THE SWORD OF ALLAH (PART3) ~ ALL FOR STUDENTS

Monday, June 3, 2013

THE SWORD OF ALLAH (PART3)

PART III

THE INVASION OF IRAQ

18: THE CLASH WITH PERSIA

The fort of Nujeir, the last stronghold of apostasy, had fallen to the Muslims in about the middle of February 633. Soon after, Abu Bakr wrote to Khalid, who was still at Yamama: “Proceed to Iraq. Start operations in the region of Uballa. Fight the Persians and the people who inhabit their land. Your objective is Hira.”¹

It was a big order. Abu Bakr was taking on the mightiest empire of the time, before which the world had trembled for more than a thousand years.

The Persian Empire was unique in many ways. It was the first truly great empire of history, stretching, in the time of the early Achaemenians, from Northern Greece in the west to the Punjab in the east. It was unique also in the length of time over which it flourished — from the Sixth Century B.C. to the Seventh Century A.D., except for a gap caused by the Greek conquest.² No other empire in history had lasted so long in all its greatness as a force of culture and civilisation and as a

^lTabari: Vol. 2, pp. 553-4.

²The Parthians, who overthrew the Seleucid power, though not Persians, were nevertheless Iranians. Thus the Greek interlude lasted less than two centuries until its end at the hands of the Parthians in the middle of the Second Century B.C. The Persian Sasanids came to power in 220 A.D.

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military power. It had known reverses, but after each reverse it had risen again in its characteristic glory and brilliance.

The last golden age of Persia had occurred in the Sixth Century A.D- when Anushirwan the Just restored the empire to its earlier level of greatness. Anushirwan reigned for 48 years and was a contemporary of Justinian. He wrested Syria from the Romans, the Yemen from the Abyssinians, and much of Central Asia from the Turks and other wild tribes of the steppes. This magnificent emperor died in 579, nine years after the birth of Prophet Muhammad.

As often happens when a great ruler passes away, Anushirwan was followed by a number of lesser mortals and the glory and prosperity of the empire began to fade. Civil war and intrigue sapped the strength of the state. The decline approached its climax in the time of Sheeruya (Ciroes), a great-grandson of Anushirwan, who first imprisoned and then killed his father, Chosroes Parwez. Not content with this heinous crime, he turned to worse cruelties. So that none may dispute his right to the throne or pose a challenge to his authority, he had all the male members of his family killed with the exception of his son, Ardsheer. The estimate of those of the house of Anushirwan who lost their lives to the maniacal fury of Sheeruya, adult and child, varies from 15 to 18. And Sheeruya reigned for only seven months before he too was dead.

With his death the confusion became worse. And there is confusion also in the accounts of the early historians about the order in which various emperors followed Sheeruya and the duration of their respective reigns. All that is certain and unanimously accepted is the position of Yazdjurd bin Shahryar bin Perwez, who somehow escaped the assassins of Sheeruya and became the last Persian Emperor of the line of Sasan. This ill-starred young man was to see the final disintegration of the great empire of the Chosroes.

Between Sheeruya and Yazdjurd there were about eight rulers in a period of four or five years, and these included two women — Buran and Azarmeedukht, both daughters of Chosroes Parwez. The first of these, Buran, proved a wise and virtuous monarch but lacked the strong hand that was needed to arrest the decline in imperial affairs. She was crowned during the lifetime of the Holy Prophet, who, when he heard of her coro-

The Clash with Persia 217

nation, made his famous remark: “A nation will never prosper that entrusts its affairs to a woman!”¹

We will not go into a description of all the countries which comprised the geographical domain of the Persian Empire, but will confine ourselves to Iraq. Iraq then was not a sovereign state; it was substantially less than that. It was not merely a province; it was considerably more than that. Iraq was a land — one of the lands of the Persian Empire; and in its western and southern parts it was an Arab land.

The Arabs had been known in Iraq since the days of Bukht Nassar,² but did not then enjoy any power in the land. It was not until the early part of the Christian era, when a fresh migration of Arab tribes came to Iraq from the Yemen, that they began to command authority and influence. One of the great chiefs of these migrating Arabs, a man by the name of Malik bin Fahm, proclaimed himself king and began to rule over the western part of Iraq. Two generations after him the throne passed to Amr bin Adi, of the tribe of Lakhm, who started the Lakhmid Dynasty which was also at times called the House of Munzir. The kings of this dynasty ruled for many generations as vassals of the Persian Emperor.

The last of the House of Munzir was Noman bin Munzir, who committed an act of disloyalty against Chosroes Parwez for which he was sentenced to death. The sentence was carried out in style — he was trampled to death by an elephant! This led to a revolt by the Arabs of Iraq, which was soon crushed by the Emperor; and with this abortive revolt ended the House of Munzir.

Chosroes then appointed a new king, lyas bin Qubeisa of the tribe of Tayy, to rule over Iraq. For some years the new king enjoyed a reasonable degree of autonomy. Then most of his authority was taken away and Persian generals and administrators took over the entire government of the land. lyas remained a titular king.

A land of culture, wealth and abundance, Iraq was the most prized possession of the Persian Empire. To the Arabs from the barren wastes of Arabia it was a green jewel, a land flowing with milk and honey. Its two mighty rivers, the Euphrates and the

¹Masudi: Tanbeeh, p. 90; Ibn Quteiba: p. 666.

²Nebuchadnezzar, Seventh-Sixth Century B.C.

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Tigris, were the greatest known rivers of the time—west of the Indus and north of the Nile. But these rivers did not then flow as they flow now; nor were the cities of Iraq then its cities of today. Kufa and Basra did not exist (they were founded in 17 Hijri). Baghdad was a small though much-frequented market town on the west bank of the Tigris. The then glorious cities of Ctesiphon and Hira are now turned to dust. Ctesiphon was the capital—a mighty metropolis and the seat of glory of the Persian Empire. Reportedly built by Ardsheer bin Babak (also known as Ardsheer Babakan and Artaxerxes, the founder of the Sasanid Dynasty) it sprawled on both sides of the Tigris and was known to the Muslims as Madain, literally the Cities, for it consisted of several cities in one.' Hira was the capital of the Arab Lakhmid Dynasty. Situated on the west bank of the Euphrates, it was a glittering, throbbing city with many citadels.²And there was Uballa, the main port of the Persian Empire which was visited by ships from India and China and other maritime countries of the East. Uballa was also the capital of the military district of Dast Meisan.³

The Euphrates and the Tigris have been known to change their course more than once since the time of Babylon. The maps in this book indicate the course which these rivers followed in the early days of Islam. The main difference from today is in the course of the Tigris. In pre-Islamic times it had flowed in what is its present channel, which is known as Dijlat-ul-Aura (the One-Eyed Tigris), but then it had abandoned this channel and adopted a new course from Kut downwards, along the Dujeila (the Little Tigris) and the Akhzar, to enter a region of lakes and marshes comprising an area about 100 miles square, just north-west of Uballa. The old bed of the river had then become a dry, sandy bed. The marshes extended much farther north than they do today (the area shown as marshland in Map 10 is not exact); and the Tigris picked its way through these marshes to rejoin the bed of the One-Eyed Tigris in the region

¹According to some sources, Ctesiphon existed before Ardsheer and was used by the Parthians as a winter residence.

²The site of Hira is 12 miles south-east of Nejef and half a mile south of the present Abu Sukheir. Nothing remains of the ancient city except some traces of the While Palace which stood at the northern end of Hira. According to Gibbon (Vol. 5. p. 299), Hira was founded in 190 A.D.

³Uballa stood where the part of modern Basra known as Ashar stands today.

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of Mazar (the present Azeir), whence it flowed south and southeast into the Persian Gulf.¹ But the Tigris changed its course again in the Sixteenth Century and returned to its old bed, the one marked on all maps now as the Tigris. This, however, is not the largest branch of the Tigris, for the Gharraf, taking off from Kut and joining the Euphrates at Nasiriyya, is larger. The Dujeila, which in the early days of Islam was the main channel, is now a modest river—the third largest branch of the Tigris, after the Gharraf and the One-Eyed Tigris.

The Euphrates followed a clear course down to the present Hindiyya, whence it split into two main channels as it does today—both sizable rivers: the Hilla branch and the main Euphrates. The main branch (the western one) again split up, flowing generally in one large and several subsidiary channels, which over the centuries have changed course several times, though not as drastically as the Tigris. The two main branches reunited at Samawa, whence the Euphrates flowed towards the region of lakes and marshes. While some of the water of the river lost itself in the marshes, one clear channel marked on today's maps as the Euphrates retained its distinct identity as it flowed eastwards to join the Tigris at Qurna. The marshes were drained by a large river known as Maqil, which emptied into the Tigris a little north of Basra; and from this junction all these waters flowed into the Persian Gulf as one great river, known today as the Shatt-ul-Arab. (See Map 10).

Many changes have taken place in the bends and twists of these rivers. I have not shown these details on the maps as there is no way of knowing how they appeared then. Hence only the main branches of these rivers are shown on our maps, and without all the twists and turns which must undoubtedly have existed.

This then was how Iraq stood politically and geographically, when the Caliph launched Khalid on it. It was a land occupied by Persians and Arabs, and ruled by the Persian court. The Empire had begun to decline politically, but it would be wrong to imagine that it had declined militarily. The military effectiveness of an empire may remain at a high level for decades

¹Ibn Rusta: pp. 94-5. At Mazar (Azeir) today only a small river flows into the Tigris from the west—certainly too small to form the bed of the old Tigris. The old bed has probably silted up and ceased to be discernible.

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after its political disintegration has set in. And so it was with the Persians in the year 633.

The Persian army, including its Arab auxiliaries, was the most formidable and most efficient military machine of the time. Led by experienced and dedicated veterans, it was a proud, sophisticated and well-tried force which gloried in its past achievements and its present might. The Persian soldier was the best equipped warrior of his day. He wore a coat of mail or a breast plate; on his head rested a helmet of either chain mail or beaten metal; his forearms were covered by metal sleeves, and his legs were protected by greaves (like leg-guards covering the front part of the leg). He carried a spear, lance or javelin, a sword, and either an axe or an iron mace (the latter was a favourite and much-feared Persian weapon). He also carried one or two bows with 30 arrows and two spare bowstrings hanging from his helmet.¹Thus powerfully equipped and armed was the Persian soldier. But, and this was inevitable, he lacked mobility. In the general set-piece battle he acknowledged no equals; and in this he was right, until Khalid's lightly armed and fast-moving riders came along.

It all started with Musanna bin Harisa. A tiger of a man who later died of wounds suffered in battle with the Persians, Musanna was a chief of the tribe of Bani Bakr, which inhabited the north-eastern part of the Arabian Peninsula and southern Iraq. It is not certain that Musanna had become a Muslim during the time of the Prophet. He probably had, because a delegation from the Bani Bakr had travelled to Madina during the Year of Delegations and had accepted Islam at the hands of the Prophet. But there is no actual record of Musanna's conversion.

Shortly after the Battle of Yamama, Musanna turned his attention towards Iraq. Seeking adventure and spoils, and encouraged by the disarray which was apparent in the political affairs of the Persian Empire, Musanna took a band of his followers and began to raid into Iraq. At first he stuck to the periphery of the desert so that he could withdraw quickly into the

¹Dinawari: p. 73.

MAP 10 : THE INVASION OF IRAQ

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safety of the sandy wastes, but gradually his incursions became bolder. He varied his objectives, striking now in the east, now in the west. Most of his raids, however, were in the region of Uballa, and he returned from these raids with spoils to dazzle the hungry Arab of the desert. The Persian garrisons were helpless against Musanna's ghostlike riders, who vanished as rapidly as they struck.

Encouraged by his successes, Musanna approached Abu Bakr. This was in early February 633 (late Zu Qad, 11 Hijri). He painted a glowing picture—the vulnerable state of Iraq, the riches that waited to be plundered, the prolonged political crisis which bedevilled the Persian court, the inability of the Persian garrisons to fight mobile, fast-moving engagements. “Appoint me as commander of my people”, said Musanna, “and I shall raid the Persians. Thus I shall also protect our region from them.”¹

The Caliph agreed and gave him a letter of authority appointing him commander over all the Muslims of the Bani Bakr. With this letter of authority Musanna returned to North-Eastern Arabia. Here he converted more tribesmen to Islam, gathered a small army of 2,000 men and resumed his raids with even greater enthusiasm and violence.

Musanna was gone from Madina, but his words continued to ring in the ears of the Caliph. He had planted a seed in the mind of Abu Bakr which germinated in a few days into a decision to take Iraq. He would not fight the entire Persian Empire, for that would be too big an objective in present circumstances. He would just take the Iraq of the Arabs, which meant the region west of the Tigris. Thus he would enlarge the boundaries of Islam and spread the new faith. At home there was peace, for with the defeat of the Kinda at Fort Nujeir, Islam had been-re-established in the land of Arabia.

Islam is a religion of peace, but not the peace of the timid and the submissive. It believes in peace, but the peace of the just and strong. “Fight in the way of Allah”, says the Quran, “against those who fight you, but do not transgress.” (II: 190)... “And fight them until mischief is no more and religion is all for Allah.” (VIII: 39). And so it would be war with the fire-worshipping Persians.

¹Tabari: Vol. 2, p 552.

The Clash with Persia 223

Abu Bakr had made up his mind to invade Iraq; but he would have to proceed with great care, for the Arab feared the Persian—with a deep, unreasoning fear which ran in the tribal consciousness as a racial complex and was the result of centuries of Persian power and glory. In return the Persian regarded the Arab with contempt. It was important not to suffer a defeat, for that would confirm and strengthen this instinctive fear. To make certain of victory, Abu Bakr decided on two measures: (a) the invading army would consist entirely of volunteers; (b) Khalid would be the commander of the army.

With this in view, he sent orders to Khalid to invade Iraq and fight the Persians. He further instructed Khalid to call to arms those who had fought the apostates and remained steadfast in faith after the death of the Messenger of Allah, and to exclude from the expedition those who had apostatised. Finally, he added (referring to the soldiers): “Whoever wishes to return to his home may do so.”¹

When Khalid announced to his troops that the Caliph had given them permission to return home if they wished to do so, he was shocked by the result: thousands of his warriors left the army and returned to Madina and other places whence they had come. Whereas at the Battle of Yamama he had commanded an army of 13,000 men, he was now left with only 2,000. Khalid wrote in haste to the Caliph, informing him of this alarming state of affairs and asking for reinforcements. When the letter reached Abu Bakr, he was sitting among his friends and advisers. He read the letter aloud so that all present might hear what it said. Then he sent for a young stalwart by the name of Qaqa bin Amr.

The young man arrived in the presence of the Caliph, armed and equipped for travel. The Caliph ordered him to proceed forthwith to Yamama as a reinforcement to the army of Khalid. The Companions stared in amazement at the Caliph. “Are you reinforcing one whose army has left him, with one man?” they asked.²

Abu Bakr looked for a moment at Qaqa. Then he said, “No army can be defeated if its ranks possess the likes of this

^lTabari: Vol. 2, p. 553.

²lbid: Vol. 2, pp. 553-4.

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man”¹ And Qaqa bin Amr rode away to reinforce the army of Khalid!

But this was not the only action that Abu Bakr took to build up Khalid's forces. He also wrote to Musanna and Mazur bin Adi (an important chief in North-Eastern Arabia), instructing them to muster their warriors and consider themselves and their men under the command of Khalid for the invasion of Iraq.

Having issued these instructions, Abu Bakr sat back and relaxed. He had given Khalid his mission—to invade Iraq and fight the Persians; he had laid down a starting-point for the campaign—the region of Uballa; he had given Khalid his objective —Hira; and he had placed under Khalid's command whatever force he could muster. There was nothing else that he could do. It was up to Khalid to accomplish his mission. And Khalid, now in the forty-eighth year of his life, set about the conquest of Iraq.²

¹Ibid.

²There are two main versions of the campaign of Iraq: the first of Ibn Ishaq and Waqidi, the second of Seif bin Umar. Tabari favours the latter version, and this is the one here used in the account of Khalid's invasion of Iraq. In this also there are two versions of Abu Bakr's plan for the invasion. For an explanation, see Note 4 in Appendix B.

19: THE BATTLE OF CHAINS

On receiving the orders of the Caliph, Khalid at once undertook preparations to raise a new army. His riders galloped far and wide in the region of Yamama and in Central and Northern Arabia, calling brave men to arms for the invasion of Iraq. And brave men assembled in thousands, many of them his old comrades of the Campaign of the Apostasy who, having visited their homes, decided to return to his standard for fresh adventure and glory. Khalid's name was now a magnet that drew warriors to him. Fighting under Khalid meant not only victory in the way of Allah, but also spoils and slaves ... in fact the best of both worlds! Within a few weeks an army of 10,000 men was ready to march with Khalid.¹

There were four important Muslim chiefs with large followings in North-Eastern Arabia; Musanna bin Harisa, Mazur bin Adi, Harmala and Sulma. The first two of these have already been mentioned in the preceding chapter. The Caliph had written to them to muster warriors and operate under the command of Khalid. Now Khalid wrote to all four of them, informing them of his appointment as commander of the Muslim army and of the mission which he had received from the Caliph. He ordered them to report to him, along with their men, in the region of Uballa. It is believed that Musanna, who was at Khaf-

¹Tabari: Vol. 2, p. 554.

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fan at the time (a place 20 miles south of Hira)¹ was displeased with the arrangement. He had hoped that the Caliph would give him a large independent command in Iraq, as he certainly deserved; but he came as ordered, and placed himself and his men at the disposal of Khalid. He was to prove the best of subordinate commanders.

Each of these four chiefs brought 2,000 men. Thus Khalid entered Iraq with 18,000 warriors²—the largest Muslim army yet assembled for battle.

In about the third week of March 633 (beginning of Muharram, 12 Hijri), Khalid set out from Yamama. But before doing so he wrote to Hormuz, the Persian governor of the frontier district of Dast Meisan:

Submit to Islam and be safe. Or agree to the payment of the Jizya, and you and your people will be under our protection; else you will have only yourself to blame for the consequences, for I bring a people who desire death as ardently as you desire life.³

Hormuz read the letter with a mixture of anger and contempt, and informed the Persian Emperor Ardsheer of Khalid's threat. He made up his mind to teach these crude Arabs a lesson that they should never forget.

Khalid began his advance from Yamama with his army divided into three groups. He did this in order not to tire his men or waste time by having too many troops in the same marching column. Each group set off a day apart. Thus each group was a day's march from the next—far enough for ease of movement and yet close enough to be swiftly concentrated for battle if required. Khalid himself moved with the third group on the third day—D plus 2. The whole army would concentrate again near Hufeir;⁴ and before leaving Yamama he promised his men a great battle with Hormuz.

Hormuz was the military governor of Dast Meisan. An experienced veteran and a trusted servant of the Empire,

¹Musil (p. 284) places Khaffan 20 kilometres south-east of Qadisiyya. It was at or near the present Qawwam which is six miles west of Shinafiya.

²Tabari: Vol. 2, p. 554. ³Ibid: Vol. 2. p. 554.

⁴Ibid: Vol. 2, p. 555.

The Battle of Chains 227

Hormuz was given this district to govern and protect because of its vital importance, which was both political and economic. It was a frontier district and lately had had a good deal of trouble with the Arab raiders of Musanna. It was also a wealthy district in natural produce and commerce. Its chief city, Uballa, was the main port of the Persian Empire and thus vital to its commercial prosperity. Uballa was also a junction of many land routes—from Bahrein, from Arabia, from Western and Central Iraq, from Persia proper—which gave it a decisive strategical importance. It was a gateway which it was the job of Hormuz to govern as an administrator and defend as a general.

The Persian society of the time had an imperial and aristocratic character. As is inevitable in such societies, it had an elaborate system of ranks to indicate a man's social and official position at the court. The outward symbol of rank was the cap; as a man rose in rank, his cap became more costly. The highest rank below the Emperor carried a cap worth 100,000 dirhams, which was studded with diamonds and pearls and other precious

stones. Hormuz was a 100,000 dirham-man!¹

A true imperialist, he was of a proud and arrogant nature and held the local Arabs in contempt, which he did nothing to conceal. He was harsh and highhanded in his treatment of the Arabs, who in return hated and feared him. In fact his heavy hand became the cause of a saying amongst the Arabs: More hateful than Hormuz.²

Soon after receiving the letter of Khalid, which he knew came from Yamama, Hormuz informed the Emperor of the imminent invasion of Iraq by Khalid and prepared to fight this insolent upstart! He gathered his army and set out from Uballa, preceded by a cavalry screen. .

The direct route from Yamama to Uballa lay through Kazima (in modern Kuweit) and thither went Hormuz, expecting Khalid to take this route. (See Map 11.) On arrival at Kazima, he deployed his army facing south-west, with a centre and two wings, and ordered that men should be linked together with chains. So deployed, he awaited the arrival of Khalid. But of

¹Tabari: Vol. 2, p. 556.

²Ibid: Vol. 2, p. 555.

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Khalid there was no sign. And the following morning his scouts brought word that Khalid was not moving towards Kazima; he was making for Hufeir.¹

Khalid had, already before he left Yamama, arrived at a broad conception of how he would deal with the army of Hormuz. He had been given the mission of fighting the Persians, and a defeat of the Persian army was essential if the invasion of Iraq was to proceed as intended by the Caliph. With the Persian army intact at Uballa, Khalid could not get far. The direction given to him by the Caliph, i.e. Uballa, was by itself certain to bring the Persians to battle, for no Persian general could let Uballa fall.

Khalid knew the fine quality and the numerical strength of the Persian army and the courage, skill and armament of the Persian soldier. Heavily armed and equipped, he was the ideal man for the set-piece frontal clash. The only weakness of the Persian soldier and army lay in their lack of mobility; the Persian was not able to move fast, and any prolonged movement would tire him. On the other hand, Khalid's troops were mobile, mounted on camels with horses at the ready for cavalry attacks; and they were not only brave and skilful fighters, but also adept at fast movement across any terrain, especially the desert. Moreover, thousands of them were veterans of the Campaign of the Apostasy.

Khalid decided to use his own mobility to exploit its lack in the Persian army. He would force the Persians to carry out march and counter-march till he had worn them out. Then he would strike when the Persians were exhausted. Geography would help him. There were two routes to Uballa, via Kazima and Hufeir, whose existence would facilitate his manoeuvre. (See Map 11.)

¹Kazima was on the northern coast of the Kuweit Bay, as shown on Map 11, 5 miles from the present Basra-Kuweit road. It was a fairly large city, over a mile in diameter, of which nothing remains but some castle-like ruins on a tongue of land jutting into the sea. These ruins may, however, be of a later period than Khalid's.

No trace remains of Hufeir, nor is there any local tradition regarding its location. According to Ibn Rusta (p. 180) it was 18 miles from Basra on the road to Madina. Since the old Arab mile was a little longer than the current mile, I place it at present-day Rumeila, which is 21 miles from old Basra. (Some later writers have confused this Hufeir with Hafar-ul-Batin, which is in Arabia, 120 miles south-west of Kazima.)

MAP 11: THE BATTLE OF CHAINS—I

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Having written to Hormuz from Yamama, Khalid knew that the Persian would expect him to advance on the direct route from Yamama to Uballa, via Kazima, and would make his defensive plans accordingly. Khalid decided not to move on that route, but to approach Uballa from the south-west so that he would be free to manoeuvre on two axes—the Kazima axis and the Hufeir axis—thus creating a difficult problem for the-less mobile Persians. With this design in mind he marched to Nibbaj, dividing his army into three groups as already explained, and took under command the 2,000 warriors of Musanna, who, along with their intrepid chief, were awaiting Khalid at Nibbaj.¹From Nibbaj he marched in the direction of Hufeir, picking up the other three chiefs on the way, and approached Hufeir with 18,000 men.

Khalid was not in the least worried about the presence of the Persian Army at Kazima. Hormuz at Kazima posed no threat to Khalid, for the Persians could not venture into the desert to disrupt his communications, apart from the fact that a mobile force like Khalid's operating in the desert did not present particularly vulnerable lines of communication. Khalid made no attempt to rush through Hufeir and make for Uballa, because with Hormuz's large army on his flank his forward movement beyond Hufeir might spell serious trouble. Hormuz could fall upon his rear and cut his line of retreat. No Arab would ever accept interference, or even a threat of interference, with his route back into the friendly, safe desert where he alone was master. Hence Khalid waited in front of Hufeir, while light detachments of his cavalry kept Hormuz under observation. He knew that his presence near Hufeir would cause near-panic in the mind of Hormuz.

This is just what happened. The moment Hormuz got word of Khalid's movement towards Hufeir, he realised the grave danger in which his army was placed. The Arab was not so simple after all! As an experienced strategist, he knew that his base was threatened. He immediately ordered a move to Hufeir, 50 miles away, and his army, weighed down with its heavy equipment, trudged along the track. The two days' march was tiring, but the tough and disciplined Persian soldier accepted

¹The old Nibbaj is the present Nabqiyya, 25 miles north-east of Bureida. (See Maps 7 and 8.)

The Battle of Chains 231

his trials without complaint. On arrival at Hufeir, however, Hormuz found no trace of Khalid. Expecting the Muslims to arrive soon, he deployed for battle as he had done at Kazima, chains and all; but hardly had his men taken up their positions when his scouts came rushing to inform him that Khalid was moving towards Kazima!

And Khalid was indeed moving towards Kazima. He had waited near Hufeir until he heard of the hurried approach of Hormuz. Then he had withdrawn a short distance and begun a counter-march through the desert towards Kazima, not going too far into the desert so as not to become invisible to Persian scouts. Khalid was in no hurry. His men were well mounted, and he took his time. He had no desire to get to Kazima first and occupy it, for then he would have to position himself for battle and his opponent would be free to manoeuvre. Khalid preferred to let the Persians position themselves while he himself remained free to approach and attack as he liked, with the desert behind him.

The Persians again packed their bags and set off for Kazima, for Hormuz could not leave the Kazima route to the Muslims. Hormuz could have fought a defensive battle closer to Uballa; but having experienced the terrible havoc wrought by Musanna in his district, he was in no mood to let Khalid approach close enough to let his raiders loose in the fertile region of Uballa. He was determined to fight and destroy Khalid at a safe distance from the district which it was his duty to protect, and he rejoiced at the prospect of a set-piece battle against the desert Arabs. Moreover, armies act as magnets: they attract each other. Sometimes an area which is not otherwise strategically important becomes so through the presence of a hostile army. Now Hormuz was drawn to Kazima not only by the strategical importance of the place but also by the army of Khalid.

This time the forced march did not go down so well with the Persians and there was grumbling, especially amongst the Arab auxiliaries serving under Hormuz, who cursed the Persian for all the trouble that he was causing them. The Persians arrived at Kazima in a state of exhaustion. Hormuz, the professional regular soldier, wasted no time and at once deployed the army for battle in the normal formation of a centre and wings. The generals commanding his wings were Qubaz and Anushjan. The men again linked themselves with chains. (For a graphic illus-

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tration of march and counter-march see Map 12.)

Chains were often used by the Persian army to link their men in battle. They were normally of four lengths, to link three, five, seven or ten men¹, and were supposed to act as a source of strength to the army. It would not be correct to say, as some critics have suggested, that the chains were used by the officers for fear that their men would run away. The chains were used as a manifestation of suicidal courage, confirming the soldiers’ willingness to die on the battlefield rather than seek safety in flight. They also lessened the danger of a breakthrough by enemy cavalry, as with the men linked together in chains it was not easy for cavalry groups to knock down a few men and create a gap for penetration. And since the Persian Army was organised and trained for the set-piece battle, this tactic enabled it to stand like a rock in the face of enemy assault. But the chains had one major drawback: in case of defeat the men were incapable of withdrawal, for then the chains acted as fetters. Men chained to fallen comrades lost all power of movement and became helpless victims of their assailants.

It was the use of chains in this battle that gave it the name of the Battle of Chains.

The Arab auxiliaries, however, did not approve of these chains and never resorted to their use. When on this occasion the Persians chained themselves, the Arabs said, “You have bound yourselves for the enemy. Beware of doing so!” To this the Persians retorted, “We can see that you wish to be free to run!”²

Now Khalid came out of the desert and approached the Persians. He had made up his mind to fight a battle here and now before the Persian army recovered from its fatigue. But the Muslim army had no water, and this caused some alarm among the men, who informed Khalid of their misgivings. “Dismount and unload the camels”, ordered Khalid. “By my faith, the water will go to whichever army is more steadfast and more deserving.”³ Their confidence in their leader unshaken, the Muslims prepared for battle. They had not been at this for long when it began to rain, and it rained enough for the Muslims

¹Tabari: Vol. 3, p. 206. According to Abu Yusuf (p. 33) the chain lengths were: five, seven, eight and 10 men.

²Ibid: Vol. 2, p. 555.

³Ibid.

MAP 12 : THE BATTLE OF CHAINS - II

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to drink their fill and replenish their water-skins.

Hormuz had deployed his army just forward of the western edge of Kazima, keeping the city covered by his dispositions. In front of the Persians stretched a sandy, scrub-covered plain for a depth of about 3 miles. Beyond the plain rose a complex of low, barren hills about 200 to 300 feet high. This range was part of the desert, running all the way to Hufeir, and it was over this range that Khalid had marched to Kazima. Emerging from these hills, Khalid now moved his army into the sandy plain; and keeping his back to the hills and the desert, formed up for battle with the usual centre and wings. As commanders of the wings, he appointed Asim bin Amr (brother of Qaqa bin Amr) and Adi bin Hatim (the very tall chief of the Tayy, who has been mentioned earlier, in Part II). Some time in the first week of April 633 (third week of Muharram, 12 Hijri) began the Battle of Chains.

The battle started in grand style with a duel between the two army commanders. Hormuz was a mighty fighter, renowned in the Empire as a champion whom few would dare to meet in single combat. (In those chivalrous days no one could be a commanding general without at the same time being a brave and skilful fighter.) He urged his horse forward and halted in the open space between the two armies, though closer to his own front rank. Then he called, “Man to man! Where is Khalid?”¹From the Muslim ranks Khalid rode out and stopped a few paces from Hormuz. The two armies watched in silence as these redoubtable champions prepared to fight it out.

Hormuz dismounted, motioning to Khalid to do the same. Khalid dismounted. This was brave of Hormuz, for a dismounted duel left little chance of escape; but on this occasion Hormuz was not being as chivalrous as one might imagine. Before coming out of the Persian ranks Hormuz had picked a few of his stalwarts and placed them in the front rank near the site which he had chosen for the duel. He instructed them as follows: he would engage Khalid in single combat; at the appropriate time he would call to the men; they would then dash out, surround the combatants and kill Khalid while Hormuz held him. The

^lTabari: Vol. 2, p. 555.

The Battle of Chains 235

chosen warriors watched intently as the two generals dismounted. They felt certain that Khalid would not get away.

The generals began to fight with sword and shield. Each struck several times at his adversary, but none of the blows made any impression. Each was surprised at the skill of the other. Hormuz now suggested that they drop their swords and wrestle. Khalid, unaware of the plot, dropped his sword as Hormuz dropped his. They began to wrestle. Then, as they were locked in a powerful embrace, Hormuz shouted to his men, who rushed forward. Before Khalid realised what was happening, he found himself and Hormuz surrounded by several fierce-looking Persians.

Now Khalid knew. He was without his sword and shield, and Hormuz would not relax his iron grip. There seemed to be no way out of the predicament; but then, being a stronger man than Hormuz, Khalid began to whirl his adversary round and round, thus making it practically impossible for the Persians to strike at him.

A storm of sound arose over the battlefield as the two armies shouted—one with delight, the other with dismay. In this noise, their attention riveted on the wrestlers, the Persian killers did not hear the galloping hooves that approached them. They did not know what hit them. Two or three of them sprawled on the ground as headless trunks, before the others realised that the number of combatants in this melee had increased by just one more. The extra man was Qaqa bin Amr—the one-man reinforcement sent by Abu Bakr.

Qaqa had seen the Persian killers rush towards the two generals, and in a flash understood the perfidy of the enemy general and the peril which faced Khalid. There was no time to tell this to anyone; no time to explain or gather comrades to support him. He had spurred his horse into a mad gallop, and arriving in the nick of time, had set upon the Persians with his sword. Qaqa killed all of them!¹

Khalid, freed of the menace of the Persian killers, turned his entire attention to Hormuz. After a minute or two Hormuz lay motionless on the ground, and Khalid rose from his chest with a dripping dagger in his hand.

¹There is no record of the actual number of Persians who took part in this plot and were killed by Qaqa.

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Khalid now ordered a general attack, and the Muslims, incensed by the treacherous plot of the enemy commander, went into battle with a vengeance. The centre and the wings swept across the plain to assault the Persian army. The Persians had suffered a moral setback with the death of their commanding general; but they were more numerous than the Muslims and their iron discipline held them together. They fought hard. For some time the battle hung in the balance, with the fast-moving Muslims assailing the front and the steady, chain-linked Persian infantry repulsing all assaults. But soon the superior skill and courage of the Muslims and the fatigue of the Persians began to tell, and after several attempts the Muslims succeeded in breaking the Persian front in a number of places.

Sensing defeat, the Persian generals commanding the wings—Qubaz and Anushjan—ordered a withdrawal and began to pull their men back. This led to a general retreat, and as the-Muslims struck still more fiercely, the retreat turned into a rout. Most of the Persians who were not chained managed to escape, but those who were chain-linked found their chains a death trap. Unable to move fast, they fell an easy prey to the victorious Muslims and were slain in thousands before darkness set in to put an end to the slaughter. Qubaz and Anushjan managed to escape and succeeded in extricating a large portion of the army from the battlefield.

The first battle with the power of Persia was over. It had ended in an overwhelming victory for the Muslims.

The following day was spent in attending to the wounded and collecting the spoils—weapons, armour, stores, costly garments, horses, captives—of which Khalid distributed four-fifths among his men. The share of each cavalryman came to a thousand dirhams, while the infantryman's share was a third of that. This ratio was a tradition of the Prophet. The cavalryman was given three shares because he had to maintain his horse as well and was more valuable for the mobile, fast-moving operations which the Arabs loved.

One-fifth of the spoils was sent to the Caliph as the share of the state, and this included the 100,000-dirham cap of Hormuz. By right it belonged to Khalid, for in a duel all the belongings of the vanquished were taken by the victor; and for this reason Abu Bakr returned the cap to Khalid, who, preferring

The Battle of Chains 237

cash, sold it!

The Muslims appear also to have captured an elephant in the Battle of Chains, and this animal was sent to Madina along with other spoils. The city of the Prophet had never before seen an elephant and there was tremendous excitement in the capital when the behemoth arrived. The people marvelled at this greatest of land animals; but Abu Bakr could not think of any use for the unfamiliar beast and returned it to Khalid. What happened to it thereafter we do not know.

While the families of the Persians and those of the Iraqi Arabs who had supported them were taken captive, the rest of the population of the district was left unmolested. This population consisted mainly of small farmers, peasants and shepherds, and they all agreed to pay the Jizya and come under Muslim protection.

For a few days Khalid remained busy with organisational matters. Then he set his army in motion towards the north. Ahead of the main body of the army he sent Musanna and his 2,000 riders to reconnoitre the country and kill any stragglers left behind by the retreating Persians.

Musanna reached a small river just north of where Zubeir stands today, on the bank of which stood a fort known as Hisn-ul-Mar'at, i.e., the Fort of the Lady, so called because a lady ruled over it.¹ Musanna laid siege to the fort; but in order to avoid delay in his advance, he left his brother, Mu'anna, in charge of the siege operations with a few hundred men and himself proceeded north with the rest of his column.

Two or three days of siege operations were enough to convince the lady of the fort of the futility of resistance. The Persian army of Uballa had been defeated and she could expect no help from any quarter. Mu'anna offered to accept a peaceful surrender—without bloodshed, without plunder, without enslavement. The lady agreed; the defenders surrendered. Mu'anna and the lady of the fort appear to have found much pleasure in their meeting with each other. First the lady became a Muslim,

¹The river is still there and is known as the River of the Lady, but there is no trace of the fort.

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and then, without any further delay, Mu'anna married her!

Meanwhile Khalid was advancing northwards from Kazima with the main body of the army.

20 : THE BATTLE OF THE RIVER

When the Persian Emperor received the message of Hormuz regarding the Muslim advance from Yamama, he organised a fresh army at Ctesiphon and placed it under the command of a top-ranking general by the name of Qarin bin Qaryana. Qarin too was a 100,000 dirham-man. The Emperor ordered him to proceed to Uballa with the new army to reinforce Hormuz, and with this mission Qarin set off from Ctesiphon.

Marching along the left bank of the Tigris, Qarin reached Mazar, crossed the Tigris and moved south along the right bank until he reached the Maqil River. He crossed this river and then another largish river a little south of the Maqil. He had hardly done so when he received reports of the disaster of Kazima. These reports were followed by the remnants of the Persian army which had survived the Battle of Kazima and now came streaming into Qarin's camp under the two generals, Qubaz and Anushjan. The survivors included thousands of Arab auxiliaries; and as is usual in such cases, the two partners —Persian and Arab—began to blame each other for the defeat. Their spirits were not as high as at Kazima; but they were brave men and reacted more with anger than fear at the reverse they had suffered.

Qubaz and Anushjan were eager for battle again. They and Qarin found it difficult to believe that a regular imperial

240 The Sword of Allah

army could be defeated in battle by a force of uncultured and unsophisticated Arabs from the desert. They did not realise that the Battle of Kazima had been fought with not an uncivilised Arab force but a fine Muslim army, purified and strengthened by the new faith. However, Qarin was prudent enough not to advance beyond the south bank. Here he could fight with his back to the river and thus ensure the safety of his rear. By limiting the possibilities of manoeuvre, he would fight the frontal set-piece battle which the Persians loved and for which their training and discipline were ideally suited.

The remnants of the Persian army of Uballa were followed by the light cavalry detachments of Musanna; and once contact was estalished with the Persians, the Muslim horsemen scoured the countryside for supplies while Musanna kept the Persians occupied and carried out reconnaissances. The Persians made no attempt to sally out of their camp. Musanna sent a messenger to Khalid to inform him that he had made contact with a powerful enemy force at Sinyy.¹

The word sinyy was used by the Arabs to denote a river. Musanna had contacted the Persians on the south bank of a river, and for this reason the battle which will now be described is called the Battle of the River.

On leaving Kazima, Khalid marched north until he reached some ruins in the vicinity of the present Zubeir, about 10 miles south-west of Uballa. He had already decided not to turn towards Uballa, where there was no enemy left to fight, when Musanna's messenger brought the news about the concentration of Qarin's army and the survivors of Kazima. Khalid was anxious to contact and destroy the new Persian army while the impact of Kazima was still fresh in the Persian mind. Consequently, while he sent Maqal bin Muqarran with a detachment to enter Uballa and gather spoils (which Maqal did), Khalid marched towards the River with the main body of the army. He caught up with Musanna in the third week of April 633 (beginning of Safar, 12 Hijri).

¹It is difficult to express this word in English. InArabic it is written as (Yaqut : Vol. 1, p. 937) or as Tobari puts it (Vol. 2, p. 557 Sinyy).

The Battle of the River 241

Khalid then carried out a personal reconnaissance of the Persian position. Since the Persians had their backs to the river there was no possibility of outflanking them; and Khalid could think of no way of manoeuvring the Persians away from their position as he had done with Hormuz. Khalid accordingly decided to fight a general set-piece battle, in the imperial Persian style. This was unavoidable, because with Qarin poised for action as he was, Khalid could neither cross the river to enter deep into Iraq nor proceed westwards towards Hira.

The two armies formed up for battle. Qubaz and Anushjan commanded the wings of the Persian army while Qarin kept the centre under his direct control and stood in front of it. Detachments of Arab auxiliaries were deployed in various parts of the army. Qarin was a brave but wise general. He deployed with the river close behind him, and saw to it that a fleet of boats was kept ready at the near bank … just in case! Khalid also deployed with a centre and wings, again appointing Asim bin Amr and Adi bin Hatim as the commanders of the wings.

The battle began with three duels. The first to step forward and call out a challenge was Qarin. As Khalid urged his horse forward, another Muslim, one by the name of Maqal bin Al Ashi, rode out of the Muslim front rank and made for Qarin. Maqal reached Qarin before Khalid, and since he was an accomplished swordsman and quite able to fight in the top class of champions, Khalid did not call him back. They fought, and Maqal killed his man. Qarin was the last of the 100,000-dirham men to face Khalid in battle.

As the Persian commander went down before the sword of Maqal, the other two Persian generals, Qubaz and Anushjan, came forward and gave the challenge for single combat. The challenge was accepted by the commanders of the Muslim wings, Asim and Adi. Asim killed Anushjan. Adi killed Qubaz. As these Persian generals fell, Khalid gave the order for a general attack, and the Muslims rushed forward to assault the massed Persian army.

In those days the personal performance of the commander was a particularly important factor in battle. His visible success in combat inspired his men, while his death or flight led to demoralisation and disorganisation. The Persian army here

242 The Sword of Allah

had now lost its three top generals; yet the men fought bravely and were able to hold the Muslim attacks for a while. But because of the absence of able generals, disorder and confusion soon became apparent in the Persian ranks. Eventually, under the violence of continued Muslim attacks, the Persian army lost all cohesion, turned about and made for the river bank.

This disorganised retreat led to disaster. The lightly armed Muslims moved faster than the heavily equipped Persians and caught up with their fleeing adversaries. On the river bank confusion became total as the Persians scrambled into the boats in a blind urge to get away from the horror that pursued them. Thousands of them were slain as other thousands rowed away to safety. Those who survived owed their lives to the caution of Qarin, who had wisely kept the boats ready by the river bank. But for these boats not a single Persian would have got away. The Muslims having no means of crossing the river, were unable to pursue the fugitives.

According to Tabari, 30,000 Persians were killed in this battle.¹ The spoils of the battle exceeded the booty taken at Kazima, and four-fifths of the spoils were again promptly distributed among the men while one-fifth was sent to Madina.

Khalid now turned more seriously to the administration of the districts conquered by the Muslims and placed this administration on a more permanent footing. Submitting to Khalid, all the local inhabitants agreed to pay the Jizya and come under Muslim protection. They were left unmolested. Khalid organised a team of officials to collect taxes and placed Suweid bin Muqarran in command of this team with his headquarters at Hufeir.

But while these administrative matters were engaging Khalid's attention, his agents had slipped across the Euphrates to pick up the trail of the vanquished army of Qarin. Yet other agents were moving along the Euphrates towards Hira to discover further movements and concentrations of the imperial army of the Chosroes.²

¹Tabari: Vol. 2, p. 558.

²Tabari also calls this battle the Battle of Mazar, which I feel is incorrect. For an explanation see Note 5 in Appendix B.

21: THE HELL OF WALAJA

The news of the debacle at the River inflamed Ctesiphon. A second Persian army had been cut to pieces by this new and “unexpected force emerging out of the barren wastes of Arabia. Each of the two Persian army commanders had been an illustrious imperial figure, a 100,000 dirham-man. And not only these two, but two other first-rate generals had been slain by the enemy. It was unbelievable! Considering that this new enemy had never been known for any advanced military organisation, these two defeats seemed like nightmares—frightening but unreal.

Emperor Ardsheer decided to take no chances. He ordered the concentration of another two armies; and he gave this order on the very day on which the Battle of the River was fought. This may surprise the reader, for the battlefield was 300 miles from Ctesiphon by road. But the Persians had a remarkable system of military communication. Before battle they would station a line of men, picked for their powerful voices, at shouting distance from one another, all the way from the battlefield to the capital. Hundreds of men would be used to form this line. Each event on the battlefield would be shouted by A to B; by B to C; by C to D; and so on.¹ Thus every action on the battlefield would be known to the Emperor in a few hours.

¹Tabari: Vol. 3, p. 43.

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Following the orders of the Emperor, Persian warriors began to concentrate at the imperial capital. They came from all towns and garrisons except those manning the western frontier with the Eastern Roman Empire. In a few days the first army was ready.

The Persian court expected the Muslims to proceed along the Euphrates to North-Western Iraq. The Persians understood the Arab mind well enough to know that no Arab force would move far from the desert so long as there were opposing forces within striking distance of its rear and its route to the desert. Expecting the Muslims army to move west, Ardsheer picked on Walaja as the place at which to stop Khalid and destroy his army. (See Map 10.)¹

The first of the new Persian armies raised at Ctesiphon was placed under the command of Andarzaghar, who until recently had been military governor of the frontier province of Khurasan and was held in high esteem by Persian and Arab alike. He was a Persian born among the Arabs of Iraq. He had grown up among the Arabs and, unlike most Persians of his class, was genuinely fond of them.

Andarzaghar was ordered to move his army to Walaja, where he would soon be joined by the second army. He set off from Ctesiphon, moved along the east bank of the Tigris, crossed the Tigris at Kaskar,² moved south-west to the Euphrates near Walaja, crossed the Euphrates and established his camp at Walaja. Before setting out from the capital he had sent couriers to many Arab tribes which he knew; and on his way to Walaja he picked up thousands of Arabs who were willing to fight under his standard. He had also met and taken command of the remnants of the army of Qarin. When he arrived at Walaja he was delighted with the strength of his army. Patiently he waited for Bahman who was to join him in a few days.

Bahman was the commander of the second army. One of the top personalities of the Persian military hierarchy, he

¹No trace remains of Walaja. According to Yaqut (Vol. 4, p. 939), it was east of the Kufa-Mecca road, and a well-watered region stretched between it and Hira. Musil (p. 293) places it near Ein Zahik, which, though still known by that name to the local inhabitants of the region, is marked on maps as Ein-ul-Muhari and is 5 miles south-south-west of Shinafiya. The area of Walaja, now completely barren, was then very fertile.

²This was the place where Wasit was founded in 83 Hijri. In fact, Kaskar became the eastern part of Wasit.

The Hell of Walaja 245

too was a 100,000 dirham-man. He was ordered by the Emperor to take the second army, when ready, to Walaja where Andarzaghar would await him. Bahman would be in over-all command of both the armies, and with this enormous might would fight and destroy the Muslim army in one great battle.

Bahman moved on a separate route to Andarzaghar's. From Ctesiphon he marched south, between the two rivers, making directly for Walaja. But he left Ctesiphon several days after the first army, and his movement was slower.

The Battle of the River had been a glorious victory. With few casualties to themselves, the Muslims had shattered a large Persian army and acquired a vast amount of booty. But the battle left Khalid in a more thoughtful mood; and only now did he begin to appreciate the immensity of the resources of the Persian Empire. He had fought two bloody battles with two separate Persian armies and driven them mercilessly from the battlefield, but he was still only on the fringes of the Empire. The Persians could field many armies like the ones he had fought at Kazima and the River.

It was a sobering thought. And Khalid was on his own. He was the first Muslim commander to set out to conquer alien lands. He was not only the military commander but also the political head, and as such had to govern, on behalf of the Caliph in Madina, all the territories conquered for Islam. There was no superior to whom he could turn for guidance in matters of politics and administration. Moreover, his men were not as fresh as on the eve of Kazima. They had marched long and fast and fought hard, and were now feeling more than a little tired. Khalid rested his army for a few days.

By now Khalid had organised an efficient network of intelligence agents. The agents were local Arabs who were completely won over by the generous treatment of the local population by Khalid, which contrasted strikingly with the harshness and arrogance of the imperial Persians. Consequently they had thrown in their lot with the Muslims and kept Khalid apprised of the affairs of Persia and the movements of Persian forces. These agents now informed him of the march of Andarzaghar from Ctesiphon; of the large Arab contingents which joined

246 The Sword of Allah

him; of his picking up the survivors of Qarin's army; of his movement towards Walaja. They also brought word of the march of the second army under Bahman from Ctesiphon and its movement in a southerly direction. As more intelligence arrived, Khalid realised that the two Persian armies would shortly meet and then either bar his way south of the Euphrates or advance to fight him in the region of Uballa. The Persians would be in such overwhelming strength that there could be no possibility of his engaging in a successful battle. Khalid had to get to Hira, and Walaja was smack on his route.

Another point that worried Khalid was that too many Persians were escaping from one battle to fight another day. The survivors of Kazima had joined Qarin and fought at the River. The survivors of the River had joined Andarzaghar and were now moving towards Walaja. If he was to have a sporting chance of defeating all the armies that faced him, he would have to make sure that none got away from one battle to join the army preparing for the next.

These then were the two problems that faced Khalid. The first was strategical: two Persian armies were about to combine to oppose him. To this problem he found a masterly strategical solution, i.e. to advance rapidly and fight and eliminate one army (Andarzaghar's) before the other army (Bah-man's) arrived on the scene. The second problem was tactical: how to prevent enemy warriors escaping from one battle to-fight another. To this he found a tactical solution which only a genius could conceive and only a master could implement— but more of this later.

Khalid gave instructions to Suweid bin Muqarran to see to the administration of the conquered districts with his team of officials, and posted a few detachments to guard the lower Tigris against possible enemy crossings from the north and east and to give warning of any fresh enemy forces coming from those directions. With the rest of the army—about 15,000 men—he set off in the direction of Hira, moving at a fast pace along the south edge of the great marsh.

If Andarzaghar had been given the choice, he would undoubtedly have preferred to wait for the arrival of Bahman

The Hell of Walaja 247

before fighting a decisive battle with the Muslims. But Andarzaghar was not given the choice. A few days before Bahman was expected, the Muslim army appeared over the eastern horizon and camped a short distance from Walaja. However, Andarzaghar was not worried. He had a large army of Persians and Arabs and felt confident of victory. He did not even bother to withdraw to the river bank a mile away, so that he could use the river to guard his rear. He prepared for battle at Walaja.

For the whole of the next day the two armies remained in their respective camps, keeping each other under observation, while commanders and other officers carried out reconnaissances and made preparations for the morrow. The following morning the armies deployed for battle, each with a centre and wings. The Muslim wings were again commanded by Asim bin Amr and Adi bin Hatim.

The battlefield consisted of an even plain stretching between two low, flat ridges, which were about 2 miles apart and 20 to 30 feet in height. The north-eastern part of the plain was marked by another such ridge, really an extension of the eastern ridge, while to the south the plain ran into a barren desert. A short distance beyond the north-eastern ridge flowed a branch of the Euphrates now known as the River Khaseef. The Persians deployed in the centre of this plain, facing east-south-east, with the western ridge behind them and their left resting at the foot of the north-eastern ridge. Khalid formed up his army just forward of the eastern ridge, facing the Persians. The centre of the battlefield, i.e. the mid-point between the two armies, was about 2 miles south-east of the present Ein-ul-Muhari and 6 miles south of the present Shinafiya.

Andarzaghar was surprised at the strength of the Muslim army. Only about 10,000, he guessed. From what he had heard, Andarzaghar had expected Khalid's army to be much larger. And where was the dreaded Muslim cavalry? Most of these men were on foot! Perhaps the Persian survivors of Kazima and the River had exaggerated the enemy's strength, as defeated soldiers are wont to do. Or perhaps the cavalry was fighting dismounted. Andarzaghar did not know that the Muslims who faced him were also surprised at their numbers, for they did not seem to be as many as they had been the day before. But the matter did not worry them. The Sword of Allah knew best!

248 The Sword of Allah

The situation put Andarzaghar in high spirits. He would make mincemeat of this small force and clear the land of Iraq of these insolent desert-dwellers. He would at first await the Muslim attack. He would hold the attack and wear down the Muslims; then he would launch a counter-attack and crush the enemy.

When Khalid's army advanced for a general attack, Andarzaghar was overjoyed. This was just what he wanted. The two armies met with a clash of steel, and the men lost all count of time as they struggled mightily in combat.

For some time the battle raged with unabated fury. The agile, skilful Muslims struck at the heavily armed Persians, but the Persians stood their ground, repulsing all attacks. After an hour or so both sides began to feel tired—the Muslims more so because they were fewer in number and each of them faced several Persians in combat. The Persians had reserves which they employed to replace their men in the front line. However, the example of Khalid kept Muslim spirits undaunted. He was fighting in the front rank.

In particular, during this first phase of the battle, the Muslims gained further confidence from the thrilling spectacle of Khalid's duel with a Persian champion of gigantic proportions known as Hazar Mard, who was said to have been the equal of a thousand warriors.¹ This giant of a man stepped forward and extended a general challenge which was accepted by Khalid. After a few minutes of duelling, Khalid found an opening and felled the man with his sword. When the Persian's body lay quite still, Khalid sat down on his great chest and called out to his slave to bring him his food. Then, seated on this grisly bench, Khalid ate a hearty lunch!²

The first phase was over. The second phase of the battle began with the counter-attack of the Persians. The experienced eye of Andarzaghar could see clear signs of fatigue on the faces of the Muslims. He judged that this was the right moment for his counter-stroke; and in this he was right. At this command the Persians surged forward and struck at the Muslims. The Muslims were able to hold them for some time, but the Herculean efforts

¹In Persian, Hazar Mard means a thousand men, and this was an appellation given to especially formidable warriors in recognition of their prowess and strength.

²Tabari : Vol. 2, p. 560. Abu Yusuf: p. 142.

The Hell of Walaja 249

that they were called upon to make placed an almost unbearable strain on their nerves and limbs. Slowly they fell back, though in good order. The Persians launched furious charges, and the Muslims looked to Khalid for any sign of a change in plan or anything to relieve the tension. But from Khalid they got no such sign. He was fighting like a lion and urged his men to do likewise. And his men did likewise.

The Persians were paying heavily for their advance, but they exulted in the success that they were gaining. Andarzaghar was beside himself with joy. Victory was just round the corner. He had not reached the top rung of the Persian socio-military ladder, but now he saw visions of a 100,000 dirham-cap. The Muslims continued to fight with the suicidal desperation of wild animals at bay. They had reached the limits of human endurance; and some even began to wonder if Khalid had at last met his match. A little more of this and the front would shatter into a thousand pieces.

Then Khalid gave the signal. We do not know just what this signal was, but it was received by those for whom it was intended. The next moment, over the crest of the ridge which stretched behind the Persian army appeared two dark lines of mounted warriors—one from the Persian left-rear, the other from the right-rear. Cries of Allah-o-Akbar rent the air as the Muslim cavalry charged at a gallop; and the plain of Walaja trembled under the thundering hooves of the Arab horse.

The joy of the Persians turned to terror. While a moment before they had been shouting with glee, they now screamed in panic as the Muslim cavalry rammed into the rear of the Persian army. The main body of Muslims under Khalid, refreshed and strengthened by the sight they beheld, resumed the attack against the Persian front, at the same time extending its flanks to join hands with the cavalry and completely surround the Persians. The army of Andarzaghar was caught in a trap from which there could be no escape.

In an instant the disciplined Persians turned into a rabble. When groups of soldiers turned to the rear they were pierced by lances or felled by swords. When they turned to the front they were struck down by sword and dagger. Recoiling from the assaults that came from all directions, they gathered

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in an unwieldy mass, unable to use their weapons freely or avoid the blows of their assailants. Those who wanted to fight did not know whom to fight. Those who wanted to flee did not know where to go. In a mad urge to get away from the horror, they trampled each other and fought each other. The battlefield of Walaja became a hell for the army of Andarzaghar.

The ring of steel became tighter as the furious charges of the Muslims continued. The very helplessness of the Persians excited the Muslims to greater violence, and they swore that they would not let the Persians and Iraqi Arabs escape this time.

In this the Muslims succeeded. A few thousand imperial warriors did get away; for no army can be so completely destroyed that not a single survivor remains, but the army as a whole ceased to exist. It was as if a vast chasm had opened under it and swallowed it up. While the armies of Hormuz and Qarin had suffered crushing defeats, the army of Andarzaghar was annihilated. The army of Andarzaghar was no more. (For a graphic illustration of the phases of this battle see Map 13.)

Andarzaghar himself, strangely enough, managed to escape. But the direction of his escape was towards the desert rather than the Euphrates, and having no desire but to put as much distance as possible between himself and the hell of Walaja, he went deep into the desert. In the desert the ill-fated man lost himself and died of thirst.

After the battle Khalid got his exhausted men together. He realised that this battle had imposed a terrible strain upon them. It had been the fiercest of the three fierce battles which they had fought in Iraq; and he wanted to make certain that their spirits were not dampened by memories of the trial, for more trials awaited them. '

He addressed the men. He started by praising Allah and calling His blessings upon the Holy Prophet. Then he continued:

Do you not see the wealth of the land of the Persians? Do you not remember the poverty of the land of the Arabs? Do you not see how the crops in this land cover the earth? If the holy war were not enjoined by Allah, we should still come and conquer this rich land and exchange the hunger of our deserts for the abundant eating which is now ours.¹

¹Tabari: Vol. 2, p. 559.

MAP 13: THE BATTLE OF WALAJA

252 The Sword of Allah

And the warriors of Khalid agreed.

The day before the Battle of Walaja was fought, Khalid had sent for two of his officers, Busr bin Abi Rahm and Saeed bin Marra.¹ He made each of them the commander of a mobile striking force of about 2,000 cavalry and instructed them as follows:

a. They would take their horsemen out during the night and move wide round the south of the Persian camp.

b. On arrival on the far side of the ridge which stretched behind the Persian camp, they would conceal their men but keep them ready to move at short notice.

c. When battle was joined in the morning, they would keep their men mounted behind the crest of the ridge and position observers to watch for the signal of Khalid.

d. When Khalid gave the signal, the two striking forces would charge the Persian army in the rear, each group echeloned a bit to one flank.

Necessary orders were issued by Khalid to those who had to be in the know of the plan, so that the organisation and preparation of the striking forces could be carried out without a hitch; but the utmost secrecy was maintained and the Muslim rank and file knew nothing of the planned manoeuvre. In the morning, the cavalry comprising these striking forces was nowhere to be seen; and Khalid formed up the rest of his army, about 10,000 men, in front of the Persians.

This was the plan of the Battle of Walaja, fought in early May 633 (third week of Safar, 12 Hijri). It was a frontal holding attack combined with a powerful envelopment. The operation went, down to the smallest detail, as planned by Khalid. Only a master could have done it.

This is not the first time in history that this brilliant manoeuvre was carried out. It had been done before. The most famous example of this type of manoeuvre was the Battle of Cannae in 216 B.C., at which Hannibal did much the same to the Romans. After Hannibal's battle this type of manoeuvre became known as a Cannae.

¹Ibid.

The Hell of Walaja 253

But Khalid had never heard of Hannibal. With Khalid this was an original conception.¹

¹There is a difference between Walaja and Cannae in that Hannibal's cavalry moved out on both flanks, drove off the Roman cavalry, and then, at the appropriate time, fell upon the rear of the Romans, while Khalid's cavalry moved (as we reconstruct the battle) round one flank. But this is a matter of pre-battle movement. The pattern of battle was the same.

22: THE RIVER OF BLOOD

The third great battle with the Persians had been won, and Khalid was nearer his ultimate objective—Hira. But he still had far to go and had no illusions about the journey. It was unlikely that the proud Persians would withdraw from his path. Much blood must yet be shed.

In spite of his masterly manoeuvre and his best efforts, a few thousand enemy warriors did manage to escape from the Battle of Walaja. They were mainly Christian Arabs from the tribe of Bani Bakr (Musanna's tribe—those elements which had not accepted the new faith and had clung to Christianity). Much of this tribe lived in Iraq, as Persian subjects. They had responded to the call of Andarzaghar and with him they had fought and suffered at Walaja.

These Arab survivors of Walaja, fleeing from the battlefield, crossed the River Khaseef and moved between it and the Euphrates (the two rivers were about 3 miles apart, the former being a branch of the Euphrates). Their flight ended at Ulleis, about 10 miles from Walaja (see Map 10). Here they felt reasonably safe, as the place was on the right bank of the Euphrates, and on the other side of Ulleis ran the Khaseef, which actually took off from the Euphrates just above Ulleis. Ulleis could only be approached frontally, i.e. from the south-east.¹

¹According to Tabari (Vol. 2, p. 560), Ulleis was at a junction of the Euphrates. Musil (p. 293) places it at Ash-Shasi, which is now known as Al Asi and is 4 miles west-north-west of Shinafiya. Even now the place can only be approached from between the two rivers, unless one uses a boat to cross one of them.

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For a few days Khalid rested his exhausted troops and himself remained busy with the distribution of the spoils and preparations for the onward march. Knowing of the existence of Bahman's army, he could appreciate that another bloody battle would have to be fought before he got to Hira. Since the centre of gravity of the campaign in Iraq had now shifted from the Tigris to the Euphrates, he recalled the Muslim detachments which he had left on the lower Tigris.

Khalid knew from his agents about the presence of hostile Arabs at Ulleis; but since they were only the survivors of Walaja he did not consider them a military problem. In any case, he did not wish to over-strain his men by rushing them into another battle before they had recovered from their great trial of strength with Andarzaghar. But when about 10 days later he was informed of the arrival of more Arab forces at Ullies, it became evident that he would have to deal with a complete and almost new army. The hostile concentration was large enough to promise a major battle. As soon as his detachments from the lower Tigris had joined him, Khalid set off from Walaja with an army whose strength, as at the time of its entry into Iraq, was 18,000 men.¹Since there was no way of getting to Ulleis from a flank because of the two rivers, Khalid had no option but to cross the Khaseef and approach his objective frontally.

The annihilation of the army of Andarzaghar, following close upon the heels of Kazima and the River, shook the Empire of the Chosroes to its foundations. There appeared to be an unearthly quality about this Army of Islam which had emerged like an irresistible force from the desert. Any Persian army that opposed its relentless march vanished. For the proud Persian court, accustomed to treating the dwellers of the desert with contempt, this was a bitter pill to swallow. Never before in its long history had the empire suffered such military defeats, in such rapid succession, at the hands of a force so much smaller than its own armies, so close to its seat of power and glory.

For the first time the Persians found it necessary to revise

¹Tabari: Vol. 2, p. 562. There is no record of reinforcements, but the Muslim losses must have been made up by either reinforcements from Arabia or local volunteers from Iraq.

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their opinions about the Arabs. It was clear that there was something about Islam which had turned this backward, disorganised and unruly race into a powerful, closely-knit and disciplined force of conquest. And it was clear also that there was something about this man Khalid—whose name was now whispered with fear in Persian homes—that added a touch of genius to the operations of his army. But a grand empire of 12 centuries is not beaten with three battles. The Persians were a race of conquerors and rulers who had lost battles before and risen again. The mood of dismay which had gripped Ctesiphon at the first reports of Walaja passed, and was replaced by a single-minded determination to crush this invading army and fling it back into the desert whence it came. Persia picked herself up, dusted herself, and prepared for another round.

Meanwhile messengers from the surviving Christian Arabs of the Bani Bakr arrived at Ctesiphon and informed the Emperor of their situation. They had sought the help of their fellow-Arabs inhabiting the region between Ulleis and Hira; in response thousands of Arabs were even now marching to join the Bani Bakr at Ulleis where they would fight a do-or-die battle with Khalid. Would not the Emperor help by sending another army of Persian warriors to join hands with his loyal Arabs subjects and save the Empire?

The Emperor would. He sent orders to Bahman who was still north of the Euphrates. On hearing of Walaja, Bahman had stopped in his tracks and decided not to move until he received further instructions. Now he got the Emperor's order to proceed with his army to Ulleis, take under his command the Arab contingents assembled there, and bar Khalid's way to Hira.

But Bahman did not himself go to Ulleis. He sent the army under his next senior general, one named Jaban, to whom he passed on the instructions of the Emperor. And Bahman added, “Avoid battle until I join you, unless it is forced upon you.”¹As Jaban set off with the army, Bahman returned to Ctesiphon. We do not know the purpose of his journey to the capital, we only know that he wished to discuss certain matters with the Emperor. He arrived at Ctesiphon to find Emperor Ardsheer very ill and remained in attendance on his master.

¹Tabari:Vol. 2, p. 560.

The River of Blood 257

Jaban moved with his army to Ulleis and found a vast gathering of Christian Arabs who had come from the region of Hira and Amgheeshiya. All had by now realised that Khalid's mission was to take Hira, and felt that Khalid's success would mean more bloodshed and enslavement. To prevent this, they had come to fight Khalid and, if necessary, die fighting. Jaban assumed command of the entire army, the Christian Arab part of which was commanded by a chieftain named Abdul Aswad, who had lost two sons at Walaja and was burning for revenge. Persian and Arab camped side by side with the Euphrates to their left, the Khaseef to their right and the river junction behind them.

According to the early historians there was a river here which came into prominence as a result of actions taken on conclusion of the Battle of Ulleis, as we shall shortly see. This river may once have been a canal, for it was dammed at its junction with the Euphrates just above Ulleis, but at the time of the battle the river was dry, or almost dry, because the dam was closed. The Muslims referred to this river as just the river. I place this river as the Khaseef (which is now a fair-sized river), for there is no space at Ulleis for another river or canal. Since, however, the name Khaseef may not have been in use at that time, it is hereafter referred to as The River.

Before the arrival of Jaban and the Persians, Musanna and his light cavalry had appeared at Ulleis and made contact with the Christian Arabs. Musanna informed Khalid of the enemy position, strength and apparent intention to fight. Khalid increased his pace, hoping to catch the Christian Arabs before they were reinforced by other Persian forces. But Jaban beat him to Ulleis, perhaps by a few hours; and again Khalid was faced by an enormous army. Again he determined to kill as many enemy warriors as he could lay his hands on, so that fewer would appear against him in the next battle. He also decided to fight the very same day; for the longer battle was delayed the more time the Persians would have to get organised and coordinate their plans. It was now the middle of May 633 (end of Safar, 12 Hijri).

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Khalid stopped just long enough on the march to array his army in battle formation, appointing Adi bin Hatim and Asim bin Amr once again as the commanders of his wings, before he started the advance towards Ulleis. This time no outflanking movements were possible, and he would rely for victory on the speed and violence of his attack rather than on manoeuvre. The Muslim advance to battle continued for some time before Jaban came to know that he was about to be attacked.

This information reached Jaban a little before midday, when it was mealtime for the Persian army. The cooks had prepared the soldiers' food, and the Persian soldier, like soldiers of all races and all ages, preferred a hot meal to a cold one and was reluctant to fight on an empty stomach. The Arab auxiliaries, however, were ready for battle.

Jaban looked at his soldiers and the tempting pots of food being brought from the kitchens. Then he looked in the direction from which the Muslims were rapidly approaching in battle array. The soldiers also saw the Muslim army. They were brave men; but they were also hungry men. “Let us eat now”, they said to Jaban. “We will fight later.”

“I fear”, replied Jaban, “that the enemy will not let you eat in peace.”¹

“No!” said the Persians, disobeying their commander. “Eat now; fight later!” The meal-cloths were spread on the ground and steaming dishes were laid out upon them. The soldiers sat down to eat. They thought they had time. Meanwhile the Arab auxiliaries, less sophisticated in their eating habits, had formed up for action.

The Persians had eaten but one or two mouthfuls when it became evident that the Muslims were about to assault. If they delayed battle any longer, a full belly would be of no use to them, for they would be slaughtered anyway. Hurriedly they left their dishes; and as hurriedly Jaban deployed them on the battlefield along with the Arabs. He was not a minute too soon. He used the Christian Arabs to form the wings of his army, under the chiefs Abdul Aswad and Abjar, and massed his Persian troops in the centre.

The battlefield ran south-east of Ulleis between the Euphrates and The River. The Persian army was deployed with its

¹Tabari: Vol. 2, p. 561.

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back to Ulleis, while in front of it was arrayed the army of Islam. The northern flank of both armies rested on the Euphrates and their southern flank on the river. The battle front was about 2 miles from river to river.

It was a very hard battle. The Battle of Walaja had been the fiercest battle of the campaign so far, but this was fiercer still. This became a battle that Khalid would never forget.

We do not know the details of the manoeuvres and other actions which took place in the battle. We know that Khalid killed the Arab commander, Abdul Aswad, in personal combat. We know that the imperial army, though losing heavily in men, would not yield before the assaults of the Muslims. If ever an army meant to fight it out to the last, it was the imperial army of Ulleis. The Arab auxiliaries were indeed fighting a do-or-die battle; for if this battle were lost, then nothing could save Hira. The Persians fought to vindicate the honour of Persian arms.

For a couple of hours the slogging continued. The fighting was heaviest on the bank of the river, where a large number of Persians fell in combat. The Muslims—tired, angry, frustrated --- could see no opening, no weakening of the Persian and Arab resistance. Then Khalid raised his hands in supplication and sprayed to Allah:

O Lord! If you give us victory, I shall see that no enemy warrior is left alive until their river runs with their blood!¹

The Muslims renewed their assaults with greater fury; and Allah gave them victory. Early in the afternoon the imperial army was shattered and its soldiers fled from the battlefield. Thousands lay dead, especially in, and on the bank of, the river whose sandy bed was red with their blood.

As the Persian army fled from the battlefield, Khalid launched his cavalry after it. “Do not kill them”, he ordered the cavalry. “Bring them back alive.”² The bed of the river was soaked with blood … but the river was not “running with blood” as Khalid had pledged!

The Muslim cavalry broke up into several groups and galloped out in pursuit of the fugitives who had crossed the

¹Tabari: Vol. 2, p. 561. ²Ibid.

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Khaseef and were fleeing in the direction of Hira. Parties of desperate Persians and Arabs were isolated from one another, surrounded, overpowered, disarmed and driven back to the battlefield like flocks of sheep. As each group was brought back it was herded to the river, and every man was beheaded in the river bed or on the bank whence his blood ran into the river. The pursuit by the Muslim cavalry, the capture and return of the Persian and Arab warriors, and their killing in the river went on the rest of that day and the whole of that night and the whole of the next day and part of the next.¹ Every vanquished warrior who fell into the victors' hands was decapitated. Khalid was keeping his pledge! Not till sometime on the third day was the last man killed.

Once the killing had stopped, a group of officers gathered around Khalid on the river bank. They looked upon a messy sight. Qaqa turned to Khalid and said, “If you kill all the people of the earth their blood will not flow as long as this river is dammed. The earth will not absorb all the blood. Let the water run in the river. Thus you shall keep your pledge.”²

Others added, “We have heard that when the earth absorbs some of the blood of the sons of Adam, it refuses to accept more.”³

Khalid ordered that the dam be opened. As it was opened the water rushed over the bed of the river and the blood lying in pools on the bed flowed with the wafer. This river then became known as the River of Blood.

As night fell after the day on which the battle was fought, while the Muslim cavalry was out bringing in the fugitives, the army of Khalid sat down to eat the food of the Persians laid out upon the meal-cloths. The desert Arab marvelled at the fine fare on which the Persian soldier was fed.

The Battle of Ulleis was over. An enormous amount of booty fell into Muslim hands and included the families of the defeated imperial warriors. According to Tabari, 70,000 Persians and Christian Arabs were killed by the Muslims including those beheaded in the river.⁴ But Jaban escaped.

On the following day Khalid entered into a pact with the local inhabitants of the district. They would pay the Jizya and

¹Tabari:Vol. 2, p. 561. ²Ibid: Vol. 2, pp. 561-2.

³Ibid. ⁴Ibid.

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come under Muslim protection; but this time another clause was added to the pact: the local inhabitants would act as spies and guides for the Muslims.

The episode of the River of Blood has been twisted and exaggerated beyond all limits by certain writers who have been unable to resist the temptation of resorting to sensationalism. This has led to some misconceptions which it would be well to correct.

These writers tell us that the river actually ran with blood;

that there was a mill downstream of the battlefield powered by the water of this river; that so much blood flowed in the river that for three days the mill was grinding not with water but with blood!

This is a fantastic untruth. Balazuri makes no mention at all of any mill. Tabari, coming to the end of his account of this battle, mentions the mill, “... as related by Shuaib, who heard it from Saif, who heard it from Talha, who heard it from Mugheera.” According to Mugheera, there was a mill downstream, powered by the water of this river; this mill was used for

grinding corn for the army of Khalid for three days; and the water was red¹

In so far as this report may be correct, it still says nothing about the mill being run by blood. And there is no other mention in the early accounts of the mill. The facts are as they have been narrated above. When the dam was opened, on Qaqa's advice, the water naturally turned red and remained so for quite some time. But to run a mill with whole blood for three days would require the lives of millions of men. The story of the river running with blood for three days can be accepted as something from the Arabian Nights; it is not history.

Furthermore, to call what happened a “killing of prisoners” is an oversimplification. Normally they would have been killed in the pursuit, as had happened before and would happen again, with no questions asked. In this battle Khalid had pledged to make the river run with blood, so those thousands of men,

¹Tabari: Vol. 2, p. 562.

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instead of being killed in the pursuit, were brought to the river and killed. And that is all that there is to the episode of the River of Blood.

Of the battles which he had fought in the time of the Holy Prophet, the Battle of Mauta had a special place in the memory of Khalid. Nowhere else had he had to take command of so disastrous a situation and save the Muslims from the jaws of death. Of the battles fought in Iraq, the Battle of Ulleis was similarly engraved upon his memory.

One day, after the campaign had been fought to a successful conclusion, Khalid sat chatting with some friends. He said, “At Mauta I broke nine swords in my hand. But I have never met an enemy like the Persians. And among the Persians I have never met an enemy like the army of Ulleis.”¹

Coming from a man like Khalid, there could be no finer tribute to the valour of Persian arms. But the Persian court was now down and out. Ardsheer lay dying, and the empire would send no more armies to face the Sword of Allah. Ulleis was the swansong of Ardsheer, great-great-grandson of Anushirwan the Just.

^lTabari:Vol. 2, p.569.

23: THE CONQUEST OF HIRA

In the middle of May 633 (beginning of Rabi-ul-Awwal, 12 Hijri) Khalid marched from Ulleis towards Amgheeshiya. This place was very near Ulleis; in fact Ulleis acted as an outpost of Amgheeshiya!¹ The same morning the army reached Amgheeshiya, and found it a silent city.

Amgheeshiya was one of the great cities of Iraq—a rival to Hira in size, in the affluence of its citizens and in the richness and splendour of its markets. The Muslims arrived to find the city intact, and its markets and buildings abundantly stocked with wealth and merchandise of every kind; but of human beings there was no sign. The flower of Amgheeshiya's manhood had fallen at Ulleis. Those who remained—mainly women and children and the aged—had left the city in haste on hearing of the approach of Khalid and had taken shelter in the neighbouring countryside, away from the route of the Muslim army. The fear which the name of Khalid now evoked had become a psychological factor of the highest importance in the operations of his army.

The Muslims took Amgheeshiya as part of the legitimate spoils of war. They stripped it of everything that could be lifted and transported, and in doing so accumulated wealth that dazzled the simple warriors of the desert. After it had been thoroughly

¹Tabari: Vol. 2, p. 563. Amgheeshiya was also known as Maneeshiya.

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ransacked, Khalid destroyed the city.¹ It is believed that the spoils taken here were equal to all the booty that had been gained from the four preceding battles in Iraq; and as usual, four-fifths of the spoils were distributed among the men while one-fifth was sent to Madina as the share of the State.

By now the Caliph had become accustomed to receiving tidings of victory from the Iraq front. Every such message was followed by spoils of war which enriched the state and gladdened the hearts of the Faithful. But even Abu Bakr was amazed by the spoils of Amgheeshiya. He summoned the Muslims to the mosque and addressed them as follows:

“O Qureish! Your lion has attacked another lion and overpowered him. Women can no longer bear sons like Khalid!”²

This was one of the finest compliments ever paid to Khalid bin Al Waleed.

These were difficult days for Azazbeh, governor of Hira. He had heard of the disaster that had befallen the Persian army at Kazima, at the River, at Walaja and at Ulleis; and it was obvious that Khalid was marching on Hira. If those large armies, commanded by distinguished generals, had crumbled before the onslaught of Khalid, could he with his small army hope to resist ? There were no instructions from the ailing Emperor.

Azazbeh was the administrator of Hira as well as the commander of the garrison. He was a high official of the realm— a 50,000 dirham-man. The Arab king of Hira, lyas bin Qubeisa, who has been mentioned earlier, was a king in name only. Other chieftains who were like princes of the realm also had no governmental authority except in purely Arab or tribal matters. It fell to Azazbeh to defend Hira; and as a true son of Persia, he resolved to do his best.

He got the army garrison out of its quarters and established a camp on the outskirts of Hira. From here he sent his son forward with a cavalry group to hold the advance of Khalid, and advised him to dam the Euphrates in case Khalid should think of moving up in boats. This young officer rode out to a place where the River Ateeq joined the Euphrates, 12 miles downstream from Hira. Here he formed a base, from which he sent a cavalry detachment forward as an outpost to another

¹Tabari: Vol. 2, p. 563. ²Ibid.

The Conquest of Him 265

river junction a few miles ahead, where the Badqala flowed into the Euphrates, a little above Amgheeshiya.¹

Khalid had now resumed his march on what was to be the last leg of his journey to Hira. He decided to use the river for transport and had all the heavy loads of the army placed in boats. As the army advanced on camels and horses, the convoy of boats, manned and piloted by local Arabs, moved alongside. Khalid had not gone far, however, when the water level fell and the boats were grounded. The son of Azazbeh had dammed the river.

Leaving the army stranded at the bank of the Euphrates, Khalid took a detachment of cavalry and dashed off at a fast pace along the road to Hira. Before long he arrived at Badqala to encounter the Persian horse sent forward by the son of Azazbeh as an outpost. These green Persians were no match for the Muslim veterans; and before they could organise themselves for defence, Khalid's horsemen bore down upon them and slaughtered them down to the last man. Next Khalid opened the dam so that the water flowed once again in the right channel; and the army resumed its advance by river.

The son of Azazbeh also was not as wakeful as the situation demanded. In the belief that his outpost at Badqala was sufficient precaution against surprise by the Muslims—not for a moment doubting that the outpost would inform him of the approach of danger—he had relaxed his vigilance. Then suddenly he was hit by Khalid. Most of the Persians in this group were killed, including the young commander; but a few fast riders managed to get away to carry the sad news to Azazbeh.

From these riders Azazbeh heard of the loss of the cavalry group and the death of his son. From couriers who came from Ctesiphon he heard of the death of Ardsheer. Heartbroken at the loss of his son and staggered by the news of the Emperor's death, he found the burden of his responsibilities too heavy

¹The River Ateeq still exists. It is a very small river, hardly more than a large stream, and may have been a canal in those days. Taking off from the area of Abu Sukheir, the Ateeq flows west of the Euphrates, going up to 5 miles away from the main river, and rejoins the Euphrates a mile above modern Qadisiyya (which is 8 miles south-east of the old, historical Qadisiyya). In the latter part of its journey, this stream is also known as Dujeij. The Badqala was a canal or channel which joined the Euphrates near Amgheeshiya (Tabari: Vol. 2, p. 563).

In his account of this operation, Tabari is both confusing and confused, and has got the two river junctions mixed up.

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for his shoulders. He abandoned all intentions of defending Hira against Khalid; and crossing the Euphrates with his army, withdrew to Ctesiphon. Hira was left to the Arabs.

Khalid continued his advance towards his objective. It is not known when he abandoned the boats and took to the road, but this must have happened a few miles downstream of Hira. Expecting stiff opposition at Hira, Khalid decided not to approach it frontally. Moving his army round the left, he bypassed Hira from the west and appeared at Khawarnaq, which was a thriving town 3 miles north-north-west of Hira.¹ He passed through Khawarnaq and approached Hira from the rear. There was no opposition to his columns as they entered the city. The inhabitants were all there. They neither fled nor offered any resistance, and were left unmolested by the Muslim soldiers as they entered deeper into the city.

Soon the situation became clearer; it was a mixed situation of peace and war. Hira was an open city; the Muslims could have it. But the four citadels of Hira, each manned by strong garrisons of Christian Arabs and commanded by Arab chieftains, were prepared for defence and would fight it out. If Khalid wanted any of these citadels, he would have to fight for it.

Each of the four citadels had a palace in which the commanding chieftain lived; and each citadel was known after its palace. The citadels were: the White Palace commanded by lyas bin Qubeisa (‘King’ of Iraq); the Palace of Al Adassiyeen commanded by Adi bin Adi; the Palace of Bani Mazin commanded by Ibn Akal; and the Palace of lbn Buqeila commanded by Abdul Maseeh bin Amr bin Buqeila.

Against each citadel Khalid sent a part of his army under a subordinate general. These generals, besieging the citadels in the order in which they have been mentioned above, were: Zarrar bin Al Azwar, Zarrar bin Al Khattab (no relation of Umar), Zarrar bin Al Muqarran, and Musanna. All the generals were ordered to storm the citadels; but before doing so they would offer the garrisons the usual alternatives—Islam, the Jizya or the sword. The garrisons would have one day in which to think it over. The generals moved out with their forces

¹Nothing remains of Khawarnaq but a mound 600 yards west of the Nejef road.

The Conquest of Hira 267

and surrounded the citadels. The ultimatum was issued. The following day it was rejected by the Christian Arabs and hostilities began.

The first to launch his attack was Zarrar bin Al Azwar— against the White Palace. The defenders stood on the battlements and in addition to shooting arrows at the Muslims, used a catapult to hurl balls of clay at their assailants. Zarrar decided to knock out the catapult. Working his way forward with a picked group of archers, he got to within bow-range of the catapult and ordered a single, powerful volley of arrows. The entire crew of the catapult was killed, and many of the enemy archers too. The rest hastily withdrew from the battlements.

Similar exchanges of archery were taking place at the other citadels, though none of the others had a catapult. It was not long before the four chieftains asked for terms. They agreed to nominate one from amongst themselves who would speak for all, to negotiate directly with Khalid. The man chosen was the chieftain of the Palace of Ibn Buqeila—Abdul Maseeh bin Amr bin Buqeila.

Abdul Maseeh came out of his citadel and walked towards the Muslims. He walked slowly, for he was a very, very old man, “whose eyebrows had fallen over his eyes.”¹

Abdul Maseeh was in his time the most illustrious son of Arab Iraq. He was a prince. Known as the wisest and oldest of men, he enjoyed no official authority from the Persian court, but was held in reverence by the Iraqis and wielded considerable influence in their affairs. He also had a sparkling, if impish sense of humour. He had become a noted figure as early as the time of Anushirwan the Just. Meeting Anushirwan shortly before the latter's death, Abdul Maseeh had warned him that after him his empire would decay.

Slowly the old sage approached Khalid. When he stopped, there began one of the most unusual dialogues ever recorded by historians.

“How many years have come upon you?” asked Khalid.

“Two hundred”, replied the sage.

Awed by the great age of the man, Khalid asked, “What

¹Abu Yusuf: p. 143.

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is the most wonderful thing that you have seen?”

“The most wonderful thing that I have seen is a village between Hira and Damascus to which a woman travels from Hira with nothing more than a loaf of bread.”

He was alluding to the incomparable order and system which existed in the time of Anushirwan. The meaning of his words, however, was lost on Khalid, who concluded that the man must be stupid. Without raising his voice Khalid remarked, “Have you gained nothing from your great age but senility? I had heard that the people of Hira were cunning, deceitful scoundrels. Yet they send me a man who does not know from where he comes.”

“O Commander!” protested the sage. 'Truly do I know from where I come.”

“Where do you come from?”

“From the spine of my father!”

“Where do you come from?” Khalid repeated.

“From the womb of my mother!”

“Where are you going?”

“To my front.”

“What is to your front?”

“The end.”

“Woe to you!” exclaimed Khalid. “Where do you stand?”

“On the earth.”

“Woe to you! In what are you?”

“In my clothes.”

Khalid was now losing his patience. But he continued his questioning.

“Do you understand me?”

“Yes.”

“I only want to ask a few questions.”

“And I only want to give you the answers.”

Exasperated with this dialogue, Khalid muttered: “The earth destroys its fools, but the intelligent destroy the earth, I suppose your people know you better than I do.”

“O Commander,” replied Abdul Maseeh with humility, “it is the ant, not the camel, that knows what is in its hole!”

It suddenly struck Khalid that he was face-to-face with an unusual mind. Everything that the sage had said fell into place; every answer had meaning and humour. His tone was more

The Conquest of Hira 269

respectful as he said, “Tell me something that you remember.”

An absent look came into the eyes of Abdul Maseeh. For a few moments he looked wistfully at the towers of the citadels which rose above the rooftops of the city. Then he said, “I remember a time when ships of China sailed behind these citadels.” He was mentally again in the golden age of Anushirwan.

The preamble was over. Khalid now came to the point. “I call you to Allah and to Islam”, he said. “If you accept, you will be Muslims. You will gain what we gain, and you will bear what we bear. If you refuse, then the Jizya. And if you refuse to pay the Jizya, then I bring a people who desire death more ardently than you desire life.”

“We have no wish to fight you,” replied Abdul Maseeh, “but we shall stick to our faith. We shall pay the Jizya.”

The talks were over. Agreement had been reached. Khalid was about to dismiss the man when he noticed a small pouch hanging from the belt of a servant who had accompanied the sage and stood a few paces behind him. Khalid walked up to the servant, snatched away the pouch and emptied its contents into the palm of his hand. “What is this?” he asked the sage.

“This is a poison that works instantaneously.”

“But why the poison?”

“I feared”, replied Abdul Maseeh, “that this meeting might turn out otherwise than it has. I have reached my appointed time. I would prefer death to seeing horrors befall my people and my land.¹

In the end of May 633 (middle of Rabi-ul-Awwal, 12 Hijri) the terms of surrender were drawn up. A treaty was signed. The citadels opened their gates and peace returned to Hira. The objective given by the Caliph had been taken after four bloody battles and several smaller engagements. Khalid led a mass victory prayer of eight rakats.

According to the treaty, the people of Hira would pay the Muslim State 190,000 dirhams every year. The pact included certain supplementary clauses: Hira would give the Muslim army one saddle (the army was one saddle short!);² the people

¹This dialogue has been taken from Balazuri: (p. 244) and Tabari {Vol. 2, pp. 564-6).

²Balazuri: p. 246.

270 The Sword of Allah

of Hira would act as spies and guides for the Muslims. And then there was the clause about an Arab princess!

One day at Madina the Holy Prophet was sitting in the company of some of his followers, talking of this and that. The subject turned to foreign lands, and the Prophet remarked that soon the Muslims would conquer Hira. Thereupon one Muslim, a simple, unlettered man by the name of Shuweil,¹said eagerly, “0 Messenger of Allah! When we have conquered Hira may I have Kirama bint Abdul Maseeh?”

Kirama, the daughter of Abdul Maseeh, was a princess. The people of Arabia had heard of her as a breathtaking beauty —a woman more beautiful than any other in existence. The Prophet laughed as he replied, “She shall be yours!”²

Hira was now conquered. As Khalid's troops came to hear of his talks with Abdul Maseeh and the preparations to draw up the terms of surrender, Shuweil, who was serving under Khalid, approached the Sword of Allah. “0 Commander!” he said. “When Hira surrenders may I have Kirama bint Abdul Maseeh? She was promised to me by the Messenger of Allah.”

Khalid found it difficult to believe that the Prophet had promised a princess of the house of Abdul Maseeh to this simple fellow. “Have you any witnesses?” he asked. “Yes, by Allah!” replied Shuweil, and brought witnesses whose testimony proved the veracity of the man's statement. Khalid then included this point as a clause in the pact: Kirama bint Abdul Masseeh would be given to Shuweil!

The women of the house of Abdul Maseeh wailed in distress when they were given the devastating news. Was a princess who had lived all her life in splendour and refinement to be handed over to a crude Arab of the desert? What made the situation ludicrous was that Kirama was an old woman of 80! She had once been the leading beauty of the day, but that was a long time ago.

The princess herself solved the problem. “Take me to him”, she said. “This fool must have heard of my beauty when I was young, and thinks that youth is eternal.”² Accompanied

¹Tabari: Vol. 2, p. 569. According to Balazuri, however, this man's name was Khureim bin Aus. (p. 245).

²Ibid. ³Ibid.

The Conquest of Hira 271

by a maid, she left the Palace of Ibn Buqeila.

Excited by visions of amorous delight, Shuweil awaited his prize. Then she stood before him. The poor man's shock and dismay made a pathetic sight as he looked at the lined face. He was left speechless.

The princess broke the embarrassed silence. “Of what use is an old woman to you? Let me go!”

Now Shuweil saw his chance of making her pay for her freedom. “No,” he replied, “not except on my terms.”

“And what are your terms? State your price.”

“I am not the son of the mother of Shuweil if I let you go for less than a thousand dirhams.”

The shrewd old woman assumed a look of alarm. “A thousand dirhams!” she exclaimed.

“Yes, not a dirham less.”

Quickly the princess handed over 1,000 dirhams to the exulting Arab and returned to her family.

Shuweil rejoined his comrades, many of whom were more knowledgeable than he. Bursting with pride he told them the story: how he had released Kirama, but made her pay through the nose—1,000 dirhams!

He was quite unprepared for the laughter which greeted his boastful account. “1,000 dirhams!” his friends exclaimed. “For Kirama bint Abdul Maseeh you could have got much, much more.”

Bewildered by this remark, the simple Arab replied, “I did not know that there was a sum higher than a thousand!”

When Khalid heard the story he laughed heartily, and observed, “Man intends one thing, but Allah intends another.”¹

Once Hira was his, Khalid turned to the subjugation of other parts of Iraq, starting with the nearer districts. He wrote identical letters to the mayors and elders of the towns, offering them the usual alternatives—Islam, the Jizya or the sword. All the districts in the vicinity of Hira had the good sense to submit; and pacts were drawn up with the chiefs and mayors, laying down the rate of Jizya and assuring the inhabitants of Muslim protection. These pacts were witnessed by several Muslim officers,

¹Tabari: Vol. 2, p, 569; Balazuri: p. 245.

272 The Sword of Allah

including Khalid’s brother, Hisham, who served under him in this campaign.

Meanwhile the affairs of Persia were going from bad to worse. The Persians were split over the question of the succession to the throne. In opposition to Khalid, they were united, but this was a sterile unity, offering no positive results. With the military affairs of the Empire in disarray, Bahman had assumed the role of Commander-in-Chief, and was working feverishly to put the defences of Ctesiphon in order against a Muslim attack which he was certain would come. Bahman aimed at nothing more amibitious than the defence of Ctesiphon; and in this he was being realistic, for over the rest of the region west of the Lower Tigris the Persians had no control.

Over this region the Arab horse was now supreme. Khalid, having crushed four large Persian armies, knew that there was no further threat of a counter-offensive from Ctesiphon, and that he could venture into Central Iraq in strength. He made Hira his base of operations and flung his cavalry across the Euphrates. His mounted columns galloped over Central Iraq up to the Tigris, killing and plundering those who resisted and making peace with those who agreed to pay the Jizya. For the command of these fast-moving columns he used his most dashing generals— Zarrar bin Al Azwar, Qaqa, Musanna. By the end of June 633 (middle of Rabi-ul-Akhir, 12 Hijri) the region between the rivers was all his. There was no one to challenge his political and military authority.

Along with military conquest Khalid organised the administration of the conquered territories. He appointed officers over all the districts to see that the Jizya was promptly paid and that the local inhabitants provided intelligence about the Persians and guides for the movement of Muslim units. Khalid also sent two letters to Ctesiphon, one addressed to the court and the other to the people. The letter to the Persian court read as follows:

In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful. From Khalid bin Al Waleed to the kings of Persia.

Praise be to Allah who has disrupted your system and thwarted your designs. And if He had not done so it would have been worse for you.

Submit to our orders and we shall leave you and your

The Conquest of Hira 273

land in peace; else you shall suffer subjugation at the hands of a people who love death as you love life.¹

The letter addressed to the people was in much the same words, with the added promise of Muslim protection in return for the payment of the Jizya. Both the letters were carried by local Arabs of Hira and delivered at Ctesiphon. There was no reply!

¹Tabari: Vol. 2, p. 572.

24: ANBAR AND EIN-UT-TAMR

The portion of Central Iraq lying between the Euphrates and the Tigris, below Ctesiphon, was now under Muslim control. The inactivity of the Persians confirmed Khalid's belief that Ctesiphon was no longer in a position to interfere with his operations, let alone pose a threat to his base at Hira or his communications with the desert. Hence Khalid turned his attention to the north, where his forces had not yet ventured. There were two places which offered a likelihood of opposition—Anbar and Ein-ut-Tamr, both manned by sizable Persian garrisons and Arab warriors who would resist the advance of the Muslims. Both were governed by Persian officers. (See Map 10.)

Khalid decided to take Anbar first. This was an ancient fortified town and commercial centre to which trade caravans came from Syria and Persia. It was also famous for its large granaries. At the end of June 633 (middle of Rabi-ul-Akhir, 12 Hijri) Khalid marched from Hira with half his army (about 9,000 men), leaving behind a strong garrison at Hira and several detachments in Central Iraq. Moving along the west bank of the Euphrates, he crossed the river somewhere below Anbar. As his scouts moved out eastwards to keep the approaches from Ctesiphon under observation, he moved the army to Anbar and laid siege to the town. The Muslims found that the town was protected not only by the walls of the fort, but also by a deep moat

Anbar and Ein-ut-Tamr 275

filled with water. The moat was within close bow-range of the wall so that those attempting to cross it would have to face accurate fire from archers on the walls. The bridges over the moat had been destroyed at the approach of the Muslims.¹

Anbar was the chief town of the district of Sabat, which lay between the two rivers west of Ctesiphon. In Anbar resided the governor of Sabat, a man named Sheerzad who was known more for his intellect and learning than his military ability. Sheerzad was now faced with the task of defending the fort against a Muslim army with the forces under his command—the Persian garrison and a large number of Arab auxiliaries in whom apparently he had little faith.

The day after his arrival Khalid moved up to examine the defences of the fort. On top of the wall he saw thousands of Persians and Arabs standing around carelessly in groups, looking at the Muslims as if watching a tournament. Amazed at this sight, Khalid remarked, “I see that these people know nothing about war.”²

He collected 1,000 archers—the best of his marksmen—and explained his plan. They would move up casually to the edge of the moat with bows ready, but arrows not fitted. At his command they would instantly fit arrows to their bows and fire salvo after salvo at the garrison. “Aim at the eyes”, Khalid told the archers. “Nothing but the eyes!”³

The detachment of archers moved towards the fort. The crowds standing on the wall gaped at the archers, wondering what they would do next. When the archers had got to the moat, Khalid gave the order, and 1,000 swift missiles flew across the moat, followed by another 1,000 and yet another. In a few seconds the garrison had lost 1,000 eyes. A clamour went up in the town:

“The eyes of the people of Anbar are lost!” As a result of this action the Battle of Anbar is also known as the Battle of the Eyes.⁴

When Sheerzad heard of the misfortune that had befallen the garrison, he sent Khalid an offer to surrender the fort if

¹Nothing remains of Anbar except some mounds 3 miles north-west of the present Faluja and about a mile from the Euphrates. One can still pick up pieces of old pottery on the mounds which cover an area half a mile square. According to Yaqut (Vol. 1, p. 367), the Persians called this town Firoz Sabur.

²Tabari:Vol.2, p.575.

³Ibid. ⁴Ibid.

276 The Sword of Allah

suitable terms were agreed upon. Khalid rejected the offer; the surrender would have to be unconditional. Sheerzad half-heartedly decided to continue resistance.

Khalid resolved to storm the fort. The wall would have to be scaled, but this was not too difficult a task. The chief problem was crossing the moat, which was deep and wide. There were no boats available, nor material with which to make boats or rafts; and the Arab of the desert was no swimmer. Khalid decided to make a bridge of flesh and bone.

For the assault he selected a point where the moat was narrowest, near the main gate of the fort. He placed his archers in a position from which they could shoot at enemy archers on that part of the wall which overlooked the crossing site, and gave them the task of preventing the enemy archers from shooting at the moat.

Khalid then ordered the collection of all the old and weak camels of the army. These jaded animals were led forward to the edge of the moat and under the covering fire provided by the Muslim archers, were slaughtered in twos and threes and thrown into the moat. Rapidly the pile of carcasses rose until it formed a firm though uneven bridge above the level of the water. Then a group of Khalid's warriors, on receiving his command, rushed on to the bridge of flesh and bone and crossed over to the far side of the moat.

As these warriors prepared to scale the wall, the gate of the fort opened and a body of Persians sallied out to drive the Muslims into the moat. There was some vicious fighting between the two groups, but the Muslims succeeded in repulsing this counter-attack: and the Persians, fearing that the Muslims might get into the fort by the gate, withdrew hastily and closed the gate behind them. All this while the Muslim archers kept shooting at the Persian and Arab archers on the wall, making it impossible for them to interfere with the bridge-building and the crossing operation.

Khalid was about to order the scaling of the wall when an emissary of Sheerzad appeared on the gate and delivered another offer from the governor: he would surrender the fort if the Muslims would let him and the Persians depart in safety. Khalid took another look at the wall. He could see that its scaling and the subsequent fighting inside the fort would not be easy. So he told

Anbar and Ein-ut-Tamr 277

the envoy that he would agree to the terms provided the Persians left all their possessions behind.

Sheerzad was only too glad to be allowed to get away, and accepted Khalid's terms with relief. The next day the Persian soldiers and their families departed for Ctesiphon and the Muslims entered the fort. The Christian Arabs laid down their arms and agreed to pay the Jizya. This happened in the second week of July 633 (end of Rabi-ul Akhir, 12 Hijri). Over the next few days, Khalid received the submission of all the clans living in the neighbourhood of Anbar.

Sheerzad journeyed with the Persian garrison to Ctesiphon, where he was severely rebuked by Bahman. Like any ineffective commander, Sheerzad blamed his troops—in this case the Christian Arabs. “I was among a people who have no sense,” he lamented, “and whose roots are among the Arabs.”¹

Khalid appointed an administrator over Anbar, and then once again set out with the army. He re-crossed the Euphrates and marched south. As he neared Ein-ut-Tamr, he found a purely Arab army deployed across his path in battle array.

Ein-ut-Tamr was a large town surrounded by date plantations, and is believed to have been named after its dates: Ein-ut-Tamr means Spring of Dates.² Garrisoned by Persian soldiers and Arab auxiliaries, this town was in a much stronger position than Anbar to oppose the advance of Khalid. The Persian commander of Ein-ut-Tamr was Mehran bin Bahram Jobeen who was not only an able general but also a wily politician. The Persian garrison of Ein-ut-Tamr was larger, and the Arabs here belonged to the proud, fierce tribe of Namr which considered itself second to none. And there were Christian Arab clans which joined the Namr to put up a united front against the Muslims. The commander of all the Arabs was a renowned chief, Aqqa bin Abi Aqqa.

When Arab scouts brought word of the Muslims marching from Anbar in the direction of Ein-ut-Tamr, Aqqa went to

¹Tabari:Vol. 2, p. 575.

²Ein-ut-Tamr, of which nothing remains but a spring, was located 10 miles west-north-west of the present Shisasa. Shisasa is also called Ein-ut-Tamr these days, but the original Spring of Dates was situated as indicated above.

278 The Sword of Allah

the Persian commander. “Arabs know best how to fight Arabs,” he said. “Let me deal with Khalid.”

Mehran nodded agreement. “True”, he observed wisely. “You know better how to fight Arabs. And when it comes to fighting non-Arabs you are like us.”¹

Aqqa was flattered by the compliment. Seeing that his words were having the desired effect, Mehran continued: “You go and fight Khalid. And if you should need help, we shall be waiting here to come to your assistance.”²

A number of Persian officers were standing beside Mehran during this exchange. When Aqqa had left, they questioned their commander: “What made you talk like that to this dog?”

“Leave this matter to me”, Mehran replied. “I plan what is best for you and worst for them. If these Arabs win, the victory shall be ours too. If they lose, they will at least have weakened the army of Khalid, and we shall then fight when our enemy is tired and we are fresh.”³

The Persians remained at Ein-ut-Tamr while the Arabs moved up about 10 miles on the road to Anbar. There Aqqa deployed his Arab army for battle.

When Khalid arrived to face Aqqa, he was surprised to find an exclusively Arab force arrayed against him; for so far all his battles in Iraq had been fought against mixed forces of Persians and Arabs. However, he deployed his army with the usual centre and wings and placed himself in front of the centre, accompanied by a strong bodyguard. Across the battlefield, in front of the Arab centre, stood Aqqa. Khalid decided that he would take Aqqa alive.

When forming up the Muslims, Khalid had instructed the commanders of the wings to engage the enemy wings on his signal but not to attack with any great violence—only enough to tie down the enemy wings before he launched the attack of the centre. Now Khalid gave the signal, and the Muslim wings moved forward and engaged the opposing wings. For some time this action continued. Aqqa was left perplexed about why the Muslim centre was not attacking. Then Khalid, followed by his bodyguard, charged at Aqqa.

^lTabari: Vol.2, p.576.

²Ibid: p. 576.

³Ibid: p.577.

Anbar and Ein-ut-Tamr 279

The bodyguard engaged the Arab warriors who stood near Aqqa, while Khalid and Aqqa began to duel. Aqqa was a brave and skilful fighter, prepared to give as good as he took; but to his dismay he soon found himself overpowered and captured by Khalid. When the soldiers in the Arab centre saw their commander captive, may of them surrendered and the rest of the centre turned and fled. Its example was followed by the wings; and the Arab army, leaving many of its officers in Muslim hands, retreated in haste to Ein-ut-Tamr.

The Arabs arrived at the fort to find the Persians gone. Mehran had sent a few scouts to watch the battle and report its progress. As soon as they saw the Arabs turn their backs to Khalid, these scouts galloped back to inform Mehran of the Arab defeat. Without wasting a moment Mehran led his army out of Ein-ut-Tamr and marched off to Cetsiphon. Discovering that they had been abandoned, the Arabs rushed into the fort, closed the gates, and prepared rather uncertainly for a siege.

The Muslims arrived and besieged the fort. Aqqa and the prisoners were paraded outside the fort, so that the defenders could see that their commander and comrades were helpless captives. This had an unnerving effect on the defenders, who called for a surrender on terms, but Khalid rejected the call. There would be no terms; they could surrender unconditionally and place themselves at his mercy. The Arab elders debated the situation for a while, and then decided that an unconditional surrender involved less risk than fighting on; for in the latter case their chances of survival would be slim indeed. In the end of July 633 (middle of Jamadi-ul-Awwal, 12 Hijri) the defenders of Ein-ut-Tamr surrendered to Khalid.

On the orders of Khalid, warriors who had defended the fort and those who had fought the Muslims on the road to Anbar were beheaded.¹ These included the chief Aqqa bin Abi Aqqa. The remainder were made captive, and the wealth of Ein-ut-Tamr was taken and distributed as spoils of war.

In Ein-ut-Tamr there was a monastery in which the Muslims found 40 boys—mainly Arabs—who were being trained for the priesthood. They were all taken captive. Among these captives there was a boy called Nuseir, who was later to have a son called Musa, and Musa would become famous as the Mus-

¹Tabari: Vol. 2, p 577.

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lim governor of North Africa and the man who launched Tariq bin Ziyad into Spain.

After a few days spent in dealing with problems of organisation and administration, Khalid prepared to return to Hira. He was about to set out when he received a call for help from Northern Arabia. After a brief consideration of this request, Khalid changed the direction of his march and gave his men a new destination—Daumat-ul-Jandal.

25: DAUMAT-UL-JANDAL AGAIN

Daumat-ul-Jandal was one of the large commercial towns of Arabia, widely known for its rich and much-frequented market. It was also an important communication centre, a meeting point of routes from Central Arabia, Iraq and Syria. In Part I of this book, I have described how Khalid came to Daumat-ul-Jandal during the Prophet's expedition to Tabuk and captured Ukeidar bin Abdul Malik, the master of the fort. Ukeidar had then submitted and sworn allegiance to the Prophet, but subsequent to the operations of Amr bin Al Aas and Shurahbeel bin Hasana in the apostasy, he had broken his oath and decided to have nothing more to do with Madina. Now he ruled over a principality of Christians and pagans.

At about the time when Khalid set off from Yamama for the invasion of Iraq, Abu Bakr had sent Ayaz bin Ghanam to capture Daumat-ul-Jandal and once again bring the northern tribes into submission. The Caliph probably intended to send Ayaz to Iraq, to assist Khalid, after this task had been completed. Ayaz arrived at Daumat-ul-Jandal to find it strongly defended by the Kalb—a large Christian Arab tribe inhabiting this region and the eastern fringe of Syria. He deployed his force against the southern face of the fort, and the situation that now developed was, from the military point of view, absurd. The Christian Arabs considered themselves to be under siege, but the

282 The Sword of Allah

routes from the northern side of the fort were open. The Muslims, engaged closely against the fort, considered themselves so heavily committed that they could not break contact. According to early historians both sides were under siege! The operations consisted mainly of archery and sallies by the garrison of the fort, which were invariably repulsed by the Muslims. This state of affairs continued for several weeks until both sides felt equally tired and equally hurt by the stalemate.

Then one day a Muslim officer said to Ayaz, “In certain circumstances wisdom is better than a large army. Send to Khalid for help.”¹ Ayaz agreed. He wrote Khalid a letter explaining the situation at Daumat-ul-Jandal and seeking his help. This letter reached Khalid as he was about to leave Ein-ut-Tamr for Hira.

It did not take Khalid long to make up his mind. The situation on the Iraq front was now stable and he had able lieutenants to deal with the Persians, should they decide to launch a counter-offensive from Ctesiphon. He sent a letter to Qaqa at Hira telling him that he would act as Khalid's deputy and command the front in his absence. He left a garrison at Ein-ut-Tamr. And with an army of about 6,000 men, he left Ein-ut-Tamr the following day to join Ayaz. Ahead of him sped Ayaz's messenger, carrying Khalid's letter, which contained nothing more than the following in verse:

Wait a while for the horses come racing.

On their backs are lions brandishing polished swords;

Regiments in the wake of regiments.

The movement of Khalid was discovered by the defenders of Daumat-ul-Jandal a good many days before his arrival, and there was alarm in the fort. With their present strength they could hold off the Muslim force under Ayaz, but they would not have a chance if Khalid's army also took the field against them. In desperate haste they sent couriers racing to neighbouring tribes. The Christian Arab tribes responded spiritedly to the appeal for help. Contingents from several clans of the Ghassan and the Kalb joined the defenders of the fort, many of them camping under the fort walls because of insufficient room within. This put Ayaz in a delicate situation, and he prayed for the early arrival of Khalid.

The Christian Arab forces were led by two great chiefs:

¹Tabari:Vol.2, p.578.

Daumat'ul-Jandal Again 283

Judi bin Rabee'a and Ukeidar. The only chief who had any personal experience of dealing with Khalid was Ukeidar, and this man had been ill at ease ever since he heard of the march of Khalid from Ein-ut-Tamr. When the clans gathered at Daumat-ul-Jandal, Ukeidar called a conference of the tribal chiefs. “I know more about Khalid than anyone else”, he said. “No man is luckier than he. No man is his equal in war. No people face Khalid in battle, be they strong or weak, but are defeated. Take my advice and make peace with him.”¹

But they spurned his advice and determined to fight it out with Khalid. Ukeidar, however, had by now completely lost his nerve. He could not bring himself to face another encounter with the Sword of Allah, and one night he slipped out of the fort and set off on the road to Jordan. But it was too late. Khalid's army had just arrived and one of his mounted detachments, under Asim bin Amr, intercepted and captured the fleeing chief.

Again Ukeidar stood before Khalid. If he hoped that memories of the peaceful ending of their last encounter would kindle a spark of kindness in the heart of Khalid, he was mistaken. In Khalid's mind the situation could not be clearer: Ukeidar had broken his oath of allegiance; he was a rebel. Khalid ordered the execution of Ukeidar, and the sentence was carried out without delay. This was the end of Ukeidar bin Abdul Malik, prince of the Kinda, master of Daumat-ul-Jandal.

The following day Khalid took Ayaz under command and incorporated his detachment into his own army. He deployed Ayaz's men on the south of the fort to block the Arabian route; positioned part of his army of Iraq to the east, the north and the west of the fort, covering the routes to Iraq and Jordan; and kept the remainder back as a strong reserve. Khalid appreciated that at present the fort was strongly manned and to storm it in its present state would prove a costly operation. He therefore decided to wait, in the hope that the defenders, tiring of the siege, would sally out to fight him in the open. Then he could inflict the maximum damage upon them and storm the fort after the garrison had been weakened. He accordingly held his forces some distance back from the fort.

With the departure of Ukeidar the entire Christian Arab

¹Tabari: Vol. 2, p. 578.

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army had come under the command of Judi bin Rabee'a. Judi waited for the Muslims to make the first move, but the Muslims remained inactive. When some time had passed and Judi saw that the besiegers were making no attempt to close up on the fort, he became impatient for a clash with Khalid. Consequently he ordered two sallies. One group would attack Ayaz on the Arabian route while the other, a large group comprising his own clan, the Wadee'a, operating under his direct command, would attack Khalid's camp to the north.

Ayaz drove back the Arabs who came out to attack him. Leaving behind many dead, they hastily returned to the fort and closed the gate. This group was lucky. It had only had to face an inexperienced general like Ayaz bin Ghanam and men who were not of the calibre of the hardened veterans of Khalid.

The other and larger group—the clan of Wadee'a operating under Judi—came out at the same time as the group against Ayaz, and made for Khalid, who stood back from the fort and deployed his army for battle. Seeing no move from Khalid's side, Judi became bolder. He formed up his clan for battle and advanced to meet Khalid. The two forces were now very close, and Judi imagined that he would send the Muslims reeling from the battlefield. Then suddenly Khalid struck at Judi with the utmost violence and speed.

The Arabs never knew just what hit them. In minutes they had collapsed like a house of cards. Judi was captured along with hundreds of his clansmen, while the rest, losing all cohesion and order, fled in panic towards the fort. The Muslims were not just pursuing them; they were with them, among them, all over them. If the first to reach the gate of the fort was a Christian Arab, the second was a Muslim. The Arabs who had remained in the fort saw a horde rushing towards the gate of which at least half was Muslim. They closed the gate in the face of their comrades, and the clan of Wadee'a which had sallied out with Judi was locked out. Hundreds were made prisoner by the Muslims. The rest perished—some in the short violent battle and the rest in the pursuit to and the fighting at the gate. It was with bitterness that they recollected the counsel of Ukeidar. Such indeed was Khalid! But now it was too late.

The first part of Khalid's plan had been accomplished. He next moved the army close to the fort to let the defenders

Daumat'ul-Jandal Again 285

see that there was no possibility of escape, and then called upon the garrison to surrender, but the garrison refused to comply.

Khalid had Judi and his captive clansmen paraded near the fort for all to see. Then, under the horrified gaze of the defenders, Judi and the captives were beheaded. But this, instead of breaking the spirit of the defenders of Daumat-ul-Jandal, as Khalid had hoped, hardened their determination to fight to the last.

The siege continued for a number of days. Then one day Khalid stormed the fort. The defenders put up such resistance as they could, but against the superb, battle-conditioned troops of Khalid they never had a chance. Most of the garrison was slaughtered, but women and children and many youths were taken captive. This happened in about the last week of August 633 (middle of Jamadi-ul-Akhir, 12 Hijri).

Khalid had always been attracted by beautiful women. And he appears to have had an especial fondness for the womenfolk of the chiefs who fought him. He purchased the lovely daughter of Judi and kept her as a slave!

Khalid spent the next few days in settling the affairs of Daumat-ul-Jandal. Then he set off for Hira, taking Ayaz with him as a subordinate general. He would return to find the situation in Iraq somewhat altered, for the Persians were on the warpath again.

26: THE LAST OPPOSITION

Khalid had not gone from Ein-ut-Tamr many days when word of his departure arrived at the Persian court. It was believed that Khalid had returned to Arabia with a large part of his army; and Ctesiphon breathed more easily. After a few days this mood of relief passed and was replaced by an angry desire to throw the Muslims back into the desert and regain the territories and the prestige which the Empire had lost. The Persians had resolved not to fight Khalid again; but they were quite prepared to fight the Muslims without Khalid.

Bahman set to work. By now he had organised a new army, made up partly of the survivors of Ulleis, partly of veterans drawn from garrisons in other parts of the Empire, and partly of fresh recruits. This army was now ready for battle. With its numerous raw recruits, however, it was not of the same quality as the armies which had fought Khalid south of the Euphrates. Bahman decided not to commit this army to battle until its strength had been augmented by the large forces of Christian Arabs who remained loyal to the Empire. He therefore initiated parleys with the Arabs.

The Christian Arabs responded willingly and eagerly to the overtures of the Persian court. Apart from the defeat at Ein-ut-Tamr, the incensed Arabs of this area also sought revenge for the killing of their great chief, Aqqa. They were anxious, too, to regain

MAP 14: THE LAST OPPOSITION

288 The Sword of Allah

the lands which they had lost to the Muslims, and to free the comrades who had been captured by the invaders. A large number of clans began to prepare for war.

Bahman divided the Persian forces into two field armies and sent them off from Ctesiphon. One, under Ruzbeh, moved to Huseid, and the other, under Zarmahr, moved to Khanafis. For the moment these two armies were located in separate areas for ease of movement and administration, but they were not to proceed beyond these locations until the Christian Arabs were ready for battle. Bahman planned to concentrate the entire imperial army to either await a Muslim attack or march south to fight the Muslims at Hira.

But the Christian Arabs were not yet ready. They were forming into two groups: the first, under a chief named Huzeil bin Imran, was concentrating at Muzayyah; the second, under the chief Rabee'a bin Bujeir, was gathering at two places close to each other—Saniyy and Zumeil (which was also known as Bashar). These two groups, when ready, would join the Persians and form one large, powerful army. (See Map 14.)

It was while these preparations were in progress that Qaqa, commanding the Iraq front in the absence of Khalid, took counter-measures. He pulled back some of the detachments which Khalid had sent across the Euphrates and concentrated them at Hira. And he sent two regiments forward—one to Huseid and the other to Khanafis. The commanders of these regiments were ordered to remain in contact with the Persian forces at these places, to delay the advance of the Persians, should they decide to push forward, and to keep Qaqa informed of Persian strengths and movements. These regiments moved to their respective objectives and made contact with the Persians. In the mean time, Qaqa kept the rest of the army in readiness to take the field.

This was the situation that greeted Khalid on his arrival at Hira in the fourth week of September 633 (middle of Rajab, 12 Hijri). The situation could assume dangerous proportions, but only if the four imperial forces succeeded in uniting and took offensive action against Hira. Any plan that the Muslims adopted

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would have to cater for two strategical requirements: (a) to prevent the concentration of the imperial forces into one great, invincible army, and (b) to guard Hira against the enemy in one sector while the Muslims operated against the enemy in the other.

Khalid decided to fight the operation in a way which had now become typical of him. He would take the offensive and destroy each imperial force separately in situ. With this strategy in mind, he divided the Muslim garrison of Hira into two corps, one of which he placed under Qaqa and the other under Abu Leila. Khalid sent them both to Ein-ut-Tamr, where he would join them a little later, after the troops who had fought at Daumat-ul-Jandal had been rested.

A few days later the entire Muslim army was concentrated at Ein-ut-Tamr, except for a small garrison left under Ayaz bin Ghanam to look after Hira. The army was now organised in three corps of about 5,000 men each, one of which was kept in reserve. Khalid sent Qaqa to Huseid and Abu Leila to Khanafis with orders to destroy the Persian armies at those places. The two generals were to take command of the Muslim regiments already deployed in their respective sectors. It was Khalid's intention to fight both Persian armies speedily as well as simultaneously, so that neither could get away while the other was being slashed to pieces. But this was not to be; for the march to Khanafis was longer than to Huseid, and Abu Leila failed to move his forces with sufficient speed to make up for this difference. Meanwhile Khalid remained with his reserve corps at Ein-ut-Tamr to guard against any offensive movement from Saniyy and Zumeil towards Hira.

Qaqa marched to Huseid, and Abu Leila followed him out of Ein-ut-Tamr on his way to Khanafis, both proceeding on separate routes to their objectives. As Qaqa neared his objective, Ruzbeh, the Persian commander at Huseid, sent an appeal for help to Zarmahr, the Persian commander at Khanafis. Zarmahr would not send his army to Huseid, because he had to have Bahman's permission before he could move the army from Khanafis. But he went to Huseid in person to see things for himself, and arrived just in time to take part in the Battle of Huseid, which was fought about the middle of October 633 (first week of Shaban, 12 Hijri).

290 The Sword of Allah

As soon as Qaqa arrived at Huseid, he deployed his corps and launched it against the Persian army, which was much larger in strength. Ruzbeh was slain by Qaqa. Zarmahr also stepped forward with a challenge which was accepted by a Muslim officer who killed him. There was no dearth of courage among the Persians, but they were nevertheless roundly defeated by Qaqa and driven from the battlefield. Leaving behind a large number of dead, the Persians retreated in haste to Khanafis, where they joined the other Persian army, now under the command of another general, named Mahbuzan.

The Persian survivors of Huseid arrived at Khanafis only a short while before the corps of Abu Leila. Reports of the Muslims' approach had been received. Being a sensible general, Mahbuzan drew the right lesson from the defeat at Huseid and decided to avoid battle with the Muslims. Setting off at once from Khanafis, he moved to Muzayyah where he joined the Arab force gathered under the command of Huzeil bin Imran. So Abu Leila arrived at Khanafis to find the Persians gone. He occupied Khanafis and informed Khalid of the departure of the Persians for Muzayyah.

At Ein-ut-Tamr Khalid heard of the defeat of the Persian army at Huseid. He next heard of the movement of the second Persian army, along with the remnants of the first, from Khanafis to Muzayyah. This move left Ctesiphon uncovered and vulnerable to attack, though it would no doubt have a garrison for local defence. Muzayyah now contained the strongest concentration of imperial forces. The Arab concentrations at Saniyy and Zumeil, on the other hand, ceased to be a threat to Hira, as with the reverses suffered by the Persians at Huseid and Khanafis, these Arabs were not likely to venture out of their camps with aggressive intentions.

Khalid now had a choice of three objectives: the imperial capital, the imperial army at Muzayyah, and the Arab force at Saniyy and Zumeil. He considered the possibility of attacking Ctesiphon, but discarded it for two reasons. Firstly, according to Tabari, he feared the displeasure of the Caliph which he would earn by an attack on Ctesiphon.¹ Abu Bakr apparently did not

¹For Khalid's mission in Iraq, see Note 4 on Appendix B.

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wish it. Secondly, and this was a purely military consideration, by advancing to Ctesiphon he would expose his flank and rear to the strong forces at Muzayyah. These forces could then either attack him in the rear while he was engaged with Ctesiphon, or advance and capture his base at Hira, severing his communications with the desert.

Of the two remaining objectives, Khalid selected Muzayyah. The other was a smaller objective and could be dealt with later without difficulty. By now the exact location of the imperial camp at Muzayyah had been established by Khalid's agents, and to deal with this objective he designed a manoeuvre which, seldom practised in history, is one of the most difficult to control and co-ordinate—a simultaneous converging attack from three directions made at night.

Khalid first issued orders for the move. The three corps would march from their respective locations at Huseid, Khanafis and Ein-ut-Tamr, along separate routes he had specified between the Euphrates and the Saniyy-Zumeil line, and meet on a given night and at a given hour at a place a few miles short of Muzayyah. This move was carried out as planned, and the three corps concentrated at the appointed place. Here Khalid gave orders for the attack. He laid down the time of the attack and the three separate directions from which the three corps would fall upon the unsuspecting enemy. He was putting his army to a severe test of precision; only a highly efficient military machine could carry out such a finely timed manoeuvre at night.

And so this manoeuvre was carried out. The Persians and the Arabs slept peacefully, for the last reported locations of the Muslim corps showed them at a considerable distance And there was no apparent danger of a surprise attack. This proved to be their last night in Muzayyah. The imperial army knew of the attack only when three roaring masses of Muslim warriors hurled themselves at the camp.

In the confusion of the night and the panic of the moment the imperial army never found its feet. Terror became the mood of the camp as soldiers fleeing from one Muslim corps ran into another. Thousands were slaughtered. The Muslims struck to finish this army as completely as they had finished the army of Andarzaghar at Walaja; but large numbers of Persians and Arabs nevertheless managed to get away, helped by the very darkness,

292 The Sword of Allah

that had cloaked the surprise attack.

By the time the sun rose over the eastern horizon no living warrior of the imperial army remained at Muzayyah. We do not know the fate of the Persian general, Mahbuzan, but the Arab commander, Huzeil bin Imran, made good his escape and joined the Arab force at Zumeil.

This action took place in the first week of November 633 (fourth week of Shaban, 12 Hijri). The manoeuvre had worked beautifully; the timing was perfect!

Among the Arabs who lost their lives at Muzayyah were two Muslims. These men had travelled to Madina a short while before the invasion of Iraq and had met Abu Bakr, accepted Islam and returned to live among their Christian clansmen.When Madina heard of the death of these two Muslims at the hands of Khalid's army, Umar walked up to the Caliph and angrily denounced what he called the tyranny of Khalid; but Abu Bakr shrugged it off with the remark: “This happens to those who live among infidels.”¹ Nevertheless, he ordered that blood-money be paid to their families. As for Khalid, the Caliph repeated his now famous words: “I shall not sheathe the sword that Allah has drawn against the infidels.”

From Muzayyah, Khalid turned to Saniyy and Zumeil. Saniyy was closer and thus became the first objective, for which Khalid decided to repeat the manoeuvre of Muzayyah. His army would operate in three corps as before. From Muzayyah the corps would march on separate axes and converge for the attack on Saniyy on a predetermined night and time. Khalid advanced on the direct route from Muzayyah while the other corps moved wide on his flanks. On the appointed night and at the appointed time—in the second week of November 633 (first week of Ramazan, 12 Hijri)—the three corps fell upon the Arab camp at Saniyy. This time even fewer Arabs survived the slaughter. The women and children and many youths, however, were spared and taken captive. The Arab commander, Rabee'a bin Bujeir, also met his death, and his beautiful daughter was captured;. but she was not taken by Khalid. She was sent to Madina, where

¹Tabari: Vol. 2, p. 581.

The Last Opposition 293

she became the wife of Ali.¹

Khalid was now manoeuvring his army with the effortlessness with which one might move pieces on a chessboard. Two or three nights after Saniyy he did the same to Zumeil—three corps attacking from different directions—and the Arabs at Zumeil too were swallowed up by the earthquake which hit Muzayyah and Saniyy.²

Once he had disposed of the captives and the booty taken at Zumeil, Khalid turned his steps towards Ruzab, where Hilal, the son of Aqqa, was gathering more Arab clans to avenge his father's death. But when the Muslims arrived at Ruzab not a soul was to be seen. At the last moment these Arabs had decided that further resistance was futile and had melted away into the desert.

Khalid could now sit back and rejoice over his victories. In less than a month he had crushed large imperial forces in four separate battles covering an operational area whose length measured 100 miles. He had done this by exploiting the tremendous mobility of his mounted army, by the use of audacity and surprise, and by violent offensive action. He had accomplished the mission given by the Caliph; there was no opposition left for him to crush. The Persians had ventured out of the imperial capital on hearing of Khalid's departure from Ein-ut-Tamr; but Khalid had returned and done it again. Ctesiphon withdrew into its shell.

Several raids were launched by Khalid into the region between the rivers. Places which had so far not felt the heavy hand of war now echoed to the tread of Muslim cavalry and the call of “Allah is Great!” But the humble masses of Iraq were left unmolested. These people considered the arrival of the Muslims a blessing; for they brought order and stability such as had not been known since the golden years of Anushirwan the Just.

But it was not in Khalid's nature to sit back and take his ease. It was in his nature to be discontented with past achievements, ever seeking fresh glory and striving towards distant horizons. The Persian capital seemed reluctant to slake his thirst

^lTabari:Vol.2, p.582.

²There is uncertainty about the location of these four battlefields. For an explanation see Note 6 in Appendix B.

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for battle by sending more armies against him; so it was a pleasure for Khalid to be reminded that a strong Persian garrison still existed on the Euphrates at Firaz (near present day Abu Kamal-see Map at endpaper), which marked the frontier between the empires of Persia and Eastern Rome. This was the only Persian garrison left west of Ctesiphon; and since he had been instructed by the Caliph to “fight the Persians”, Khalid decided to eliminate this force also. He marched to Firaz. On arrival here in the first week of December 633 (end of Ramazan, 12 Hijri), Khalid found two garrisons—a Persian and a Roman. These garrisons, representing empires which in the preceding two decades had fought each other in a long and costly war, now united to battle the Muslims, and were joined in this purpose by many local Christian Arab clans.

For more than six weeks nothing happened. The two armies stood and glared at each other across the Euphrates, the Muslims on the south bank and the Romans and Persians on the north bank, neither side willing to cross the river. Then, on January 21, 634 (the 15th of Zu Qad, 12 Hijri) Khalid was able to entice the allies across the Euphrates onto his side; and their crossing was hardly complete when he attacked them with his usual speed and violence. Thousands of them were slain before the rest found safety in flight.

This was neither a great nor a decisive battle; nor was the enemy force a very large one, as some early historians have stated. (No Persian strategist in his senses would leave a powerful garrison in a peaceful frontier town like Firaz while Central and Western Iraq was being lost and Ctesiphon itself was threatened.) Its importance lies only in the fact that it was the last battle in a brilliant campaign.

Khalid spent the next 10 days at Firaz. Then, on January 31, 634, the army left Firaz on its way to Hira. For this march it was formed into an advance guard, a main body and a rear guard; and Khalid let it be known that he would travel with the rear guard. But as the rear guard filed out of Firaz, Khalid and a few close friends struck out on their own in a southerly direction. They were off to Mecca, to perform the pilgrimage which was due in a fortnight. This was to be a peaceful adventure; almost an escapade!

The actual route taken by Khalid is not known. All that

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is known is that he and his comrades traversed a trackless waste — a difficult and inhospitable region which no guides knew and into which even bandits feared to enter.¹ But they made it. At Mecca they performed the pilgrimage inconspicuously to avoid being recognised. Then they rushed back to Iraq. The speed at which Khalid and his wild, adventurous comrades travelled can be judged by the fact that the Muslim rear guard had not yet entered Hira when Khalid rejoined it. He rode into Hira with the rear guard as if he had been there all the time! Only the commander of the rear guard had known the secret; but the men did wonder why Khalid and a few others had shaven heads!²

Shortly after this adventure, Khalid went out on another. Tiring of the peace and quiet which now prevailed in Iraq, he decided to lead a raid in person in the area close to Ctesiphon. Along with Musanna he raided the prosperous market of Baghdad and returned laden with spoils.

If Khalid had hoped that he would not be recognised in Mecca, he was mistaken. He had hardly got back from the raid on Baghdad when he received a letter from Abu Bakr warning him “not to do it again!” The warning was accompanied by another great mission: Khalid was to proceed to Syria. The Campaign in Iraq was over.³

The invasion of Iraq was a splendid success. The Muslims had fought several bloody battles with Persian armies much larger in size, and they not only won every battle but also inflicted crushing defeats on the Persians and their Arab auxiliaries. And the Persian Army was the most fearsome military machine of the time!

Khalid's strategy in this campaign, and it was one from which he never deviated, was to fight his battles close to the desert, with his routes to the desert open in case he should suffer a reverse. The desert was not only a haven of security into which the Persians would not venture but also a region of free, fast

¹Tabari: Vol. 2, p. 583.

²It is traditional for Muslims to shave the head when they perform the pilgrimage.

³For an explanation of the dates of the battles in this campaign see Note 7 in Appendix B.

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movement in which he could move easily and rapidly to any objective that he chose. He did not enter deep into Iraq until the Persian Army had lost its ability to threaten his routes to the desert.

The Persian military strategy was conditioned by the political necessity of defending the imperial borders, and this led to their fighting their battles with the Muslims on the boundary between the desert and the sown, as Khalid wished. But within this political limitation, they followed a sound course and planned a massive concentration of strength for battle. Qarin should have joined Hormuz; Bahman should have joined Andarzaghar; and Ruzbeh and Zarmahr should have joined the Arab forces at Muzayyah and Saniyy-Zumeil. Had these combinations taken place, the campaign may have taken an altogether different course. But they did not take place, thanks to Khalid’s fast movement and his deliberate design to bring the various armies to battle one by one, separating them from each other in time and space.

The main instruments that Khalid used to make his ambitious manoeuvres successful were the fighting quality of the Muslims and the mobility of the army. These he exploited to the limits of human and animal endurance. Though only part of his army was actual cavalry, the entire army was camel-mounted for movement and could strike at the decisive place and the decisive time as its commander wished. It could move fast enough to fight a battle at A, and then be present at B for another battle before the enemy could react.

There is no record of the strength of the Persian forces which faced Khalid in the various battles, or of the casualties suffered by either side. Certain casualty figures given for the Persians are probably exaggerated. What is certain is that they were very large armies and suffered staggering losses, especially at Walaja, Ulleis, Muzayyah and Saniyy-Zumeil, where they ceased to exist as effective fighting forces. The Persian armies that faced Khalid at Kazima, Maqil, Walaja and Ulleis probably numbered between 30,000 and 50,000 men. An enemy force up to two or three times their strength would not worry Khalid and his stalwarts. They would take it in their stride. Nor would armies of this size be too large by Persian standards. (At the Battle of Qadisiyya, fought three years later, the Persians

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fielded an army of 60,000 men!) As for Muslim casualties, considering that the army remained at a high level of effectiveness throughout the campaign, they must have been light.

Above all, it was the personality of Khalid that made the invasion of Iraq possible and successful against such staggering odds. He was the first of the illustrious Muslim commanders who set out to conquer foreign lands and redraw the political and religious map of the world. He imposed no hardship upon his men which he did not bear himself. It was the limitless faith which his warriors had in the Sword of Allah that made it possible for them to brave such dangers.

Khalid swept across Iraq like a violent storm. Like a violent storm he would now dash to Syria and strike the armies of another proud empire—Eastern Rome.

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Monday, June 3, 2013

THE SWORD OF ALLAH (PART3)

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THE SWORD OF ALLAH (PART3)

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