the Jazeera, without shooting an arrow!
*
The abortive attempt of the Arabs of the Jazeera to fight the Muslims did no damage to the Muslims in Syria. It did, however, arouse the anger of the Muslims and made them con­scious of the fact that they could not regard Syria as being safely in their possession until neighbouring lands were cleared of all hostile elements. These elements existed in the Jazeera and in the region east of the Taurus Mountains; and they would have to be destroyed or subdued in order to create a zone of security beyond the borders of Syria.
Umar decided to deal with the Jazeera first. He ordered Sad to arrange for its capture, and appointed Ayaz bin Ghanam as the commander of this theatre of operations. Sad instructed Ayaz to continue the invasion of the Jazeera with the forces under his command, and the Muslims from Iraq resumed their forward march late in the summer of 638. Ayaz operated with three columns, and over a period of a few weeks overran the
MAP 29 THE JEZEERA
The Completion of the Conquest 465
region between the Tigris and the Euphrates up to Nuseibeen and Ruha (now Urfa). (See Map 29.) It was a bloodless operation.1
As soon as this part of the Jazeera was occupied, Abu Ubeida wrote to Umar and asked for Ayaz to be put under his command, so that he could use him for raids across the northern border. Umar agreed to this request, and Ayaz moved to Emessa with part of the Muslim force sent from Iraq to the Jazeera.
In the autumn of 638, Abu Ubeida launched several columns, including two commanded by Khalid and Ayaz, to raid Roman territory north of Syria up to as far west as Tarsus. Khalid's objective was Marash, and he arrived here and laid siege to the city which contained a Roman garrison. By now the presence of Khalid was sufficient to strike terror in the hearts of the Romans; and a few days later Marash surrendered on con­dition that the garrison and the populace be spared. As for material wealth, the Muslims could take all they wished. And the Muslims did. Khalid returned to Qinassareen laden with spoils such as had seldom been seen before. Just the spoils of Marash were sufficient to make the soldiers of this expedition rich for life.
Had Khalid acquired the quality of thrift in his youth, he would have been one of the richest men of his time. It was the custom in those days that a warrior who won a duel took all the possessions of his vanquished foe, and this reward was apart from his normal share of the spoils taken in battle. Khalid had fought more duels than anyone else in the Muslim army and won each one of them. Moreover, his adversaries were usually generals, more richly equipped than others, especially the Persian and Roman generals who wore jewels and gold orna­ments with their dress. Thus more wealth came into the hands of Khalid than of others; but it slipped through his fingers like sand. He would live well and give generously. Whatever wealth was gained in one battle lasted only till the next. Khalid had acquired a large retinue of slaves. He had married many times and had dozens of children; and the upkeep of his household took a good deal of money. Then there were the soldiers. After every battle Khalid would pick out warriors who had done better than others and give them extra gifts from his own pocket.
1Some narrators have described a considerable amount of fighting in the Jazeera; but most early historians agree that it was a peaceful occupa­tion.
466 The Sword of Allah
This was known to the austere and frugal Caliph, who regarded it not as generosity but as extravagance.1
On Khalid's return from Marash the same thing happe­ned; he gave lavishly to his soldiers. And by now a number of unscrupulous persons had arisen in the Muslim army who would approach successful generals, sing their praises and receive gifts— in true Oriental fashion. One such man was Ash'as bin Qeis, chief of the Kinda, who has been mentioned in Part II of this book. (He had led the apostate revolt of his tribe in the Yemen, and saved himself at the last minute by betraying his own followers!) Ash'as was a great poet. He came to Khalid at Qinassareen and recited a fine poem in praise of the great con­queror; and in return Khalid gave him a gift of 10,000 dirhams. Within a fortnight the agents of the Caliph had informed him of this episode; and Umar was furious. This, thought Umar, was the limit!
Ash'as did not know that when he recited his eloquent poetry, he was in fact digging the grave of Khalid's military career.
1Khalid's earnings from his duels and from his share of the spoils of war were not part of his pay, the scale of which for a corps commander was between 7,000 and 9,000 dirhams a year (Abu Yusuf: p. 46).














37: FAREWELL TO ARMS
Some time before his expedition to Marash, Khalid had a special bath. Just as he did everything well, Khalid also bathed well. He had with him a certain substance prepared with an alcoholic mixture which was supposed to have a soothing effect on the body when applied externally. Khalid rubbed his body with this substance and thoroughly enjoyed his bath, from which he emerged glowing and refreshed.
A few weeks later he received a letter from the Caliph:
“It has come to my notice that you have rubbed your body with alcohol. Lo, Allah had made unlawful the substance of alcohol as well as its form, just as He has made unlawful both the form and substance of sin. He has made unlawful the touch of alcohol in a bath no less than the drinking of it. Let it not touch your body, for it is unclean.”1
This, pondered Khalid, was carrying the Muslim ban on alcohol a bit too far. Like all Companions, Khalid was tho­roughly conversant with the Holy Book and knew that the Quranic verses on alcohol dealt only with the drinking of it, and that the injunction against strong drink was intended to elimi­nate the evils of drunkenness and alcoholism. The Quran said nothing about the external application of oils and ointments treated with alcohol. Khalid wrote back to Umar and explained
lTabari:Vol.3, p.l66.
468 The Sword of Allah
the method of preparation of the offending substance with the alcoholic mixture and the cleaning of it by boiling. He added; “We kill it so that it becomes like bathwater, without alcohol.”1
In this matter of the interpretation of the Quranic verses on alcohol Umar was not on a strong wicket. So he contented himself with writing to Khalid: “I fear that the house of Mugheera2 is full of wrong-doing. May Allah not destroy you on account of it!”3 And there the matter rested. We do not know whether Khalid ever again had such a bath; probably not. But it is clear that the goodwill which Khalid had gained in the eyes of Umar as a result of the Battle of Hazir was washed away by Khalid's. rejection of Umar's opinions regarding the external application of substances treated with alcohol.
*
Shortly after Khalid's capture of Marash, in the autumn of 638 (17 Hijri), Umar came to know of Ash'as reciting a poem in praise of Khalid and receiving a gift of 10,000 dirhams. This was more than the Caliph could take. This, thought Umar, was the limit! He immediately wrote a letter to Abu Ubeida: “Bring Khalid in front of the congregation, tie his hands with his turban and take off his cap. Ask him from what funds he gave to Ash'as … from his own pocket or from the spoils acqui­red in the expedition? If he confesses to having given from the spoils, he is guilty of misappropriation. If he claims that he gave from his own pocket, he is guilty of extravagance. In either case dismiss him, and take charge of his duties.”4
This was no ordinary letter. Though the method describ­ed by Umar for arraigning the accused was the normal custom of the Arabs, the accused in this case was no ordinary accused. The instructions of the Caliph would have to be carried by a Companion of high standing, and Umar selected Bilal the Muazzin for the task. He entrusted the letter to Bilal, briefed him about how he was to proceed in the matter of Khalid, and ordered him to journey with all speed to Emessa.
Bilal arrived at Emessa and handed the letter to Abu Ubeida, who read it and was aghast. He could hardly believe that this was to be done to the Sword of Allah; but the Caliph's
1Ibid.
2Mugheera was the grandfather of Khalid.
3Tabari: Vol. 3. p. 166.    4Ibid: p. 167.
Farewell to Arms 469
orders had to be obeyed, and Abu Ubeida sent for Khalid.
Khalid left Qinassareen without the least suspicion of what lay in store for him. He imagined that he was being called for another council of war, that perhaps there was to be another expedition to 'Rome' or even a full scale invasion of the Byzantine Empire. He looked forward eagerly to more battles and more glory. Arriving at Emessa, he went to the house of Abu Ubeida, and here for the first time he came to know the purpose of Abu Ubeida's call. The Commander-in-Chief briefly explained Umar's charge against him, and asked if he would confess his guilt. Khalid was astounded by Abu Ubeida's statement, and saw it not as a simple matter of a question or a charge, but as an attem­pt on the part of his old rival, Umar bin Al Khattab, to bring about his undoing. He asked Abu Ubeida for a little time to consult his sister, and Abu Ubeida agreed to wait.
Khalid went to the house of his sister, Fatima, who was then in Emessa, explained the position to her and sought her advice. Fatima confirmed his suspicions. “By Allah,” she said, “Umar will never be pleased with you. He wants nothing more than that you should confess to some error, so that he can dis­miss you.”1
“You are right”, said Khalid. He kissed his sister on the head, and returning to Abu Ubeida, informed him that he would not confess. Thereafter the two generals walked in silence to a place where a large number of Muslims were gathered, most of whom rushed to shake Khalid's hand. At one end stood a rai­sed platform, and on this Abu Ubeida and Khalid sat down, facing the congregation. On one side of Abu Ubeida sat Bilal the Negro.
For a few minutes there was complete silence. The Muslims had no idea of the purpose of the congregation; nor had Khalid. He did not connect Umar's charge against him with this gathering, for it never occurred to him that he would face a public trial. Bilal looked questioningly at Abu Ubeida, but Abu Ubeida turned his face away. He had obeyed the Caliph's ins­tructions as far as he considered necessary. If a man like Khalid, who had rendered military services to the new Muslim State as no other general had done, was to be subjected to public humilitation, he, Abu Ubeida, would have nothing to do with it.
1Ibid: Vol. 2, p. 624. Yaqubi: Tareekh, Vol. 2, p. 140.
 470 The Sword of Allah
Bilal could do as he wished.
Bilal understood Abu Ubeida's reluctance. He stood up, faced Khalid, and in a voice which could be heard by the entire congregation, called out: “O Khalid! Did you give Ash'as 10,000 dirhams from your own pocket or from the spoils?”
Khalid stared at Bilal in shocked silence. He could hardly believe his ears!
Bilal repeated his question; but Khalid, for once in his life, was left dumbfounded. When another minute had passed with no reply from Khalid, Bilal walked up to him, and with the words, “The Commander of the Faithful has ordered this”, took off Khalid's turban and cap and with the turban tied Khalid's hands behind his back. Again the Caliph's messenger spoke: “What do you say ? From your pocket or from the spoils?”
Only now did Khalid find his speech. “No!” he protested. “From my own pocket.”
When he heard these words, Bilal untied Khalid's hands, replaced Khalid’s cap, and with his own hands tied Khalid's turban on his head. He said, “We hear and obey our rulers. We honour and serve them.”1 Then he returned to his place and sat down.
For a few minutes pin drop silence reigned in the assembly. Abu Ubeida and Bilal sat staring at the floor. Then Khalid stood up, still shaken by what had happened. He did not know the result of the trial, whether he was dismissed or still in com­mand of his corps. Not wishing to embarrass the gentle Abu Ubeida with questions, he walked away from the assembly, mounted his horse and rode to Qinassareen.2
*
Bilal returned to Madina and gave Umar an account of the proceedings. The Caliph now awaited a letter from Abu Ubeida confirming that he had dismissed Khalid from command at Qinassareen; but when another week had passed
lTabari:Vol.3,p.l67.
2According to one version, which appears to be mistaken, Umar ordered Abu Ubeida to confiscate half of whatever Khalid possessed; and Abu Ubeida carried out the Caliph's instructions with such meticulous accuracy that of a pair of shoes that Khalid wore, one shoe was taken away and the other left with him! (Tabari: Vol. 2, p. 625; Yaqubi: Tareekh, Vol. 2, p. 140).
Farewell to Arms 471
and no such letter arrived, Umar guessed that Abu Ubeida was reluctant to inform Khalid of his dismissal. The Caliph decided to deal with the matter of Khalid's dismissal himself, and wrote to Khalid to report to him at Madina.
On receiving Umar's letter, Khalid came to Emessa and questioned Abu Ubeida about his position. The Commander-in-Chief told him that he was dismissed from office by order of the Caliph. “May Allah have mercy upon you” said Khalid. “Why did you do this to me? You concealed a matter from me which I would have liked to know before today.”
There was sorrow in the eyes of Abu Ubeida, and a great deal of affection and commiseration, as he replied, “By Allah, I knew that this would hurt you. I would never hurt you if I could find a way.”1
Khalid went back to Qinassareen, got the Mobile Guard together, and addressed the warriors whom he had led to victory and glory in battle after battle—warriors who had followed him with unquestioning loyalty and faith. He informed them that he had been dismissed from command, and that he was now pro­ceeding to Madina on the instructions of the Caliph. Then he bade farewell to the Mobile Guard—a body of men which under Khalid had not known the meaning of defeat.
From Qinassareen he rode again to Emessa, said his fare­wells, and then continued his journey to Madina. He was going to Madina not as a hero returning home from the wars to receive honours from a grateful government, but as a man under dis­grace.
Khalid arrived at Madina and proceeded towards the house of the Caliph. But he met Umar in the street. As these two strong men drew closer to each other—the greatest ruler of the time and the greatest soldier of the time—there was no fear in the eyes of either. Umar was the first to speak. He extemporised a verse in acknowledgement of Khalid's achievements and recited it:
You have done;
And no man has done as you have done.
But it is not people who do;
It is Allah who does.2
In reply Khalid said, “I protest to the Muslims against
1Tabari: Vol. 3, p. 167.    2Ibid: p. 168.
472 The Sword of Allah
what you have done. By Allah, you have been unjust to me, O Umar!”
“Whence comes all this wealth?” countered Umar.
“It is what is left of my share of the spoils. Whatever exceeds 60,000 dirhams is yours.”1
Umar had a check made of all Khalid's possessions, which consisted mainly of military equipment and slaves, and found that it was valued at 80,000 dirhams. He confiscated the surplus of 20,000 dirhams.
When this had been done, Umar said to Khalid, “O Khalid! By Allah, you are honourable in my eyes, and you are dear to me. You will not have cause to complain of me after this day.”2 The point was academic, however, for there was not much more that could be done to Khalid!
After a few days, Khalid left Madina for Qinassareen, never to return to Arabia. Hardly had he left, when the people of Madina came to Umar and appealed to him to return Khalid's property to him. To this Umar replied, “I do not trade with what belongs to Allah and the Muslims.”3 But after this, according to Tabari, Umar's heart was 'cured' of Khalid.
Very soon it became evident to Umar that his treatment of Khalid was being deeply resented by the Muslims. It was openly said that Khalid had suffered because of Umar's personal hostility towards him. This popular disapproval of Umar's action became so widespread that the Caliph found it necessary to write to all his commanders and administrators:
I have not dismissed Khalid because of my anger or because of any dishonesty on his part, but because people glorified him and were misled. I feared that people would rely on him.4 I want them to know that it is Allah who does all things; and there should be no mischief in the land.5
In this letter Umar, unwittingly paid, Khalid the highest compliment that any general could hope to earn: that his men regarded him as a god! But Khalid returned to Qinassareen an embittered man. The Destroyer of the Apostasy, the Con­queror of Iraq and Syria, came home as a nobody—dismissed and disgraced. As his wife greeted him at the door, he said:
1Tabari: Vol. 3, p. 167.     2Ibid.    3Tabari: Vol. 2, p. 625.
4i.e. rather than on God, for victory.   5Tabari: Vol. 3, p.167
Farewell to Arms 473
“Umar appointed me over Syria until it turned to wheat and honey; then dismissed me!”1
Khalid's campaigning days were over. The Sword of Allah —the sword that God had drawn against the infidels—which Abu Bakr had refused to sheathe, was at last sheathed by Caliph Umar.
*
Little remains to be told. After his dismissal Khalid had less than four years to live, and these were not very pleasant years. Financially, though not impoverished, he was severely restricted. In 15 Hijri, Umar had started the institution of allo­wances to all Muslims, varying in extent according to their posi­tion in Islam and the services rendered by them in war. All those who had accepted the Faith after the Truce of Hudebiya and before the Apostasy received an annual allowance of three thousand dirhams,2 and this category included Khalid. The sum was enough to enable a man and his family to live modestly; but with Khalid, born an aristocrat and accustomed to giving away thousands of dirhams on an impulse, it did not go far. He took his family to Emessa, where he bought a house and settled down to retirement.
His dismissal was a terrible blow to him. But as if this were not enough, Khalid suffered even more grievous losses in the plague which struck soon after his return from Madina, and which claimed most of those nearest and dearest to him.
The plague started at Amawas in Palestine in Muharram or Safar, 18 Hijri (January or February 639), and spread rapidly across Syria and Palestine, striking down Christians and Muslims in its path. The Caliph was deeply grieved by the sufferings of the Muslims in Syria and concerned especially about Abu Ubeida, and thought to save the Trusted One of the Nation by asking him to visit Madina. But Abu Ubeida saw through Umar's letter and knew that the Caliph would detain him in Madina until the epidemic had spent itself. The man who had not abandoned his soldiers in the thick of battle was not going to adandon them in the plague. He refused to visit Madina, and for his loyalty to his men paid with his life.
lTabari:Vol.3, p. 99.
2Ibid: Vol. 3, p. 109. Balazuri: p. 437.
474 The Sword of Allah
Thousands of Muslims died in the Plague of Amawas, and these included the noblest and best: Abu Ubeida, Shurahbeel, Yazeed, Zarrar—Khalid's dearest friends. And yet this was not the end of his sufferings, for he lost 40 sons in the epidemic! The terrible pestilence thus took away most of those whom Khalid loved, those who could have added comfort and cheer to his years of retirement. We only know of three sons who survived Khalid: Suleiman, who fell in battle in the latter part of the Egyptian Campaign; Muhajir, who fought and died under Ali at Siffeen; and Abdur Rahman, who survived to live to a mature age and appeared to be endowed with his father's military prowess. But he too met an untimely death at the hands of a poisoner in 46 Hijri, during the caliphate of Muawiya. It is recorded that the assassination was engineered by Muawiya, who was jealous and fearful of the great prestige of the son of the Sword of Allah.1 The assassin was later killed, as an act of vengeance by Abdur Rahman's son. We do not know how many daughters Khalid had, but the male line of descent from Khalid is believed to have ended with his grandson, Khalid bin Abdur Rahman bin Khalid.
After the death of three of the original corps commanders, Amr bin Al Aas took command of the army and immediately dispersed it in the hills of Syria and Palestine. By so doing he was able to save much of the army, but not before 25,000 Muslims had fallen before the foul breath of the plague. The epidemic had not yet ended when Umar appointed Ayaz bin Ghanam as military governor of Northern Syria, and Muawiya of Damascus and Jordan, while Amr remained in command in Palestine.
When Abu Bakr was planning the Campaign of the Apostasy, he discussed with Amr bin Al Aas the appointment of various generals as corps commanders. The Caliph said, “0 Amr, you are the shrewdest of the Arabs in judgement. What is your opinion of Khalid?” Amr replied, “He is a master of war; a friend of death. He has the dash of a lion and the patience of a cat!”2
But the patience of a cat was not enough for a man of Khalid's temperament at this stage of his life. What makes patience possible and bearable in a cat is the prospect of a victim
1Tabari: Vol. 4, p. 171; Isfahani: Vol. 15. pp. 12-13.
2Yaqubi: Tareekh, Vol. 2, p. 129.
Farewell to Arms 475
for supper. If there were no victim in sight even a cat could not bear to be patient; and Khalid now had no prospects, nothing to be patient for. He could fight no more battles, kill no more enemies. In enforced obscurity Khalid mourned the loss of his comrades and his sons.
The conquests of Islam continued. After the plague, in 18 Hijri, Ayaz again invaded the Jazeera; and by the end of the following year had completed its subjugation, after several battles, as far north as Samsat, Amid (now Diyar Bakr) and Bitlis. He even raided successfully as far as Malatya. (See Map 29.) News from the eastern front was just as thrilling. By the time of Khalid's dismissal, Sad bin Abi Waqqas had conquered most of what is now Iraq and parts of present-day South-Western Persia—Ahwaz, Tustar, Sus. On this front further advances were made, though the last great battles against the still for­midable Persians were not fought till after Khalid's death. In 640 (19 Hijri) Caesarea surrendered to the Muslims and Amr bin Al Aas invaded Egypt.
Like all Muslims, Khalid gloried in the conquests of Islam; but each victory also reminded him that he had not taken part in the battle. The news that reached him at Emessa was, to him, bitter-sweet. He was like an ardent lover who sees his beloved before him but is unable to move towards her. Thus lived, for the last few years of his life, the man whom Gibbon, in his Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, has described as “ … the fiercest and most successful of the Arabian warriors.”1
*
Fortunately, in Khalid's relations with Umar there was a marked change for the better. Umar was no longer the harsh, impetuous, hot-tempered man that he had once been. With the burdens of the caliphate on his shoulders, he had mellowed and grown more patient. He was still stern and puritanical, but he imposed no burden upon others which he did not carry him­self. He was strict with the strong, kind to the weak, generous to widows and orphans. He sat with the poor and often spent the
1While some sources have stated that Khalid fought under Ayaz in the Jazeera, most early historians have quoted other sources to indicate that after the death of Abu Ubeida, Khalid did not serve under anyone. I accept the latter version as correct.
476 The Sword of Allah
night sleeping on the steps of the mosque. At night he would walk the streets of Madina with a whip in his hand, and Umar's whip was feared more than the sword of another man. He lived on salted barley bread, dry dates and olive oil, and allowed no better fare to his family. His clothes were made of the poorest material, patched in many places. Unshakeable in his resolve to do justice, he had his own son, Ubeidullah, whipped for drinking.
Khalid, now having more time for reflection, saw the great virtues and enviable qualities of his old rival. He forgave him. One day he said to a visitor, “Praise be to Allah who took Abu Bakr away. He was dearer to me than Umar. Praise be to Allah who appointed Umar in authority He was hateful to me, but I grew to like him.”1 This change in attitude was so great that when he died, Khalid named Umar as his heir, to re­ceive whatever he left. Time, mercifully, healed the wounds.
*
Khalid spent a good deal of his time thinking of his battles, as old soldiers are wont to do. He would relive the battles and duels in which he had challenged the greatest cham­pions of the world and made them bite the dust. He was naturally proud of his victories, but there was no vanity or conceit in Khalid's mind. He attributed his victories to the help of God and to his red cap, in which was woven the hair of the Holy Prophet. When not thinking of his battles, his mind would be occupied by memories of his fellow generals—Abu Ubeida, Shurahbeel, Yazeed, Amr bin Al Aas; and his valiant champions like Abdur Rahman bin Abi Bakr, Rafe bin Umeira and the in­comparable Zarrar bin Al Azwar, whose feats of skill and daring, like his own, would glow for ever in the pages of history. He did not, however, know his place in history as we do now.
Khalid was the most versatile soldier history has ever known—a true military genius. He had the strategical vision of a Changez Khan and a Napoleon, the tactical brilliance of a Timur and a Frederick the Great, and the individual strength and prowess of the half-legendary Rustam of Persia. In no other case in history do we see such diverse military virtues combined in one man. Khalid was one of only two great generals in history
lTabari:Vol.2, p.598.
Farewell to Arms 477
who never suffered a defeat. The other was Changez Khan, but Changez Khan was not a champion fighter like Khalid, even though his conquests covered a far greater region of the earth. Combined with Khalid's strategical and tactical genius was the extreme violence of his methods. To him a battle was not just a neat manoeuvre leading to a military victory, but an action of total violence ending in the total annihilation of the enemy. The manoeuvre was only an instrument for bringing about the enemy's destruction.
Khalid was the only man who inflicted a tactical defeat on the Holy Prophet—at Uhud. He was the first Muslim com­mander to leave Arabia and conquer foreign lands; the first Muslim to humble two great empires, one after the other. Almost all his battles are studies in military leadership, especially Uhud, Kazima, Walaja, Muzayyah, Ajnadein and Yarmuk. His finest battle was Walaja, while his greatest was undoubtedly Yarmuk.
Khalid was essentially a soldier. He also administered the territories which he conquered, but this he did as a routine res­ponsibility of a high-ranking general, who had not only to con­quer territory but also to rule it as a military governor. His plans and manoeuvres show a superb military intellect; but to­wards such things as learning and culture he was in no way inclined. Khalid was pure, unadulterated, undiluted, unspoilt soldier. It was his destiny to fight great battles and vanquish mighty foes … to attack, kill, conquer. This destiny be­came apparent only when, with the rise of Islam, the prospect of holy war arose in Arab lands. And it was only after he had accepted the new faith and submitted to the Prophet that this destiny came into full play. Wherever Khalid marched, enemies stood up to oppose him, as if some unkind fate had condemned them to death by his sword. Wherever Khalid passed, he left behind a trail of glory. From the Battle of Uhud up to the time of his dismissal, over a period of 15 years, Khalid fought 41 battles (excluding minor engagements), of which 35 were con­centrated in the last seven years. And he never lost a single one! Such was Khalid, the irresistible, all-conquering master.
It is interesting to speculate what would have happened if he had remained in command of the Muslim army in Syria and had been launched to conquer the Byzantine Empire. Since Khalid never lost a battle, there is no doubt that he would have
478 The Sword of Allah
taken the whole of Asia Minor and reached the Black Sea and the Bosphorus. But it was not to be. By the end of 17 Hijri Khalid's race was run. Thereafter the stage of history was crowded by other players.
*
In 641, Ayaz bin Ghanam died. In this year, too, died Bilal the Muazzin and Khalid's defeated foe, Heraclius, Emperor of Rome. The following year it was Khalid's turn to go.
Some time in 642 (21 Hijri), at the age of 58, Khalid was taken ill. We do not know the nature of his illness, but it was a prolonged one and took the strength out of him. As with all vigorous, active men upon whom an inactive retirement is sud­denly thrust, Khalid's health and physique had declined rapidly. This last illness proved too much for him; and Khalid's sick bed became his death bed. He lay in bed, impatient and rebel­lious against a fate which had robbed him of a glorious, violent death in battle. Knowing that he had not long to live, it irked him to await death in bed.
A few days before his end, an old friend called to see him and sat at his bedside. Khalid raised the cover from his right leg and said to his visitor, “Do you see a space of the span of a hand on my leg which is not covered by some scar of the wound of a sword or an arrow or a lance?”
The friend examined Khalid's leg and confessed that he did not. Khalid raised the cover from his left leg and repeated his question. Again the friend agreed that between the wounds farthest apart the space was less than a hand's span.
Khalid raised his right arm and then his left, for a similar examination and with a similar result. Next he bared his great chest, now devoid of most of its mighty sinews, and here again the friend was met with a sight which made him wonder how a man wounded in so many places could survive The friend again admitted that he could not see the space of one hand span of unmarked skin.
Khalid had made his point. “Do you not see?” he asked impatiently, “I have sought martyrdom in a hundred battles. Why could I not have died in battle?”
“You could not die in battle”, replied the friend.
“Why not?”
Farewell to Arms 479
“You must understand, 0 Khalid,” the friend explained, “that when the Messenger of Allah, on whom be the blessings of Allah and peace, named you Sword of Allah, he predetermined that you would not fall in battle. If you had been killed by an unbeliever it would have meant that Allah's sword had been broken by an enemy of Allah; and that could never be.”
Khalid remained silent, and a few minutes later the friend took his leave. Khalid's head could see the logic of what his visi­tor had said, but his heart still yearned for a glorious death in combat. Why, oh why could he not have died a martyr in the way of Allah!
On the day of his death, Khalid's possessions consisted of nothing more than his armour and weapons, his horse and one slave—the faithful Hamam. On his last day of life he lay alone in bed with Hamam sitting in patient sorrow beside his illustrious master. As the shadows gathered, Khalid put all the torment of his soul into one last, anguished sentence: “I die even as a camel dies. I die in bed, in shame. The eyes of cowards do not close in sleep.”1
Thus died Khalid, son of Al Waleed, the Sword of Allah.
May Allah be pleased with him!
*
The news of Khalid's death broke like a storm over Madina. The women took to the streets, led by the women of the Bani Makhzum, wailing and beating their breasts. Umar had heard the sad news and now heard the sounds of wailing. He was deeply angered. On his very first day as Caliph, he had given orders that here would be no wailing for departed Muslims. And there was logic in Umar's point of view. Why should we weep for those who have gone to paradise? … the blissful abode promised by God to the Faithful! Umar had enforced the order, at times using his whip.2
Umar now heard sounds of wailing. He stood up from the floor of his room, took his whip and made for the door. He would not permit disobedience of his orders; the wailing must be stopped at once! He got to the door, but there he paused. For a
lIbn Quteiba: p.267. 2Tabari:Vol.2, p.614.
480 The Sword of Allah
few silent moments the Caliph stood in the doorway, lost in thought. This was, after all, no ordinary death; this was the passing away of Khalid bin Al Waleed. Then he heard the sounds of mourning from the next house—his own daughter, Hafsa, widow of the Holy Prophet, was weeping for the departed warrior.1
Umar turned back. He hung up his whip and sat down again. In this one case he would make an exception. “Let the women of the Bani Makhzum say what they will about Abu Suleiman, for they do not lie”, said the Caliph. “Over the likes of Abu Suleiman weep those who weep.”2
*
In Emessa, to the right of the Hama Road, stretches a large, well-tended garden which has lawns studded with orna­mental trees and flower beds and is traversed by footpaths. At the top end of the garden stands the Mosque of Khalid bin Al Waleed. It is an imposing mosque, with two tall minarets rising from its north-western and north-eastern corners. The inside of the mosque is spacious, about 50 yards square, its floor covered with carpets and the ceiling upheld by four massive columns. Each of the four corners of the ceiling is formed as a dome, but the highest dome is in the centre, at a considerable height, and from this dome several chandeliers are suspended by long metal chains. In the north-west corner of the mosque stands Khalid's shrine—the last resting place of Abu Suleiman.
The visitor walks up the garden, crosses the courtyard of the mosque, takes off his shoes and enters the portals. As he enters, he sees to his right the shrine of Khalid. The actual grave is enveloped by an attractive domed marble structure which gives the impression of a little mosque within the larger one. The visitor, if so inclined, says a prayer and then loses himself in contemplation of the only man who ever carried the title of the Sword of Allah.
And if the visitor knows something about Khalid and his military achievements, he lets his imagination wander and pictures of an attack by Khalid flicker through his mind. He
lYaqubi: Tareekh: Vol. 2, p. 157.
2Isfahani: Vol. 19, p. 89.
Farewell to Arms 481
sees a long, dark line of horsemen emerge from behind a rise in the ground and charge galloping at a body of Roman troops. The cloaks of the warriors fly behind them and the hooves of their horses pound the earth pitilessly.  Some carry lances; others brandish swords; and the Romans standing in the path of the charge tremble at the sight of the oncoming terror, for they are standing in the way of the Mobile Guard, whom none may resist and survive to tell the tale. The line of charging horsemen is not straight, for it is impossible to keep it straight at such a mad, reckless pace. Every man strives to get ahead of his comrades and be the first to clash with the infidel; strives to get ahead of all but the Leader, for no one may, or possibly could, overtake the Leader.
The Leader gallops ahead of the Muslims. A large, broad-shouldered, powerfully-built man, he is mounted on a magni­ficent Arab stallion and rides it as if he were part of the horse. The loose end of his turban and his cloak flutter behind him and his large, full beard is pressed against his chest by the wind. His fierce eyes shine with excitement—with the promise of bat­tle and blood and glory—the glory of victory or martyrdom. His coat of mail and the iron tip of his long lance glint in the clear sunlight, and the earth trembles under the thundering hooves of his fiery charger. Perhaps beside him rides a slim young warrior, naked above the waist.
The visitor sees all this with the eyes of his mind. And with the ears of his mind he hears, just before the Mobile Guard hurls itself at the Romans in a shattering clash of steel and sinew, the roar of Allah-o-Akbar as it issues from the throats of the Faithful and rends the air. And rising out of this roar, he hears the piercing cry of the Leader:
I am the noble warrior;
I am the Sword of Allah
Khalid bin Al Waleed!
                  
          *               *                *




author

This post was written by: Franklin Manuel

Franklin Manuel is a professional blogger, web designer and front end web developer. Follow him on Twitter

0 Responses to “THE SWORD OF ALLAH (PART4)”

Post a Comment

Subscribe to: Post Comments (Atom)

Translate

All Rights Reserved ALL FOR STUDENTS | Blogger Template by Bloggermint
Sponsored by Florida Phone Book, Florida Accountants, Optician Jobs